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ABSTRACT

TOWARD A NEW READING OF CICERO’S DE FINIBUS

By
Kelsey Ward
May 2018

Dissertation supervised by Professor Ronald Polansky
In this dissertation, I argue that Cicero has two primary, interdependent aims in De
finibus: the critical assessment of the dominant ethical positions, and the education of his readers.
These aims are accomplished through four key devices. First, Cicero develops flat, useful
readings of the dominant ethical positions without rejecting eudaimonism itself. This allows
Cicero to demonstrate Academic practices while also insisting upon the importance of virtue,
which suggests the best ethical view for Cicero is a skeptically grounded eudaimonism. Second,
the arrangement of the text in reverse chronological order dramatically enacts Cicero’s own
alternative to the cradle argument on which the dominant positions rely. Third, he uses truthdisclosive terminology to suggest the relative strength of different positions. Fourth, he obscures
his own position, if he has one, in several ways over the course of the text. Cicero uses each of
these devices to direct De finibus at the interlocutors and at the readers. The relative successes
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and failures of philosophical positions in the dialogue instruct the readers about the general
terrain of ethical discourse. In learning about ethics, the readers are ideally thinking more
critically about the principles on which they guide their lives and become better people. As better
people, they might also become the virtuous citizens who could steady Roman politics again.
Cicero is in some sense concerned with the impact of De finibus on the political future of Rome
even when he deals with the minutiae, down to the knuckle bone, of Hellenistic ethics.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of Cicero and his works has a long and varied history. Cicero’s influence is
significant through the Renaissance, but the re-discovery and distribution of ancient Greek texts
precipitated the swift decline of his philosophical reputation. His decline is marked by rebellion
against scholasticism and Ciceronianism as a confining style and practice by Erasmus and others
(Wilamowitz 1982, 28, 44). In addition, the rise of Hellenism in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries had a significant deleterious effect on the study of Latin texts (Davies 1971,
105; Douglas 1968, 27). Perhaps the final straw is Drumann’s influential treatment of Cicero and
its distillation by Mommsen, now understood to be striking misrepresentations of Cicero and his
abilities (Douglas 1968, 5). In the aftermath, Cicero has been read for the sake of some other
end, from learning Latin to reconstructing the views of the Hellenistic schools represented in his
philosophical works.
In recent years, Cicero’s philosophical reputation has undergone a rapid recovery. It is no
longer controversial to say that Cicero fell out of favor as the result of historical accident and the
incorrect assessment of his work as unoriginal and derivative by modern scholars. Especially
telling is the shift that has occurred in the last few years from defending Cicero’s philosophical
abilities to assuming them. Cicero’s competence is now generally accepted, but it is interpreted
differently by different scholars. As a result, there are two main interpretive camps concerning
his philosophical works.
The first camp isolates arguments in the text, extracts them from their context, and
evaluates them for strength, detail, and accuracy.1 This camp, which I call ‘excavationist’,
1

Irwin 1986 is the quintessence of this tendency when he describes the Stoic position concerning
care for and about the body and cites De finibus iii 41; iv 36, 72; v 74, 89 as his sources (205).
Others in the excavationist camp include Reydams-Schils 2005, Schofield and Striker 1986, and
Long 2006 on questions of ethics. On questions concerning knowledge, see Striker 1996, Bett
1

produces valuable work, but it is necessarily limited by the assumption that Cicero is an eclectic
commentator whose works can generally be used as sourcebooks for the contents of Stoic,
Epicurean, and Academic arguments. Reading his work in this way makes it possible to overlook
Cicero’s craftsmanship in engineering the texts as he does. This may be especially true in the
case of the philosophical works. Cicero is far better known as an orator than as a philosopher.
Cicero defended the idea of the Roman republic, was a sought-after litigator in the courts, and
was an influential writer and orator in his public life. The historical circumstances of his life
make his political involvement a seeming preoccupation that he and his commentators cannot
avoid. Unfortunately, such a focus usually overshadows for interpreters his training and
philosophical background. In several dialogues Cicero recounts his acquaintance with
philosophers throughout his youth, including the Epicureans Phaedrus and Zeno of Sidon, the
Academic Philo of Larissa and his student Antiochus of Ascalon. Several of his friends and
colleagues were patrons of philosophers. Some of these also serve as characters in Cicero’s
dialogues, including Piso and Lucullus, who hosted Staseas of Naples and Antiochus,
respectively. Cicero even sends his son to be educated by Cratippus, the most prominent
Peripatetic philosopher at the time.
The second camp would accept Cicero’s interest in philosophy is genuine and that his
philosophical training arguably has as much influence on his writing as his political inclinations
and background in rhetoric. I call this camp ‘contextualist’ because it incorporates the structural
and dramatic components of Cicero’s work into its analyses. In several works ‘he remains
consistent about his interest as a writer in integrating philosophy with politics and rhetoric’
(Long 1995, 39). Cicero himself insists philosophy and rhetoric are finest when they are together
2010, Inwood and Mansfield ed. 1997, Burnyeat and Frede ed. 1997, and Allen 1994, among
others.
2

(Ac. i 8-10, De fin. iv 6, iv 24, v 1). Contextualist interpretations use Cicero’s unique strengths in
rhetoric to complement his philosophical argumentation.2 Whereas excavationists might assume
that Cicero’s position is directly reported by the character bearing his name, for example,
contextualists take seriously the possibility that Cicero’s own view may differ from the claims of
the character named Cicero.3 Yet much of the literature in this camp looks across several
dialogues, or even across several genres of Cicero’s writings, which generally limits
understanding of the subtle themes Cicero can develop over the course of a single text.
This means that both camps, for one reason or another, continue to undervalue Cicero’s
philosophical work. There is a need to direct these efforts to one dialogue as a concentrated case
study to discover the themes and ideas that emerge over the text as a whole.4 This dissertation
uses the strengths of each camp to demonstrate the consistency and nuance of Cicero’s position
in De finibus, his text on ethics. I argue that Cicero has two equally important aims. First, Cicero
assesses Hellenistic ethics to criticize the problematic components of the Epicurean, Stoic, and
Antiochian positions in order to suggest the more plausible alternative of a skeptical
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As we have learned to take seriously the dramatic features of Plato’s dialogues as having an
impact on their philosophical content, we should become increasingly cognizant that Cicero as a
gifted philosophical author and rhetorician is similarly situated as Plato to write works that
require careful consideration of their form along with their content.
3
Görler 1997 exposes the elements of the Lucullus that indicate Cicero’s personal views where
they differ from the Cicero character. Another fruitful application of the contextualist approach is
in facilitating the discovery that Cicero develops passages of his own dialogues parallel to
passages of Plato’s. For one strong example, Barnes 1997 observes that Academica ii 91 parallels
Plato’s Gorgias 453-454.
4
Some recent interpreters in the second camp have focused on De finibus, but the resulting
analysis focuses on the structural anomaly of De finibus v. The structure and dramatic
construction of De finibus are examined in Stokes 1995, Wright 1995, Schofield 2012, and Long
2015.
3

eudaimonism.5 Second, Cicero is using De finibus to aid in the philosophical training of his
Roman readers.
As an Academic, Cicero adopts three features of skepticism in De finibus associated with
Socrates and Carneades: ‘(i) relieving others of falsely believing they know what they don’t, and
(ii) revealing the most probable solutions to the problems discussed while (iii) concealing his
own opinion so as not to interfere with the rational autonomy of the participants’ (Thorsrud
2018, 51).6 The first three chapters deal with features (i) and (ii), in effect establishing Cicero’s
inclinations toward Carneadean probabilism.7 In brief, Carneadean probabilism is one product of
the Academic-Stoic exchange that begins with the criterion of knowledge. Stoics maintain that
knowledge is possible on account of kataleptic impressions, or impressions that are marked just
so that they could not possibly be false. When someone assents to those impressions, they have
knowledge. The Academics challenge the possibility of kataleptic impressions, and suggest that
it is irresponsible to assent entirely to impressions that are not indubitably true. The Stoics reply
with the apraxia argument, which claims that without assent, action is impossible. In response to
the apraxia argument, Carneades provides a practical criterion: the plausible or probable (to
pithanon). Under the guidance of the probable, an Academic may act according to the best
option. Some interpretations of Carneades maintain that the Academic can act on the probable
without assenting to the probable and holding a corresponding opinion. Others maintain that the
5

In so doing, Cicero is in the Socratic tradition.
There is a substantive body of literature dedicated to the specific determination Cicero’s
allegiance to the Old Academy, the New Academy, or radical or mitigated skepticism. Most of
these distinctions rely on distinctions in the critique, acceptance, or rejection of the
epistemological tenets of the Stoics in particular. A clear determination of Cicero’s position can
be made from De finibus outside of his general methodology and general inclination toward
Carneadean probabilism. As a result, I focus on the skeptical features of Cicero’s method, which
can fall under Frede’s description of ‘classical’ as opposed to ‘dogmatic’ skepticism (Burnyeat
and Frede 1997).
7
In chapter 1, I offer my own interpretation of Thorsrud’s three features.
6
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Academic may hold opinions, assenting to the probable as true, under the proviso that they may
be mistaken.8
Eudaimonism is a promising ethical position because it requires that people take virtue
seriously as an important contributor to personal happiness. Since virtue is central to attaining
eudaimonia, citizens engaged in eudaimonistic pursuits will likely benefit their community. For
Cicero, then, eudaimonism is the only, or at least the best, ethical position because it confers
well-being at the level of the individual and the state. Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians are all
eudaimonists insofar as they all strive for happiness or well-being as the best end. Though
concepts of happiness proper to each school differ, they all make an attempt to include virtue in a
serious way. For the Stoics, virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness. The Antiochians
maintain that virtue is sufficient for the happy life, but not the happiest life. The Epicureans have
the most strained relationship with virtue since they use it instrumentally as something useful in
producing the best pleasure and minimizing pain.
Incorporating virtue in different ways makes the schools differ in degree of political
viability and responsibility. The Antiochians and Stoics promote virtue for its own sake, which
should guide their practitioners to become better people and, as a result, better citizens. Cicero
finds the role of virtue in Epicureanism problematic. He portrays Epicurean virtue as the
instrumental good that helps promote the highest good, which is pleasure and freedom from pain.
Instrumental virtue seems to teach the Epicureans that they should only be good people so that
they experience more pleasure. Compared to the others, Epicurean happiness is self-serving and
often results in a withdrawal from politics. It refuses to confront Roman realities and cannot
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For a thorough treatment of the meaning and application of to pithanon, see Thorsrud 2018;
Allen 1994; Striker 1996 and 1997.
5

encourage flourishing in a truly Roman context. The Epicurean offers an unacceptable and
irresponsible response to philosophy and must therefore be rejected.
Though Cicero values eudaimonism, he cannot accept it without scrutiny. His critiques of
the positions provided by the different schools are designed to scrutinize the extent to which they
distort the original positions. There is a precedent for this practice in Plato and Aristotle.9 This
strategy of providing flat readings is not taken up with the purpose of being unfair. Instead, it
serves to help educate the readers. Flat readings provide readers with the distinctions and
awareness of the general problems they need in order to think more effectively about the topic in
question. In the Meno, for example, Plato aims to develop a distinction between what is truly
good and apparent goods. In order to draw this distinction, Socrates provides Meno with options
that he cannot easily refuse. Consider the question Socrates asks: ‘does anyone wish to be
miserable and unhappy?’ (78a3) The answer is obviously ‘no’. Thus when people choose objects
that make them miserable and unhappy, they do so while thinking that the object they choose is
good. This means there must be a difference between what is actually good and what merely
seems to be good. Having been led through this process, readers possess a new distinction that
they can use for further philosophical inquiry and for practical application in their own lives.
Cicero in De finibus gives all obvious options, even if they do not accurately reflect the nuance
of their original forms. He then eliminates some or, arguably, all options with criticism of varied
intensity and subtlety. In the end, the reader is left somewhat uncertain about the correct answer,
but for good reason. If there is a correct ethical position, and all of the obvious answers fail, then

9

Even the classification of the three ethical systems concerning their use of virtue may be
distorting. Virtue can be (1) instrumental in attaining happiness, (2) solely constitutive of
happiness, or (3) partly constitutive of happiness. Cicero might borrow this threefold division
concerning the role of virtue from Plato. See Vlastos 1991, 203-209 for an assessment of this
threefold division and its origin in Plato’s dialogues.
6

a more difficult answer must be sought by further inquiry and reflection. The best Cicero can do
for his readers is provide them with the tools they need to think about the problem.
De finibus is equally concerned with the critical assessment of ethical systems as it is
about teaching Roman readers the best philosophical practices and methods. In this dissertation, I
argue that Cicero aims to train his readers in Academic philosophy so that they can make their
own judgment about the ethical systems on display in De finibus. The result of this training
should bring the readers to appreciate that there are no easy answers in selecting the best ethical
system. Instead, readers proficient in Academic methods will recognize that the best option is to
adopt that skeptically grounded eudaimonism.
Instruction that relies on flat readings assumes that the readership is sophisticated.
Cicero’s writing assumes that his audience will include well-educated Romans who might
possess or lack the ability to discern his more subtle points. In other words, Cicero presents some
material that could be understood without much effort, and some ideas that require a sharp eye
and careful analysis to be understood. The expectation that his readership engagement will vary
in perspicacity was accepted by many ancient philosophers. Piso attributes apparent conflicts
between texts within the Old Academy, for example, to this difference between esoteric and
exoteric works (v 12). The case of De finibus is further complicated by the structure of the text,
and amplified by Cicero’s many roles in the text. Cicero includes himself in De finibus as a
character in all three dialogues, each occurring at different times in Cicero’s life and possibly
offering very different perspectives on what positions he may or may not take up. In addition to
using himself as a named character, Cicero also takes care to call attention to his work as author
and translator in the text. As author, Cicero constructs the text and conducts the narration that
frames all three dialogues for Brutus, who is not used as an interlocutor.

7

Plato writes a number of narrated dialogues, including Republic, Protagoras, Charmides,
Lysis, and Euthydemus. In such narrated dialogues, Plato has Socrates narrate an account of a
dialogue he supposedly had with his interlocutors. The narration is conducted for those reading
the dialogue, but it occurs with or among interlocutors. The aim of narration demonstrates
authorial care for the education both of the interlocutors with whom Socrates is directly engaged
and of the readers who are approaching the text separately. Cicero does something quite similar
in De finibus. He narrates the three dialogues of De finibus and arranges them in such a way that
the careful, talented readers can discern insights that are unavailable to the interlocutors.
Consider, for example, Cicero’s approach to the Hellenistic appeal to nature that we call the
‘cradle argument’. The interlocutors engage with the Cicero character to present their respective
schools’ understanding of this appeal to nature. Yet each of the three dialogues occurs at
different times, and they are arranged in reverse chronological order. This means that Cicero’s
character in book 1 is supposed to have already participated in the discussion that takes place in
book 5, but the other characters of book 1 were not present for book 5’s debate. Meanwhile, the
reader gains philosophical experience by reading the books in order, so that when she arrives at
book 5, she has the benefit of having read the basic positions and basic refutations of the
Epicureans and Stoics. This is a kind of privileged access that Cicero allows for his readership
but denies for his interlocutors. In effect, only the reader can draw conclusions about the text that
concern Cicero the author. The interlocutors are unable to see the progress of the text Cicero
devises as author and therefore have very limited access to Cicero’s position.
Only the reader has access to the fact that De finibus is arranged in reverse chronological
order, for example. This arrangement allows Cicero to dramatically enact his own, highly
modified, appeal to nature in which he indicates our ethical origins should be located during a
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time of rational maturity and philosophical engagement rather than in pre-rational infancy. It is
not possible to consider Cicero’s own position as an interlocutor because interlocutors in each
dialogue cannot see the ongoing critique of the various cradle arguments or the increasingly
impressive philosophy that occurs over the course of the text. To the extent that it is possible to
consider Cicero’s position, it must be from the perspective of a reader. The most perceptive
readers will notice in addition that the reverse chronological order is Cicero’s dramatic reply to
the content of the cradle arguments of the various schools.
Though the reader is in a superior position to understand what Cicero’s aims might be in
De finibus, the philosophical work being done by the interlocutors is still meaningful. Most of
the text’s important philosophical work is completed at the interlocutor level. The work of the
interlocutors may not be as sophisticated as the training that the readers can receive from the
text, but the direct participants in the dialogue are nonetheless benefitted by the discussion. De
finibus, like Plato’s dialogues, is concerned with readers and interlocutors alike, the education of
the former being in part conducted by means of the education of the latter. Recall that one of
Cicero’s main Academic aims is to prepare others to practice philosophy to the extent that they
are able. Part of this aim is served by withholding his own view so that the interlocutor or reader
is not tempted to accept such a view on the basis of authority instead of critical evaluation. Even
though Cicero is a participant in De finibus, in the tradition of Plato’s dialogues he Socratically
avoids giving his own position. Though the immediate recipients of the cradle argument are the
interlocutors, overall the content of the cradle argument and Cicero’s subtle interpretation of the
cradle argument are directed at the readers. Both the discovery of Cicero’s alternative and one’s
assessment of that alternative rest on the training and the judgment of the readers.

9

It is difficult, therefore, to overestimate the importance of education as a theme in
Cicero’s De finibus. He develops philosophical education as a central theme in De finibus
through three well-placed devices: (1) the opening passages are focused entirely on the
introduction of philosophy to Roman culture, (2) Cicero’s stated preference for art over natural
talent, and (3) the progression of the text reflects steady progress in philosophical learning, and
the dramatic setting of books 3-5 are centered around education. The opening passages of the
text anticipate disapproval of philosophy in general, disapproval of practicing or writing
philosophy in Latin instead of Greek, and disapproval for Cicero’s personal involvement in both.
Cicero uses these objections to create a space for philosophy in his Roman context. He insists
wisdom is a commendable object of attention and that the discipline is best suited for the hardworking and mature person, particularly someone whose character (persona) and position
(dignitas) are respected by Roman standards (i 2-3). He makes it so that those who resist his
project because they prefer to read philosophy in Greek are shamefully choosing Greece over
Rome. In addition to this political insinuation, refusing to engage philosophy in Latin also
implies a philosophical problem, for if philosophy has but a single language and setting, then it is
unlikely to be the pursuit of wisdom it aspires and claims to be.
Creating cultural space for philosophy in the Roman context makes philosophy a more
appealing discipline for Romans to study, while justifying philosophy as in fact philosophy, and
in effect preparing his readers to appreciate and engage in it. In addition to preparing his readers
for philosophical education, Cicero also suggests that art, which is learned, is superior to innate
natural talent. This is most clear when Cicero critiques the Epicurean and Stoic cradle arguments.
Nature, in the pre-rational, biological sense that the cradle arguments appeal to, is an unreliable
and potentially misleading origin for determining our nature, in the sense of essence or end (or
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summum bonum). Proper training in an art produces better results more consistently than natural,
untrained talent. Regular, non-accidental, and repeatable success is more likely to follow from
the former than the latter. It also makes progress possible, both with respect to individual
mastery over time and to progress of the discipline overall. In the case of ethics, Cicero suggests,
education seems necessary to propel human beings from the biological origin to the summum
bonum in a way that the cradle argument is unable to do.
The final device is Cicero’s increasing emphasis on education through dramatic setting
and the philosophical proficiency of the interlocutors. After Cicero makes space for Roman
philosophical practice, he presents the readers with two characters who, despite their literary
interests, are philosophically inexpert and Torquatus is unable to defend his position against
Cicero’s criticisms. In the second dialogue, Cicero’s interlocutor is Cato, who has a strong
reputation as a Stoic and he proves to be a technically adept philosopher. Cicero opens the
dialogue by having the two characters bump into each other at teenage Lucullus’ personal
library. They agree that they will share responsibility for Lucullus’ education. In effect they are
two characters of strong intellectual reputation discussing education in a scholarly setting. Recall
that the third dialogue takes place during Cicero’s youthful philosophical studies in Athens.
Cicero and his companions are in Athens with the sole purpose of gaining an education. They
wander around the ruins of the Academy, marveling at the philosophical history of the place,
when they begin their discussion. The emphasis on philosophical education is anything but
subtle—and it is underscored by the fact that Cicero and Piso are vying for the educational
commitment of Lucius, Cicero’s cousin. As Cicero increasingly emphasizes philosophical
education over the course of De finibus, and the quality of discussion also increases.

11

Cicero refrains from giving his own position or from telling his interlocutors what they
should believe. He rigorously critiques the positions of the Hellenistic schools so that the
characters of the dialogues—especially those who are beginning their education—might be
guided to make better choices for themselves. Both the interlocutors and the readers are guided
to interrogate the existing ethical systems, and both can make progress over the course of the
discussion. Yet Cicero’s emphasis on education is best understood, as previously indicated, as
pertaining most crucially to the readers of the text, rather than merely the interlocutors. The
readers of De finibus are in the best position to see the full trajectory of Cicero’s critical project,
and to begin to see suggestions that there are alternatives to the doctrinal positions of the
Hellenistic schools.
The chapters of this dissertation support this complexity of De finibus in four distinct
areas. In chapter one, I show that Cicero gives flat, useful readings to the Hellenistic ethical
positions to allow for eudaimonism to be promising while also rejecting its currently existing
forms. The misrepresentations he devises share in the purpose of highlighting some common
problems in philosophical process, namely, that most philosophers either fail to provide a
politically viable ethics or fail to develop their ethics with sufficient philosophical rigor. Cicero’s
own methods contrast with the other schools, suggesting they may avoid those same mistakes.
Having shown that Cicero likely allows eudaimonism but denies its current forms, I turn
to the Hellenistic schools’ appeal to nature in the second chapter. The appeal to nature takes the
form of the ‘cradle argument’ in De finibus, where the Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians each
have their own version. I point out that Cicero’s rejection of the various forms never challenges
the underlying desire to find an origin for ethics that is ‘natural’ for human beings. I argue that
Cicero arranges the text to dramatically enact his own appeal to nature. Rather than appeal to the
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non-rational infant, Cicero appeals to his rational educational prime, an age at which he was
ready to make critical judgments, when the text concludes with a debate concerning the strongest
philosophical position, set during Cicero’s philosophical education in Athens.
In the third chapter, I analyze Cicero’s usage of key terms that indicate some clear
evidence for the line of interpretation I have been pursuing. He uses plane, for example, to
indicate a position worth consideration. Apertus and perspicuus indicate value based on their
context. Perspicuus is used in books 3 and 4 because perspicua are the starting point for Stoic
ethics, but its ongoing importance in book 5 suggests Cicero uses perspicuus to represent
legitimate references to compelling ideas. Apertus is context-sensitive so that it is used ironically
by some interlocutors and not by others. Finally, clarus and illustris are generally reserved for
examples of virtuous or otherwise admirable behavior. I argue that Cicero uses these five key
truth-disclosive terms to accomplish two tasks. First, he uses them to challenge the
presuppositions that his readers might have about Cicero’s own position and the possibility of
being transparent in philosophy. Second, he arranges the usage of these terms in a way that leads
the most astute readers to consider the relative strength of some positions against others in De
finibus. In particular, he both suggests that the Antiochian position is strongest, and that the Stoic
position remains influential for him.
In chapter four I argue that Cicero gives himself several roles in De finibus to obscure his
own position, if he has one, in order to guide his readers into making their own philosophical
judgments. When Cicero introduces the aims of the text and narrates each dialogue for Brutus,
Cicero expresses the persona of author. This draws the attention of Cicero’s Roman readers to
his authorial concerns as distinct from the concerns of the ‘Cicero’ character. Cicero adds to this
effect when he emphasizes his work as a translator throughout De finibus, both through his own
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narration and through the interactions of the ‘Cicero’ character. Finally, in his role as the
character ‘Cicero’, he visibly adds to the complexity of his own position in two ways. First,
‘Cicero’ may agree or disagree with Cicero’s own position on each major point of argument.
Second, ‘Cicero’ engages in imaginary conversations within the dialogues, further distancing
Cicero from the text. Cicero’s use of personae provides him with several dimensions of
obfuscation. As the translator, author, and character—particularly a character who appears at
three separate times in his life, and who invents a new character ‘Cicero’ to engage in pretend
conversations within the imaginary dialogue—Cicero has several avenues to disclose or withhold
his own opinion. This is a useful strategy to prevent readers from attributing any position to
Cicero himself.
The results of each chapter contribute some bit of insight toward Cicero’s own position
and his overall aims for the text. When Cicero begins De finibus, he tells us: ‘nothing in life is
more worth investigating than philosophy in general, and the question raised in this work in
particular: what is the end, what is the ultimate and final goal, to which all our deliberations on
living well and acting rightly should be directed?’ (i 11) In this dissertation, I examine four
different aspects of De finibus that address the dialogue that occurs at the level of the
interlocutors, the possible intended effects of that dialogue on the readers, and Cicero’s aims for
the text to have an impact on the political future of Rome. His assessment of the other schools
suggests that even the best available answer is unsatisfactory. It is therefore likely that the best
practice in philosophy is to engage in classical skepticism.10 In effect, the participants in the

10

Though the distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘dogmatic’ skepticism collapses some
important distinguishing features between different philosophers and different movements in the
Academy, it is a reasonable way to divide skepticism in this case because the two will share
some methodological features and differ concerning the possibility of knowledge.
14

dialogues are the readers, and Cicero’s way of doing philosophy is the lesson readers should take
away from De finibus.

15

CHAPTER 1
THE AIMS OF DE FINIBUS

Many interpretations of Cicero have found him ‘unoriginal’. It has been suggested that
such interpretations come from Cicero himself, since he ‘would never have dreamed of claiming
originality in philosophical research’ (DeGraff 1940, 143). Interpretations of this sort are
founded primarily on the content of the arguments Cicero presents, and the evidence seems
compelling. De finibus appears to confirm a lack of originality insofar as the arguments Cicero
presents in the text are not novel. They are stock arguments for and against the positions held by
the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Antiochians, or the Old Academy. There are no apparent
surprises and, for many readers, no real excitement. Yet when Cicero addresses the ethical
systems of the Hellenistic schools in De finibus, he critiques their arguments and often distorts
their initial form in the process. He turns each idea over so it is exposed in a way that it was not
intended to be. Each turning indicates both rejection and his own offering, sometimes negative,
indicating that the reader should not adopt that idea unthinkingly, and sometimes positive,
indicating a superior alternative. Cicero presents his work as an elegantly strewn set of dialogues
through which the reader must navigate, but the path has already been determined by the choices
he made in creating that aggregation. The product is a thoughtful philosophical engagement that
is Cicero’s own, comprised of parts that are like the ideas of the other Hellenistic schools, yet
distinct in their distortion and assembled with insight. Cicero’s ‘original’ contribution, if we can
call it that, is located in this ability to alter the philosophical landscape and craft a response with
rhetorical aplomb.11 De finibus is, as a result, a highly contrived philosophical work that aims to
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I include under ‘originality’ all indications of innovation and novelty.
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train its Roman audience to improve in reading and practicing philosophy, where this practice is
both philosophizing itself and leading a philosophically guided life.
In this chapter, I argue that Cicero uses the De finibus to instruct his Roman readers how
to distinguish good philosophy from its imitations. The Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians are
made into examples of how not to do philosophy. Together they suggest a few key qualities that
philosophers should express. Philosophy should be support responsible politics. Philosophers
should be competent. They should avoid unnecessary jargon. They should honor their
predecessors, particularly when their predecessors have done good work. Finally, they should
develop strong philosophical arguments that complement political engagement. Cicero rejects
each of the schools for their failure to express one or more of these qualities. The Epicureans,
Cicero argues, are incompetent and politically dangerous. The Stoics invent unnecessary jargon
and fail to honor their predecessors, resulting in political difficulties. The Antiochians succeed in
almost every aspect, and are the most viable politically, but Piso’s argument for the summum
bonum is flawed. The other philosophical schools become silly, irresponsible foils to Cicero’s
own project, which demonstrates a good way to do philosophy through Academic skepticism.
The result of Cicero’s process is a sophisticated philosophical position that promotes
eudaimonism, because it takes virtue seriously in a way that can support political activity, yet
rejects the current eudaimonistic theories because they fail to meet Cicero’s philosophical or
political requirements for Roman philosophy.

Cicero defends his own contribution
Cicero’s use of the concept of originality to critique the Stoics and Epicureans is
interesting, and I should note that Cicero makes innovation a discussion point well before he
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refutes the ethical theories of the schools. Despite never explicitly claiming originality in
research, Cicero implicitly suggests that he is doing something new in the history of philosophy
when he writes philosophy in Latin, at least insofar as he brings a new discipline into Roman
culture. Before he begins any philosophical exposition, Cicero explains to Brutus, the audience
of the text’s narration, that he expects to ‘incur criticism of various kinds’ (De fin. i 1). He
anticipates three general categories of criticism: (1) disapproval of philosophy in itself, (2)
disapproval of practicing and writing philosophy in Latin rather than Greek, and (3) disapproval
that Cicero in particular should waste his time writing philosophy in Latin. Cicero aims to avert
these criticisms with a defense of philosophy itself, of the translation of philosophy into Latin,
and of his own participation in philosophy and its Latinization. The defense suggests either there
is some resistance to his endeavor or Cicero wants us to think that there could be such resistance.
Whether the criticisms are real or imagined, their inclusion bears a similar effect insofar as the
reader is brought to consider Cicero’s actions as new and controversial.
Of course, this is not entirely true. Cicero may be innovative in applying his particular
mode of evaluation to the Hellenistic schools, in Latin, for a Roman audience. Yet there are
others writing philosophy in Latin. Cicero explicitly refers to Gaius Amafinius, who was
publishing books about Epicureanism in Latin, in Tusculan Disputations iv 5-7. Schofield 2008
explains that Amafinius and his imitators are the likely targets of Cicero’s criticisms that
Epicureans ‘cannot make the right distinctions nor organise their arguments, and they cannot
write elegantly’ (68n14). With an even greater intellectual reputation, Varro was Cicero’s
contemporary who wrote many treatises in Latin now lost to us, ranging from philosophy and the
Latin language to agriculture.12 He is also represented as a character in Cicero’s Academica. It is
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In the parts of Varro’s Rerum rusticarum that remain, Varro discusses agriculture and refers
directly to his predecessor Cato. Cicero’s style of giving useful, flat readings to the other schools
18

therefore quite clear that there are other Romans writing philosophy in Latin, and Cicero knows
about them. When he discusses his own project in the opening pages of De finibus as novel, he
cannot be making a mistake from ignorance.
There are surely some who will maintain that Cicero’s claim of novelty here is the
unsubstantiated boasting of an arrogant man. If Cicero is not making a sloppy error or indulging
his own vanity, he may still ignore those other writers for other reasons. The most likely role of
the opening criticisms is to allow Cicero to give philosophy a context in Roman culture. To
criticism (1) and (3), for example, Cicero insists wisdom is a commendable object of attention
and that the discipline is best suited for the hard-working and mature person (i 2-3). If wisdom is
a commendable object, then it should be pursued by those who are well-suited by Roman
standards to pursue such commendable objects. Cicero presents philosophy as a discipline that
would suit someone of Cicero’s character (personae) and position (dignitatis) well. In addition,
Cicero develops an identity for philosophy that is distinctly Roman. He expects criticism (2) to
be held by Hellenophiles ‘learned in Greek and contemptuous of Latin…[who] say that they
would rather spend their time reading Greek’ (i 1). Given that philosophy had been either a
strictly Greek endeavor, or one undertaken in the Greek language, Cicero is cautious to avoid the
accusation that he loves Greek culture too much. He claims that an excessive distaste for Roman
culture and language is not comprehensible, particularly since, in his view, Latin is even richer
than Greek (i 10). Furthermore, Cicero continues, since many already read Latin plays that are
direct translations from Greek plays, they should be receptive to reading philosophy, a more
worthy discipline, in Latin (i 4). More importantly, he includes that Hellenophiles complain that

to further his own pedagogical aims may not be so novel if Varro is doing something similar. Yet
the extent to which Varro is building from Cato, or misrepresenting Cato to provide himself an
interesting position with which to engage, cannot be assessed here.
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Latin translations are less refined than the Greek originals, and they lack readability. Cicero
actually agrees that this is the case. Yet he attributes the problem to a translation from ‘bad
Greek into worse Latin’, and his solution is complex (i 8). First, it is possible that the Greek
originals are not worth reading in these cases, and they should be re-evaluated to determine their
quality (i 8). Second, even bad Latin translations of worthy Greek originals are valuable (i 5, i 8).
Cicero’s reasoning is as follows: if the bad translations of plays, literature, and other entertaining
material constitute an essential part of a good Roman education, then philosophy, whose ends are
admirable, translated from the greatest Greeks and Romanized, must be invaluable. Cicero
makes it so that the only person who wouldn’t want to read a Latin work of worthy content and
style is someone who obstinately chooses the Greeks over the Romans.13 No longer does
philosophy belong exclusively to the aloof curiosities of the well-educated, Greek-reading elite.
It now belongs to the best Romans. This is not to say that Cicero is motivated by strong
democratic concerns, but rather that he wishes to add philosophy to the cultural repertoire of
Rome as a labor of love and service to the state.14
The discussion carries a distinct patriotic tone that echoes Cicero’s public career and the
duty he feels toward Rome as self-identified savior of the republic.15 Cicero’s perceived
commitment to Rome is evident in his concern for Roman education, his praise of Latin over
Greek, and his clear emphasis that philosophy does not interfere with his civic duties. He is
walking a fine line on which he must present philosophy, the pinnacle of Greek culture and
13

Such a person is represented in the example of Albucius at De finibus i 9.
It does, however, call into question excessive snobbishness of Cicero, inasmuch as he can
work well in Greek, but he resists the exclusivity of the Greek-reading elite.
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As consul, Cicero prosecuted Cataline and his alleged conspirators. Cicero considered this a
high point of his career and in the extant letters and speeches he often models himself as the
savior of the Republic. It is an ethos that Cicero appears to enjoy, as May 1989, 143-155 explains
the return of this ethos in the Philippics. My reading thus allows Cicero to be both rather
egocentric and a fair-minded sophisticated writer.
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civilization in Cicero’s eyes, without betraying his Roman sensibilities. He must transform the
discipline formerly reserved for the disconnected Hellenophiles into something that all good
Romans might benefit from on their own terms. He must show that the Greek and Roman culture
can complement one another. This is why Cicero notes that his interest in philosophy, a
traditionally Greek endeavor, does not interfere with his duties to Rome (i 10). He even identifies
this project as an opportunity to take on a new duty, namely, to ‘improve the learning of [his]
fellow-citizens’ (i 10).
His aim is not simply to represent the history of philosophy for his audience. Many
commentators are most concerned with critically assessing the quality of Cicero’s work as a
historian of philosophy. They examine the positions of the philosophers Cicero discusses to
determine the accuracy of his reports. They are right to point out the many instances of Cicero’s
inaccuracy, yet their focus on accuracy as such may make it impossible to see what else Cicero
might be doing. In particular, such work tends to overlook that De finibus is consistently used to
show what philosophy should look like and do in the Roman context. Treating his work even as a
sophisticated report on the contemporary themes in philosophy is inadequate because he is
layering Plato and Aristotle with all of their philosophical descendants from the various
Hellenistic schools. Any indication of asymmetry is critiqued in order to discover the most
fundamental, consistent set of ideas in philosophy and make them applicable in the final days of
the Roman republic. I therefore assume that De finibus is a highly contrived, carefully
constructed work produced by an exceptional writer. Cicero may very well be arrogant, but this
is not likely to be the only reason Cicero has for opening the text as he does.
The aim of educating Romans reflects Cicero’s commitment to the Roman republic.
Powell 2012, 40 notes that Cicero attributes the many problems of the republic to the ‘failings of
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individuals’ rather than the constitution. Individual failings are best moderated through external
motivations, including well-designed laws, and through proper education to develop good
character and suitable interests. In some sense Cicero parallels Plato’s own position that
philosophy seems vital for developing virtue in citizens who can, then, save their city or
constitution.16 For Cicero, oratory shapes politics and therefore should be grounded in true
knowledge of its subjects.17 His De oratore even suggests the best orator is a philosopher.18
Cicero writes at the end of the Roman republic and the beginning of rule by dictatorship. The
republican ideals on which Cicero’s Rome was founded were being overpowered by the interests
of ambitious individuals. He may very well have thought philosophy necessary to rebuild
traditional Roman citizens and restore republican values. Not only would this allow Cicero to
consider himself the savior of the republic for the second time in his life, but it would give his
project of translation (and not mere translation) urgency for his audience.
Cicero’s defense shows his Roman readers that philosophy should have a Roman context.
It also in effect argues for the validity of philosophy, translation, and his own personal
engagement with both.19 Cicero does indicate that translation itself is an innovation, but he
clearly thinks his role in De finibus extends beyond that of a translator. At i 6 Cicero writes,
‘What of it, if I do not perform the task of a translator, but preserve the views of those whom I
consider sound while contributing my own judgment and order of composition?’ He is telling his
16

See, for example, Plato’s Seventh Letter, in which the opposite characters of Dion and
Dionysius II embody different kinds of cities. Dionysius is a non-philosophical tyrant, while
Dion shares Plato’s values and strives to liberate cities from tyranny.
17
Crassus holds this position in De oratore i, for example.
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Not unlike Plato’s Phaedrus, where true rhetoric requires that the rhetorician understands the
topic about which he speaks, that he appreciates the sorts of souls of his listeners, and that he
uses his talents for persuasion to bring his readers to the truly good or beneficial (269d-270a).
19
Cicero’s defense appears to argue for the validity of translation. This remains a major issue in
philosophy today both in analytic and continental traditions. It may be that the act of translation
itself represents an innovation, and Cicero considers his work to extend beyond mere translation.
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audience, including Brutus and other readers, that he does not aim to translate Greek into Latin
verbatim. It is with an expert eye that he curates the arguments and their presentation while
‘[teaching] philosophy to speak Latin’ (iii 40). Thus we can expect the De finibus to be replete
with Cicero’s own evaluation, his own judgment, and his own composition regarding the
arguments that were already subject to debate among the schools at the time. In these ways,
Cicero is offering a positive model for what philosophy should do. The positive model is subtle,
especially in contrast with the extended refutations of the other schools. When Cicero challenges
the dogmatic claims to which those schools adhere and discredits their underlying assumptions,
he criticizes their ideas as wrong and as new. On the one hand, he criticizes the other schools’
innovations because they either fail to contribute something useful to philosophy or they actively
detract from the discipline by making confused or false contributions. On the other hand, he
criticizes them for not innovating enough. Together, Cicero implies that philosophers should
critically assess all ideas and make useful contributions to philosophy, as he seems to think of his
own work. They should not weaken philosophy or make it unnecessarily complex as the other
schools do.20

The Epicurean lesson
It is generally understood that Cicero’s treatment of the Epicureans is unfair in De
finibus. He rejects their theory entirely, partially based on his misrepresentation of their key
20

Socrates, of course, warns against innovation in Plato’s Republic. It raises the interesting
question about the relation between innovation and progress in philosophy. With every new
philosophical method there is some novel approach to wisdom. Wisdom, perhaps, can never be
attained, so philosophers must strive to innovate and approach wisdom from new directions. This
seems especially relevant in the context of Cicero’s project of translating and adapting
philosophy for his Roman context. Cicero subtly gestures to innovation as a crucial concept for
his project and invites us to think about the expectations we should have for new contributions to
philosophy, including his own.
23

ideas. In the relevant literature, some find Cicero’s misrepresentation more problematic than
others. I address briefly Cicero’s rejection of the general contents of Epicureanism, and the
misrepresentation of the theory, before I turn to Cicero’s rejection of their allegedly failed
innovations. My brevity does not indicate that the problem is uninteresting or unworthy of
further comment. Rather, I argue that Cicero has a pedagogical motive for giving the other
schools a flat and distorted reading. His presentation of the Epicureans is important insofar as it
serves this broader aim, to teach his Roman audience that they can do better than the Epicureans
by practicing philosophy in the way Cicero himself does. There is also political urgency in
dismissing the Epicureans. Insofar as the Epicureans advocate withdrawal from public life, they
undermine precisely the kind of education that Cicero is trying to provide for his fellow Romans.
On the one hand, Cicero suggests they prioritize a summum bonum that is unworthy of Romans.
Indulgence in personal pleasure, Cicero suggests, is only possible at the expense of the virtue he
wishes to restore. On the other hand, the example set by Epicurus in retreating to his Garden to
live among friends without the burdens of public life would accelerate the republic’s fall.
Interpretations of the Epicureans’ treatment by Cicero in De finibus vary significantly.21
Some commenters find Cicero’s treatment ungenerous but correct in identifying the main
problems of Epicureanism. Others, that he offers an unreliable, irresponsible misinterpretation of
their theory. Some argue that Cicero misunderstands Epicureanism, others that he understands
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Commenters sometimes find Cicero’s understanding, reading, or presentation of the
Epicureans unfair if not unreliable. Stokes 1995, 145-147 offers a nice overview of the debate
concerning the accuracy of Cicero’s interpretation of Epicureanism. He details the position of
Gosling and Taylor 1982 and Rist 1972, which might be roughly reduced to the views that
Cicero is cavalier in his presentation and that he provides an irresponsible misinterpretation,
respectively. His own position builds from Brunschwig 1986 and Mitsis 1988, arguing that
Cicero understands Epicurus well and does not necessarily misrepresent his theory (150-153).
Assessing Cicero’s accuracy as a historian of philosophy is not the point; instead we should
consider why he misrepresents when and how he does.
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Epicureanism exceptionally well and rejects it nonetheless. For my purposes, I maintain at
minimum that Cicero’s presentation is sufficiently uncharitable to misrepresent the distinction
between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, their relation to pleasure and freedom from pain, and
the Epicurean summum bonum itself. The misrepresentation amounts to a useful flat reading.
Cicero is careful and purposive in his treatment, and his aim is to discredit.
By a ‘flat reading’ I mean the sort of summary account of a position such as offered by
Plato and Aristotle. Such summary accounts take away much of the caution of the original
articulation of a position, but they maintain in a more straightforward way some of the apparent
power of the position. Thus a flat reading offers some of the appeal of the original position while
preparing it for close scrutiny and rejection. The background thinking seems to be that
philosophy in its striving for wisdom must aim for comprehensiveness. Such comprehensiveness
can be achieved by taking thought to extremes that will circumscribe all the promising possible
positions. A flat reading generally embraces some such extreme position. For example, Plato
may suggest that Heracliteans have everything in motion in every way, while Parmenides rejects
any change whatsoever (see, e.g., Theaetetus). Such flat readings take thought to an extreme
position, permitting comprehensive reflection and prudent resistance to such simple and
implausible positions.
One of Cicero’s fundamental criticisms of Epicurean ethics is that pleasure is ‘utterly
unworthy of a human being’ (i 24). For Cicero, pleasure is a positive phenomenon best
characterized by intense pleasures of the body. This is not necessarily what Epicurus or even
Torquatus understands by ‘pleasure’. The greatest pleasure of all, for Epicurus, is the complete
absence of pain.22 Epicurus writes, ‘the flesh’s cry is not to be hungry or thirsty or cold. For one
22

Key Doctrines, hereafter KD. See Epicurus’ KD 3: ‘the removal of all pain is the limit of the
magnitude of pleasures’ (Long and Sedley 1987 translation unless otherwise noted).
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who is in these states and expects to remain so could rival even Zeus in happiness’ (Vatican
Sayings 33).23 Torquatus echoes the words of his master when he says ‘we do not simply pursue
the sort of pleasure which stirs our nature with its sweetness and produces agreeable sensations
in us: rather, the pleasure we deem greatest is that which is felt when all pain is removed…every
release from pain is rightly termed a pleasure’ (i 37). Where one ends the other begins, such that
the complete absence of one is the clearest appearance of the other.24 Thus Cicero shows his
awareness that he somewhat abuses the position of the Epicureans.
Yet Cicero does not allow Torquatus to identify the highest pleasure with the absence of
pain as identical. Cicero argues the Epicurean summum bonum is both pleasure and freedom
from pain, but that these two are distinct in sensation and in meaning. The positive phenomenon
of pleasure Cicero identifies with the vivid pleasures of the body, and he calls this kinetic
pleasure; the absence of pain he calls katastematic pleasure. The distinction between kinetic and
katastematic pleasure is Epicurean. It is intended to distinguish the relieving of pain, as eating
when one is hungry, from the absence of pain, as being sated.25 Cicero misuses the distinction to
claim, first, that kinetic and katastematic pleasure represent two completely different kinds of
sensations. This makes the Epicureans look foolish for claiming they are both equally called
‘pleasure’. Second, Cicero’s positioning makes it seem both kinds of pleasure reside in the body.
This undermines fact that for the Epicureans pleasures and pains of the mind are more intense
than those of the body, and that both kinetic and katastematic varieties of pleasure can be as
23

Italics added. Vatican Sayings, hereafter VS. See also KD 18.
Epicurus links this to the distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘empty’ desires—and then the
division of natural desires into the necessary and unnecessary ones. Human happiness is best
attained and preserved by the satisfaction of natural necessary desires. One may also satisfy
natural unnecessary desires so long as they are harmless. See Letter to Menoeceus 127-32; De
finibus i 43-46.
25
Rist 1972, 105-110 provides a helpful summary of the kinetic and katastematic pleasure as
presented by Epicurus and Cicero.
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much mental as physical.
Epicureans insist, according to Cicero, that non-Epicureans misunderstand what pleasure
really is. Cicero thinks this is absurd, in two related ways. First, it wrongly implies ‘people don’t
know what hedone or voluptas mean’ (ii 12). ‘Pleasure’, Cicero explains, ‘every Latin speaker
takes…to consist in the perception by the senses of some delightful stimulation’ (ii 14). The
sources of both nominal and real definition are refused in favor of Epicurus’ ‘worthy but hardly
erudite supporters’ that Cicero mockingly depicts as a mysterious, initiated class (ii 12). Second,
Cicero insists that Epicureans mean the lesser, kinetic pleasure when they use the word
‘pleasure’ even though they praise absence of pain as the summum bonum. Rist 1972 correctly
identifies the ‘absurd form’ Cicero assigns to the Epicurean ethical position: ‘since the natural
impulses of children and animals are directed towards kinetic pleasure, therefore katastematic
pleasure is the summum bonum’ (106).
Cicero’s treatment of pleasure and pain, central tenets of Epicurean ethics, reveals a gross
misrepresentation of their system. The question must turn from the fairness of the presentation to
its purpose. One obvious outcome of Cicero’s treatment—or mistreatment—is that Torquatus
can recite the works of his master but cannot defend his position against Cicero’s skillful attacks.
This suggests that there is a better way of argument and practicing philosophy than the Epicurean
one. The point is underscored by Cicero’s handling of innovation in the hands of the Epicureans,
first when he argues that they do not make improvements when and where they should, and then
when he says that the things they do change undermine their own position. Further, very little of
hedonism, even a sophisticated, moderate, and eudaimonistic hedonism, seems useful for saving
the Roman republic because it seems to result in a life like Epicurus’: egocentric and exclusive of
politics. By means of his flat reading, his refutation of hedonism, even in a supposedly moderate
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form, exposes both Epicurean philosophical and political shortcomings. His rejection shows that
Cicero uses Epicureanism as a negative example for his pupils, Roman readers.
The first criticism concerning Epicurus and innovation occurs when Cicero writes that
Epicurean physics is ‘totally derivative (alienus)’, that is, unoriginal (i 17).26 Alienus suggests the
theory is foreign, in this case Greek, or that it belongs to someone else, namely Democritus.
Epicurus, Cicero explains, does not seem to deviate from any of the major tenets of Democritus’
physics. 27 As a result, Epicurus ends up adopting the same errors Democritus had made. Both
thinkers accept that atoms and void make up the world but, Cicero alleges, neither one provides
any account of an efficient cause, or force that brings a thing into being (i 18).28 When Epicurus
follows Democritus into error, he proves himself to be an insufficiently critical thinker.
The second criticism is that Epicurus’ own contributions, offered when he does not
blindly follow Democritus, weaken the theory on which he depends. Epicurus changes some
aspects of Democritean physics, according to Cicero, but he never improves it. Cicero identifies
a number of errors proper to Epicurus’ contributions, the most egregious ones relating to his
physics. Cicero tells us that Epicurus thought Democritus’ ‘solid and indivisible bodies move
downwards in a straight line under their own weight and this is the natural motion of all bodies’
(i 18). Because of this, all atoms move down in parallel and cannot collide, leaving the world
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Cicero writes, ‘principio…in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus.
Democritea dicit, perpauca mutans, sed ita ut ea quae corrigere vult mihi quidem depravare
videatur.’ I am using Rackham 1914 for the Latin text unless otherwise noted.
27
Epicurus, Cicero explains, does not deviate from Democritus when he believes that atoms are
bodies that are indivisible because of their density, that they move through the directionless void
with eternal motion, that the void is infinite, that they move in such a way as to ‘coalesce’ when
they collide, and that the results of these collisions make up all things.
28
Again, this may not be a fair presentation. The variable size and weight of atoms, and the
swerve, may account for efficient cause.
28

completely determined.29 Having added weight to the qualities of atoms and created this
problem, Epicurus’ solution ‘is a novel (commenticiam) one’: the swerve. The swerve is the
absolutely smallest possible motion that will allow for atoms to collide with one another, thereby
creating the world (i 19).
Cicero rejects Epicurus’ swerve for a few reasons. First, Epicurus invents a new motion
that is itself generated by no clear cause. Cicero insists ‘the most unprincipled move that any
physicist can make is to adduce effects without causes’ (i 19). Thus, when Epicurus makes his
own contributions, he neglects the basic principles of inquiry in natural science and ‘he seems to
me only to distort (depravare)’ the work of Democritus (i 17). According to Cicero, the motion
generated by the swerve ‘groundlessly deprives atoms’ of what Epicurus had called their natural
motion, and he produces new difficulties in its implications for atomic motion (i 19). Cicero
challenges at i 20: either all atoms will be affected in the same way by the swerve, or some will
swerve and others will continue to fall downwards in a straight line.30 If all atoms have the same
nature, then they are likely affected in the same way by the swerve, but then ‘none will ever
come together’. If different atoms are affected differently, then the inclination to swerve and the
inclination to fall downwards represent two different kinds of atoms with two different motions
and possibly two different natures, which is impossible for Epicurus’ and Democritus’ atoms.
Cicero has Epicurus caught in a bind by his own invention. He must admit either that the swerve
means all atoms move in parallel according to the swerve and thus cannot collide, or that there
are different kinds of atoms dictated by different natures, which might eliminate the need for a
swerve in the first place.
29

For Democritus, the void allows atoms to move freely and interact with one another according
to shape (see 68A37, 67A16, 68A58, 67A16, and 68A47).
30
In another uncharitable reading, Cicero overlooks the possibility that swerves may happen
unpredictably, as Lucretius describes them (De rerum natura ii 216).
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Note also that Cicero uses the term ‘commenticiam’ to describe Epicurus’ swerve. The
very word carries with it the sense of fabrication, and indeed Cicero goes on to call it a ‘childish
fiction’ (i 18). He implies that fictions can understandably be devised and employed with
explanatory legitimacy. This happens frequently in Plato’s works when myth is used to illustrate
abstract ideas. Indeed, going outside of science to seek a scientific explanation, as Cicero claims
Epicurus has done, would require both good justification and good results. Unlike Plato’s myths,
Cicero maintains, Epicurus’ fabrication fails to provide his theory the results he needs (i 19).
Rejecting Epicurean physics is at least as important in overturning Epicurean ethics as
rejecting Epicurean ethical doctrines directly, because physics is fundamental to Epicurean
ethics. Indeed, Torquatus makes it clear that Epicurus ‘deemed physics to be of the very highest
importance’ because it has direct bearing on one’s life and thought (i 63). That is, natural
philosophy helps soothe human fears that accompany the ideas, grounded in ignorance of nature,
that ‘celestial phenomena and death might matter to us’ (KD 11). Concerning ethics and securing
happiness for oneself, the study of physics is indispensable. Epicurus writes ‘without natural
philosophy there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures’ and by extension the security
of the summum bonum (KD 12). Physics connects more clearly with our happiness than any other
field of study for the Epicureans. Through the study of nature Epicureans are able to ‘possess
solid scientific knowledge, and hold to that criterion which has as it were been sent from heaven
to enable us to understand all things, and to which we refer all our judgments, then we will never
allow anyone’s rhetoric to sway us from our views’ (i 63). Expertise in physics makes it possible
to have courage in the face of death and the strength to stand up to superstition. It gives peace of
mind and enables self-control through knowledge of nature and its requirements. It even provides
a criterion of knowledge, founding the basis of judgment and granting legitimacy to the force of
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sense perceptions. When Cicero undermines Epicureans physics, he destabilizes the entire
system.
Cicero’s treatment of the Epicureans therefore contains a number of valuable messages
for educating his Roman audience. Concerning physics, Cicero’s criticisms of Epicurus are
twofold: ‘when he changes Democritus he makes things worse; when he follows Democritus
there is nothing original’ (i 21). First, Epicurus innovates in ways that make the philosophy he
inherits from Democritus less plausible.31 Cicero implies that philosophers should make
contributions that improve the discipline. They should make progress toward what is plausible, if
not truth itself. Second, Epicurus’ failure to think critically keeps him from making changes
where he should. Cicero is demanding his Roman readers become keen critical thinkers. He uses
the derisive ‘commenticiam’ to label specifically Epicurus’ unscientific and unjustified
contributions that make his theory worse than Democritus’. This applies as much to evaluation of
existing philosophy as it does to developing new ideas, though it is especially important in the
context of Epicureanism. The Epicurean system is made to be absurd in its physics so that its
ethics has no ground. The ethical ideas prioritize pleasure over virtue, on Cicero’s reading. This
makes it unsurprising that Epicurus uses his private Garden as the site of his community and
place of respite from the challenges of daily and political life. Withdrawal from turmoil is always
tempting, but it cannot save the republic from tyranny.

The Stoic lesson
Cicero uses Epicureanism as an example of how not to do philosophy. He does
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It is not clear from De finibus what Cicero’s view of Democritus is. When he implies that
Epicurus should be improving on Democritean theory, Cicero also implies that Democritean
theory needs improvement.
31

something similar in his treatment of the Stoics. Concerning Stoic contributions to philosophy,
Cicero’s major criticism involves their new vocabulary. In this section I show that Cicero’s
treatment of the Stoics can demonstrate for his readers that the Stoics are mistaken to develop
their vocabulary because the concepts they express are not new, and because the new
terminology makes the existing philosophical terrain unnecessarily complicated. Stoics, like
Cato, depend on virtue for the summum bonum and as such need not elect to leave politics as the
Epicureans do. Emphasizing virtue may even require service to the state. Stoicism is a better
choice than Epicureanism because it is politically more tenable. Nevertheless, there are clear
difficulties with their system. Stoic vocabulary makes philosophy more confusing and less
accessible. This makes it more difficult for all serious Romans to be encouraged to participate in
its practice. The invention of new terms is not in itself problematic, but Cicero implies new
vocabulary should be developed only when expressing new concepts, or translating old ideas into
a new language and context. Additionally, the identification of virtue as the only good makes it
difficult for committed Stoics to hold public office and truthfully state their views. As a result,
the astute reader should imitate Cicero instead of Cato.
Before attending to the precise neologisms and the concepts that underlie them, I wish to
emphasize that the problems Cicero identifies are not in the development of a new vocabulary as
such. Every specialized field requires a dedicated vocabulary to help determine the limits of a
new discipline or, as Cicero explains, ‘designate the subject-matter of the relevant field’ (iii 3).
Advancement of science and knowledge in all fields depends to some degree on the existence of
specialized terms. Cicero explains that the more public and well-known disciplines such as
rhetoric have specialized terms used in teaching, and the comparably unsophisticated crafts of
artisans and farmers also have a special set of terms (iii 4). It is not surprising philosophy
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similarly requires specialized language. New developments in philosophy therefore require new
terms, and this challenge is amplified by Cicero’s project of translation. Cicero has maintained
throughout this text that Latin is superior to Greek in wealth of vocabulary. We can expect that
this will benefit Latin in philosophical vocabulary and discourse. Cicero explains two ways in
which new Latin words are adopted. On the one hand, they are sometimes assimilated from the
Greek arts, as in the case of ‘rhetoric’, ‘philosophy’, and ‘music’. On the other hand, new words
are adopted as a result of innovation. This reflects well on Cicero’s own project. When he
procures a philosophical vocabulary in Latin he does so on the grounds that ‘Romans…have to
find a new vocabulary and invent new terms to match new concepts’ (iii 3). At iii 5 Cicero
explicitly states that using formerly unknown terms is permitted for the learned when working
with profound, demanding material. In dealing with this kind of material for the first time in
Latin, it is all but imperative to draw on new vocabulary.
Cicero and the Stoics are like-minded in this aim. Because the mastery and progression of
all arts and sciences use new terms to meet the needs of new ideas and disciplines, Cicero credits
the Stoics for contributing new vocabulary insofar as it is a necessary and valuable service to
Roman philosophy. Some of their inventions are not so necessary and valuable, however. The
problem is evident in Cicero’s characterization of the Stoic founder Zeno as even more a real
‘inventor of words than new ideas’ (iii 5). Cicero suggests that Zeno and the Stoics have the
process backwards, inventing terms and claiming they belong to new ideas. Their claim to
introduce something new to philosophy with these terms is by Cicero’s measure unsuccessful.
He writes, ‘the Stoics…have a way of arguing which is not so much subtle as obscure, even for
the Greek reader, and thus far more so for us Romans’ (iii 5). Subtlety in writing and vocabulary
are expected when the subject matter is new and complicated, but Cicero suggests the Stoics
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make their philosophy unnecessarily difficult.32 Further, he presses, the Stoics discuss the very
same subjects taken up by many thinkers before them. This means the terms they use cannot
possibly reflect new ideas. There is no need for their presentation to be as obscure (spinosum) as
it they make it. In sum, their new vocabulary makes their philosophy worse.
The alleged shortcomings of the Epicureans resulted in a complete rejection of their
position and their abilities as philosophers. Cicero’s treatment of the Stoics does not bring the
same result, for Cicero allows that the Stoics do make some good contributions to philosophy as
it matures in the Latin language. Cicero praises Cato’s translation of Greek ideas into Latin,
exclaiming ‘how lucidly your language conveys your exact meaning, Cato… You seem to me to
be teaching philosophy Latin and, as it were, granting her Roman citizenship’ (iii 40).33 Given
that this is consistent with Cicero’s own goals for De finibus, we might take this to be a selfcongratulatory remark.34 There is no need to claim that this is the only purpose of such an
exclamation, however. Cicero’s statement here affirms the project of the Stoics as much as
himself insofar as they are committed to the same goal, bringing philosophy into Roman culture.
Indeed, Cicero praises Cato’s ability to capture the meaning of some Greek philosophical terms
in Latin. When Cato explains what should be pursued and avoided, for example, he states the
‘moral’ (honestum) is the highest good, and as such has a higher value than ‘the intermediate
32

Obscurity may result from authorial intention, as is the case with Heraclitus, or because of the
difficulty of the material itself, as is the case in Plato’s Timaeus. Cato insists that the difficulty
here is ‘ingrained in the subject matter’ rather than ‘deliberate affection’ (iv 2).
33
Philosophy is the pupil in this quotation. This might bring about two opposite interpretations.
First, Cicero may intend to educate both his Roman readers about philosophy, and also to teach
philosophy about Roman culture. Second, Cicero might also be suggesting through Cato’s
example that the Stoics mistakenly treat philosophy as a pupil.
34
Annas 2001, 78n22 observes that in congratulating Cato, Cicero congratulates himself. Annas
is right in that we should be reminded that this is one of Cicero’s stated goals, and that he wants
his reader to notice success when it comes. Annas does not comment on the fact that Cicero
chooses to give Cato the success in this venture. I take it that Cato’s role as the mouthpiece of
Stoic philosophy gives this success more significance.
34

objects it procures’ (iii 39). All immoral acts, by contrast, ‘flow from vices (vitia)’ for the Stoics,
making the immoral the only evil. Cato notes that he chooses the word ‘vitia’ carefully over the
Greek ‘kakiai’ from a number of already existing Latin possibilities. Cicero says that he is
committing these terms to memory to use himself in reply (iii 40).
In praising Cato, Cicero highlights the ability of already existing Latin terms to express
philosophical ideas. When the Stoics choose their vocabulary well, Cicero cheers them for
promoting the cause they share in common. Since Cato chooses his words well here, Cicero can
congratulate Cato earnestly for having the dexterity and mental acuity to find the right words in
this case.35 These words, however, are not technical neologisms. Cicero clearly rejects the Stoics
only when they make arguments and ideas appear to be more complicated than they really are, as
Stoic jargon tends to do. The Stoics would have more success as philosophers, Cicero suggests,
if they abandon their unnecessary new terms and take up with the already existing Latin words
that can be integrated into philosophy.
Cicero’s own project aims to use Latin to discuss philosophical ideas. His success in this
endeavor is sometimes debated.36 Douglas 1968 finds Cicero’s translation is inadequate because
he does not create enough new terminology. Cicero’s love of the language keeps him from
manipulating it more. He cites two general challenges for practicing philosophy in Latin, and one
specific to Cicero. Latin lacks a definite article, which can inhibit clarity in philosophical
writing, and it is a language that tends to ‘concretize’ in a way that makes its metaphors ‘too
35

Cicero takes another jab at the Epicureans here. Cato’s success is highlighted as a significant
achievement in contrast to sloppy and imprecise philosophers who ‘could express their doctrines
in any language’ from a lack of care concerning definition and division (iii 40).
36
Palmer 1954 credits Cicero for developing many new terms, while Jones 1959 argues that
Cicero is unsuccessful in his translation efforts that would make it possible to philosophize in
Latin. Powell 1995 notes that Cicero’s translations span a broad range of accuracy. Unlike Jones,
Powell does not equate inaccuracy with failure. He offers six possible reasons for Cicero’s
variability in accuracy (excluding error) on page 274.
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vivid to serve merely as vehicles for abstract ideas’ (Douglas 1968, 34). The Stoics appear to flee
to abstract language too quickly, while Cicero seems to prefer drawing from already existing
Latin terms as much as possible. He explains at De finibus iii 15, ‘my usual practice, where there
is no alternative available, is to express a single Greek word by several Latin ones’. He notes
specifically that he and his interlocutors should use a Greek word where there is no Latin
equivalent to be found. Cicero is cautious in altering Latin too much because he wants to avoid
scaring away those good Romans who are potential philosophers but may be wary of
undertakings that have no direct practical application. Cicero must take care to avoid a criticism
of philosophers that lingers today—that they use technical terms too abstract to have meaning.
Let us now turn to the specific terms the Stoics use and the ideas they represent. Cicero
adopts a criticism that originates with Carneades. Though Stoic neologisms claim to reflect
conceptual innovation, Carneades suggests there is no new content behind them. The Stoics, he
maintains, simply apply new terms to old concepts. As a result, ‘there is no dispute between the
Stoics and the Peripatetics other than a verbal one’ (iii 41). Cato insists there is a conceptual
difference between them and the Peripatetics concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions
for happiness. For the Stoics, he explains, complete virtue or wisdom is sufficient for happiness.
The Peripatetics, by contrast, call health and wealth good and say that they contribute to the
happy life. He claims the Peripatetics hold ‘the richer one is in bodily or external goods, the
happier’, and even the wise cannot be completely happy unless they have a healthy body (iii 43).
Health still has value for the Stoics and may be worth seeking, such that having health and
wisdom at the same time is better than having wisdom without health, ‘but’ Cato explains ‘if
each commands some value, it does not follow that the two together are worth more than wisdom
on its own’ (iii 44). The value of health is far superseded by the value of virtue so that the sum

36

value of the two on the one hand could not outweigh the value of virtue alone on the other hand
(iii 45).37 Bodily or external goods cannot have a determining role in happiness because they can
never overpower the value of morality itself. If this is an important conceptual difference, then
the Stoics would be able to justify using new terms on the question of things called ‘good’.
In highlighting what he perceives to be an important difference between Stoic and
Peripatetic ethics, Cato points us to an important source of Stoic terminological change. It
quickly becomes clear that the Stoics rely on a number of very slightly different terms to make
their claims about the kinds of things that are commonly called ‘good’ in the Stoic view. To
begin, some things are called good instrumentally because they bring about other good things (iii
49). Wealth, for example, is instrumentally good because it makes possible the pursuit of the
arts. Virtue and wisdom, by contrast, are good in themselves and immeasurably more valuable.
Things that are good in themselves Cato divides into three categories. They are either
‘constitutive of the final end (ad illud ultimum pertinentia)’, ‘productive (efficientia)’ of that end,
or both.38 The only goods constitutive of the final end are virtuous actions, while the only
productive external good is a friend.39 Wisdom, by contrast, is both constitutive and productive.40
In so far as wisdom is ‘harmonious action’ in accord with nature, it is a constitutive good. At the
same time, and equally important, wisdom informs the choices that produce virtuous action.
Wisdom is therefore also productive of the end. (iii 55)
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This is why, Cato explains at iii 46-48, Stoics can endorse the otherwise strange view that
happiness does not admit of degrees. Being happy through varied circumstances or for different
durations of time has no effect on that happiness.
38
Goods constitutive of the final end and productive of the final end are also differentiated in
Greek—telika and poietika, respectively.
39
Cato does not elaborate here. It seems that the Stoics understand friendship as an important
external good because it encourages virtuous action.
40
Cato appears to call ‘wisdom’ both virtuous action and the disposition from which virtuous
action is produced. No further clarification is given here.
37

More telling than this division of goods is Cicero’s treatment of those many and varied
things that fall between virtue and vice. Most of the things human beings deal with on a daily
basis fall somewhere between virtue, the only true good, and vice, the only true evil. To help
guide daily action among such things, the Stoics generate a ranking system in which some things
have a positive value, some the opposite, and others are neutral (iii 50). Those with positive
value—including health, well-functioning senses, freedom from pain, honor, and wealth—are
preferred (anteponerentur), which Zeno had called ‘proegmenon’ (iii 51). Their opposites—pain,
illness, loss of sense, and poverty—Zeno called apoproegmenon. The designation of
proegmenon or apoproegmenon or not does not mean they are good or bad, respectively. They
should be chosen or avoided where appropriate, as suggested by nature and reason. Cato calls
these ‘intermediates’ (iii 59).41 Intermediates are chosen or rejected on the basis of what is
appropriate at the time. Good health is almost always appropriately chosen over poor health, for
example, but good health is not good absolutely.
Zeno’s proegmenon and apoproegmenon exemplify the unnecessary neologisms that
Cicero is criticizing. Cicero claims the Latin equivalents for proegmena and apoproegmena are
praeposita and reiecta, respectively, at iii 15. The discrepancy between Cicero’s choice of Latin
words at iii 15 and Catos’ choice of anteponerentur at iii 51 is not examined more closely in De
finibus. It appears to be one case in which the Stoics develop a specialized Latin term over a
Latin term already in usage.42 Cicero in effect passes over an obvious sticking point while also
explicitly discussing Stoic language as problematic. That is, it is possible that he intentionally
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Even the wise person performs appropriate action (kathekon, officium) and operates among
intermediates, but appropriate actions are themselves neither good nor evil.
42
The Lewis & Short entries for the terms suggest anteponerentur is more specialized, appearing
mostly in Cicero’s works where he writes about Stoicism. The entry for praeposita indicates
wider usage across several areas.
38

leaves open this opportunity to critique the Stoics. This would allow for his more advanced,
philosophically capable readers to detect the discrepancy and reach the same position Cicero has
put forward about unnecessary Stoic innovation. The ‘ordinary educated’ reader, however, would
accept Cicero says at face value and require nothing more.43
The anteponerentur discrepancy aside, Cato’s Latin translations demonstrate close
attention to language and terminology.44 At iii 53, he emphasizes his care in choosing terms for
‘advantageous’, ‘superior’, and ‘indifferent’. He notes,
it is not the items that occupy the first rank, but rather the second,
that should be called proegmena—that is, ‘preferred’. (This is the
term we may use—it is literal. Alternatively, ‘promoted’ and
‘demoted’, or as we have long said, ‘advantageous’ or ‘superior’,
and ‘to be rejected’ for the opposite. If the meaning is understood,
we should be relaxed about the words we use.) (iii 52)45
Nevertheless the distinction between ‘preferred’ things and their opposites, and the relation of
both to the good and evil remain difficult. Cato appears to sense the challenge and draws on two
analogies to help explain what the Stoics mean. The first is a political rank analogy from Zeno,
where he claims no one would say to be king is ‘preferred’. Some lesser position that approaches
the king’s rank most closely would be one that is ‘preferred’. Thus, things that occupy the second
or other good ranks are ‘preferred’ while the highest thing is not preferred, exactly, but simply
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Douglas 1968, 27 makes this claim historically about how Cicero was read until the rise of
Hellenism in the 1800’s. I am suggesting that this simple way of reading Cicero similarly
characterizes Cicero’s Roman audience, which might simply accept a synonymic relationship
between anteponerentur and praeposita.
44
Despite the meticulous distinction between his terms, Cato suggests at iii 52 that the exact
words used are not so important if his interlocutors understand his meaning. This appears to be
inconsistent with his use of anteponerentur instead of praeposita—if the exact terms do not
much matter, why use the more obscure term?
45
‘…sic in vita non ea quae primo ordine sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinet
προηγμένα, id est, producta nominentur; quae vel ita appellamus (id erit verbum e verbo) vel
promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita verl praecipua, et illa reiecta. Re enim
intellect in verborum usu faciles esse debemus.’
39

good (iii 52).46 Applied to the value of various goods, the thing that is good has the first rank,
while advantageous things are ‘indifferent’ though they might have moderate value and be
‘preferred’. The complementary analogy relies on the strategy of throwing a knuckle-bone. A
knuckle-bone can be thrown in a number of ways, but throwing it a certain way is advantageous
to get it to land upright (iii 54). Throwing it another way isn’t ‘bad’ but merely less advantageous
to obtain the desired outcome. Goods work the same way. Some are more advantageous in
developing virtue and attaining happiness, and others are less advantageous. An advantage in
attaining an outcome is not a part of the end desired. Similarly, material things may be
advantageous in becoming virtuous, but they do not constitute the ‘essence and nature’ of the
Stoic end.47
One of the main differences between Zeno and his predecessors is in the rank or worth of
the things called ‘good’. Good health, sound senses, and freedom from pain are not properly
called ‘good’ for the Stoics (iv 20). It is not the aim of the Stoics to do away with all distinctions
between good and bad or health and disease. They simply mean that none of these things are
themselves good or bad, but only preferred or dispreferred. Cicero is dissatisfied with the
terminological shift because ‘everything that the ancients referred to as good is actually
“preferred”, not good’ (iv 20). Soundness and strength of body were considered worth seeking
for Aristotle and the other ancients. For the Stoics, these are not worth seeking, but might be
worth ‘adopting’. Everything that the ancients had called ‘good’ are on the Stoic view not more
46

At iii 52, Cato insists that if we understand the concept he is referring to and his meaning here,
then the language becomes less important.
47
Foolish and wise alike choose intermediates that each thinks will best promote and support,
directly or indirectly, the love of self and preservation that all people possess. Such choices are
not necessarily directed at the only truly good thing, the moral. Because such actions are
common to all, ‘it is here that its involvement in what we call intermediates arises’ (iii 59). By
contrast, determining the primary objects of nature and which things are in accord with or against
nature belongs properly to wisdom and the wise person.
40

worth seeking than any alternative—they are only more worth ‘adopting’ than those alternatives.
Stoic neologisms and terminological hairsplitting are frustrating for Cicero, but they also
pose a practical challenge for the Stoics. Cicero uses the example of the effective ruler who, to
rule well in times of war, would have to commit to saying that slavery, death, or loss of
homeland are evils. Stoics are not able to call those things evil, but only dispreferred. This would
be ineffective, of course. Cicero further suggests the Stoic ruler in such a position is not
conceptually obligated to call slavery and death ‘dispreferred’ instead of evil. When the Stoics
say freedom, for example, is not ‘good’ but merely ‘preferred’, those who call these things
‘good’ do not in fact value them more highly than the Stoics, who call them ‘preferred’. (iv 23)
The end result is therefore more or less the same, but the new terminology makes the Stoic ruler
look ridiculous. The Stoic understanding of and response to all things other than virtue and vice
as intermediates may be effective in helping secure happiness in the form of tranquility for the
individual, but it does not appear to be valuable when considering human affairs on a larger,
political scale. The Stoics, like the Epicureans, present a philosophy that seems unlikely to save
the Roman republic. Unlike the Epicureans, the Stoic position at least prioritizes virtue in a way
that might help develop citizens capable of defending the constitution, that is, if they are able to
resist the accompanying doctrine that nothing else is good.
Cicero praises Cato’s exposition as clear and accurate (iv 1). This reminds us that the
Stoics are capable philosophers, and points to their linguistic competence. In Cato’s view, Zeno
was forced to craft new terms to grapple with the difficult concepts he was introducing. Cato
reports that Zeno, ‘for all the abundance of the Greek language…still availed himself of new and
artificial words’ (iii 51). Cato laments that this freedom that Zeno was granted is denied to the
Roman Stoics in Latin. Cato thinks that the need to develop new terms in Latin is even more
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pressing because, conversely to Cicero, Cato thinks the Greek language is richer than Latin.
Cicero posits a related challenge concerning Cato’s claim that these new terms are
necessary to match difficult new concepts. Cicero maintains that the Peripatetics outline the same
doctrines, and they are easily understood without the Stoic inventions. Cicero recounts the unity
of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophy at iv 3 to demonstrate the impressive force of
the Stoic predecessors. The immediate followers of Plato (Speucippus, Aristotle, Xenocrates)
and their own pupils, Polemo and Theophrastus, he claims, ‘put together a system of thought full
of richness and refinement’. The doctrines they provide, the ones the Stoics rely on, Cicero calls
comprehensive and complete. He argues that Zeno would have little reason to disagree with his
teacher and earlier predecessors. Cicero thus enlists the power of the predecessors to dispute the
necessity, and by implication the value, of the Stoics’ terminological contributions. It is not clear
that the distinctions between what is good and what is ‘advantageous’ or ‘preferred’ amount to
more than a discussion of the different kinds of goods as useful but not good in themselves,
consistent with Aristotle.48 New Stoic terms are worthless and offer nothing substantially
innovative. These innovations discard ‘tried and tested’ terminology for the sake of novelty that
serves no purpose (iv 7). It threatens the reputation that Cicero is trying to establish for
philosophy as a discipline for serious and mature people.
The extent to which the Stoics follow in the footsteps of their predecessors is fairly
extensive, but they fail to imitate their precursors when they fail to write well. Cato’s
predecessors divide philosophy into ethics, logic, and physics.49 Cicero explains that both early
Peripatetics and Academics develop ethics fully and with care, insisting that ‘the difference here
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For example in his Nicomachean Ethics i 8-9 and viii 2, 5.
Annas 2001, 91n6 claims that the tri-fold division is Stoic, but was later projected back to
Xenocrates, and Antiochus projected it back to what he called the unified tradition.
49
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between these schools was verbal rather than substantial’ (iv 5).50 Cicero explains that the work
in natural science available to Zeno was thorough, complete, and well-written. In physics or the
study of nature, the Peripatetics ‘explain how and why natural phenomena occur’, relying on ‘a
wealth of highly convincing arguments to account for every aspect of nature’ (iv 13). Cicero
argues that the Stoics generally follow the Peripatetics in physics. He allows that Zeno disputes
some minor points, ‘but on the central question he agreed that the whole of the universe and its
greatest parts were governed by a divine intellect and nature’ (iv 12). After Zeno, Chrysippus
makes some valuable contributions as a Stoic, developing physics ‘to its fullest extent, but
Zeno’s contribution was far less than that of the ancients’ (iv 9).
Cicero maintains that Zeno has no reason to change anything that has come before him in
terms of content, and that his contributions are worse than his precursors’ in style. His emphasis
is on the enormous value of the tradition. The neologisms of Zeno and his followers are
presented as evidence of Stoic disregard or disrespect for their predecessors who launched the
same ideas first. He explains that the Stoics ‘fail to acknowledge the extent of their debt to the
real pioneers (inventoribus)’ (iv 13). This suggests the Stoics are prideful in a way that is not
consistent with philosophy.51 The Stoics in general do not admit how indebted they are to their
predecessors when they claim to have new ideas behind their new vocabulary, and the ancients
overshadow any novel contributions they do make. Cicero suggests that this is inappropriate for
50

Cicero’s claim is distorting. The Stoic position that soul is pneuma and the Aristotelian
position that soul is form, for example, likely reflects a conceptual difference rather than a verbal
one. Annas 2001, 95 claims that he ‘greatly understates the differences between Stoic and
Aristotelian physics and metaphysics’. Cicero has a purpose in distorting Stoics in this way,
namely to distinguish his own project from theirs: where the Stoics make changes that do not
reflect new concepts, Cicero’s way of doing philosophy relies efficient use of terminology and
strength of concepts.
51
Recognition of what one does not know and the humility that should accompany it seem
necessary for education. This can be attributed to Socrates’ strategies for refutation, as Vlastos
1994 identifies it in the ‘standard elenchus’.
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philosophers. Instead, philosophers should only be making changes that improve the discipline.
Cicero makes Chrysippus an example of a good philosopher from the Stoic school, for he does
natural philosophy well and makes contributions that develop the discipline to its fullest capacity
in Cicero’s view.
Cicero applies the same basic criticism to Stoic ethics as well. Zeno’s predecessor
Polemo famously claimed that the supreme good is to live in accordance with nature (iv 14).
Cicero offers three Stoic interpretations of this. First, he suggests, it means to live applying your
knowledge of nature. This may have been Zeno’s own interpretation, in which we ought ‘to live
in harmony with nature’ (iv 14). Second, it might mean to ‘live performing all or most of the
intermediate appropriate actions’ (iv 15). Third, it might mean to ‘live in enjoyment of all or the
most important things that are in accordance with nature’. In this case, the summum bonum is not
entirely within the control of an individual’s conduct. Instead, virtue is enjoyed on the same level
as the possession of things that are in accordance with nature but outside of our control. Cicero
credits Xenocrates and Aristotle with this interpretation. Because it entails virtue, this
interpretation means that the supreme good is only available to the wise (iv 15).52
Cicero uses Zeno as an example of an ambitious thinker who fails to make valuable
contributions to philosophy. He is a negative example for Cicero’s audience. He is used to show
the audience how not to do philosophy with respect to style, content, innovation, and political
application. Had Zeno relied on ordinary language, had he not been ‘seduced by the grandeur of
language’, his philosophy would be no different from Aristo’s or Pyrrho’s (iv 60). Cicero is
52

Several problems with Cicero’s treatment of the Stoic definition of happiness are detailed in
Annas 2001, 95n15. Her assessment makes it clear that Cicero (or Antiochus, or his source) are
not giving a fair or complete presentation of Stoic happiness. This represents another example of
Cicero’s possible manipulation of the philosophical schools to underscore the contrast he wants
his readers to see between their project and his own.
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directing his Roman readers away from this kind of practice. Every new term, he suggests, must
refer to a new concept or idea. He also makes a few suggestions about the appropriate
relationship between philosophers and their predecessors. Cicero claims the Stoics avoid holding
Aristo’s position by depending on the Peripatetic one with some slight terminological variations.
Cicero thinks the misleading practice is made worse by the style with which the Stoics defend
their neologisms, lacking the grace of their predecessors.53 The Stoics’ failure to recognize just
how much they borrow from their predecessors represents a failure of character that is
inconsistent with the serious and respectable person that should be doing philosophy. Cicero’s
project, by contrast, seeks the strongest consistent core for philosophy among all existing
positions. If he is successful, his project will be able to avoid the frivolous and prideful
innovations of the Stoics. He therefore turns to classic skeptical method to approach such a core.

The Antiochian lesson
Cicero’s criticisms of the Epicureans and Stoics are designed to highlight the flaws that
would make philosophy distasteful for his Roman readers. The Epicureans represent the most
significant failure both with respect to philosophical content and the impossibility of applying
their philosophy to save the Roman republic. The Stoics are problematic in more subtle ways.
The Stoic priority of virtue is preferable to the Epicureans’ instrumental use of it, but the Stoics
still fail to provide a philosophy than can be fully effective in political application. They also
engage in terminological hair-splitting that would not be compatible for a Roman context, and
their disrespect for their philosophical predecessors indicates a character flaw inconsistent with
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Cicero notes some exceptions to the rule at iv 79. Panaetius, for example, rejected this harsh
style, offering more clear and easy doctrines and drawing readily from his predecessors. Cicero
even advises Cato to study the authors that Panaetius relied on for his own edification.
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philosophy in general. These shortcomings are incompatible with the image of the philosopher
Cicero builds at the beginning of De finibus. When Cicero addresses Antiochus and the Old
Academy in book 5, he shows his Roman readers the most promising model yet for practicing
philosophy. Despite his own professed allegiance to the New Academy, Cicero suggests the Old
Academy has many advantages over the other schools because of its deep respect for the
tradition, its practitioners’ competence, and its avoidance of unnecessary jargon. Though it has
many strengths, the Antiochian position, as given by Piso, has an inconsistent account of goods
and their relation to the summum bonum. Cicero thereby returns us to the strength of the position
itself and the ideas at its center. The most important strength of the philosopher, whatever
character qualities or formal training she might have received, is her contribution. When a
philosopher excels in every other area, Cicero suggests, we should still only be persuaded if the
idea is likely true.
Cicero highlights the strengths of the Old Academy in its respect for its historical roots,
the competency of its practitioners, and its straightforward use of terms. That Cicero emphasizes
the Old Academy’s respect for its predecessors is evident in three ways at the beginning of book
5. First, any interpretation of book 5 must admit the strangeness of its setting compared with the
rest of De finibus. It takes place in Athens, at the ruins of the Academy, when Cicero and the
other characters are studying in their youth. The tone is nostalgic both for Cicero writing the
scene and for the characters, all of whom envision the likenesses of their philosophical
inspirations who are long gone (v 1-4). Second, the opening lines are given to Piso, who marvels
at the evocative power of place. Standing at the ruins of the Academy, he thinks of Plato,
Speucippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo (v 2). The same phenomenon occurs when he looks on the
Senate-house in Rome and thinks of his own grandfather in addition to Scipio, Cato, and Laelius.
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The young Roman with intellectual and political aspirations appropriately acknowledges the
great men who have come before him. Third, Piso notes this power of the Senate-house is
strongest in ‘the original old Hostilia; its enlargement seems to me to have diminished it’ (v 2).
This means Piso, the spokesperson for the Antiochian position, both expresses admiration for his
predecessors and implies that the changes made to the Senate-house to modernize it have
changed it in a way that diminishes its connection to history.
When Cicero engages the Old and New Academy in debate, the power of the tradition
becomes clear. In De finibus v Cicero’s nephew, Lucius Tullius Cicero, wishes to learn about
Carneades of the New Academy, but cannot find much information on him and is constantly
being lured by Antiochus of the Old Academy because there is ‘no one else to hear’ (v 6).
According to Antiochus, the Old Academy contains Academics (Speucippus, Xenocrates,
Polemo, Crantor) as well as the early Peripatetics, headed by Aristotle (v 7). Piso speaks in favor
of the Old Academy and Antiochus, and he appears to win the young Lucius over in part by
reaffirming the continuity of the Old Academy’s philosophical tradition. The tradition offers
many useful and profound insights wherein Lucius can find ‘a complete liberal education, a
complete history, and a complete manual of style’, according to Piso (v 7). Cicero’s character,
speaking on behalf of the New Academy, agrees with Piso. The comprehensive, thorough, and
strong treatment of a number of questions by these philosophers was detailed in De finibus iv
when Cicero challenged Zeno’s innovation. When Cicero introduces the Antiochian position, he
does so with an emphasis on their respect for the philosophical tradition that precedes them and
their acknowledgment of the strong work put forward by their predecessors.
Piso uses the Old Academy to represent a viable and superior set of philosophers to study
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over the New Academy as embraced by Carneades and Arcesilaus.54 Piso contrasts the methods
of the New Academy with Aristotle, Piso’s positive example for the way philosophy should be
conducted. Aristotle, Piso explains, examines all the points on either side of an argument, ‘with
the purpose not of contradicting everything like Arcesilaus’, or simply to be clever, but instead
with the more honest goal of ‘revealing every point which could be made on either side’ (v 9).55
In addition to using good methods, the Peripatetics are interested not only in the ‘organization of
one’s private life but in the good conduct of public affairs as well’ (v 11). Studying their works is
good intellectual training, but it would also prepare any person for personal reflection and living
well in their private and public lives. This point is important for Piso. He tells Lucius explicitly
that enthusiasm for studying philosophers or other thinkers from the past must always serve
some purpose, namely ‘the emulation of great individuals’ (v 6). All of these considerations lead
Piso to insist that Lucius is sure to find what he seeks from Carneades in the writings of the Old
Academy (v 6).56
Piso acknowledges that the Old Academy appears to have some inconsistencies in the
theories put forward by its various thinkers, particularly regarding the supreme good. The
variations do not arise from incompetence, Piso explains, but from the existence of exoteric and
54

The Old Academy as a formal school develops out of the New Academy in response to the
New Academy’s radical skeptical position. The extent of the differences and similarities between
them remains disputed. See Brittain 2001 and Sedley 2012 for a complete treatment.
55
Cicero and Piso enjoy skepticism of different types. The Antiochian position is often called
‘mitigated skepticism’ because it more readily adopts plausible things as true. Antiochus even
goes so far as to suggest that some true sense perceptions do not have indistinguishable false
perceptions (Görler 1997, 41). Cicero, by contrast, tends to identify himself with the position of
Arcesilaus and Carneades, who engage have more firmly skeptical practices.
56
Carneades wrote nothing, and his own view remains a matter of dispute. Cicero considers
Carneades as one of the New Academy, and interprets Carneades as a radical skeptic in the
manner of interpretation headed by Clitomachus. The alternative view, that Carneades is a
mitigated skeptic advocated by Philo of Larissa and Metrodorus, consistent with the views of the
Old Academy, was also strong. This is a central concern of Cicero’s Academica, and Charles
Brittain gives excellent accounts in Brittain 2001 and 2006.
48

esoteric works (v 12). One of the greatest sources of variation concerns the summum bonum, and
whether happiness is up to the wise person or depends on external factors that are subject to
forces outside of our control (v 12). In examining the question of the summum bonum, Piso
explains that it is held nearly unanimously that practical reason is concerned with the attainment
of something that is well suited and adapted to our nature, attractive in itself and arousing desire
for itself (v 17). 57 Piso relies on a Carneadean division, something that Antiochus relied on as
well, to give a comprehensive overview of the theories that exist on the basis of the natural
attachments they claim and the ultimate ends they therefore endorse (v 16). There are three basic
positions one might adopt, according to Piso: (1) the most basic desire is pleasure and the most
basic aversion, pain; (2) the basic desire is for freedom from pain and the basic aversion is to
pain; (3) the basic desire is for primary things ‘in accordance with nature’. Things ‘in accordance
with nature’ are namely the preservation of a sound body, good senses, freedom from pain, and
other goods of the body, as well as analogous mental goods and attributes that are ‘sparks and
seeds of virtue’ (v 18). Desire or repulsion is with respect to one of these things as objects, and
practical reason guides our lives and makes decisions according to these things. Each of these
basic positions has two possible modes. In the first, the person seeks the attainment of the object.
In the second, the person seeks to act in accord with these ends without necessarily attaining the
object. There are thus six possible ethical theories that emerge from this division (v 20). The
disagreement over the first principles among the schools corresponds directly to the
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The emphasis placed on honoring the good work of the predecessors remains dominant here.
Piso provides a brief overview of the different philosophers following after Aristotle,
Nicomachus, and Theophrastus. With varying talents, the successors also have varying aptitude
and insight concerning philosophy, but Piso favors those who imitate or adhere to the ancients
that came before. Unsurprisingly he finds that ‘my own teacher Antiochus seems…to follow the
views of the ancients with the most care, and he tells us that the positions of Aristotle and
Polemo were the same’ (v 14). Despite variation, Piso suggests, the Old Academy is united.
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disagreement over the highest goods and evils.
Piso’s adoption of a Carneadean division reflects important points that demonstrate the
superiority of the Old Academy over the Stoics. First, it demonstrates that Piso is willing to
adopt the good work of what has come before him and use it for his own discussion. This is
consistent with the respect for his predecessors already discussed, but it represents a concrete
application of a pre-existing argument form that we had not seen in the case of the Stoics. It
seems to be a more straightforward or honest way to acknowledge the valuable contributions
already available. Second, it represents one appropriate way to incorporate borrowed
philosophical tools into a new discussion. Philosophical tools and concepts can often serve
multiple purposes. When the Stoics create new terms to discuss old ideas, they limit the language
of each philosopher, and the ideas they represent, to the domain of their creators. They give the
impression that a Peripatetic idea can only be used in Stoic discourse if given a Stoic name.
Piso’s willingness to use ideas and terms from Carneades represents a better way of doing
philosophy that values exchange across schools of thought, promoting unity and progress in the
discipline.
Piso’s elimination of viable ethical positions further emphasizes the superiority of the Old
Academy over the Stoics and Epicureans in demonstrating Piso’s competency. He immediately
rejects those that have no defenders and those that do not account for virtue and are therefore
unsuitable to discuss the supreme good (v 21-23). The remaining, most suitable theory is that of
the ancients, the one that Piso himself endorses.58 This theory begins with self-love and selfpreservation in ethics, which Antiochus and the Stoics have in common (v 24). Beginning with
this desire, the young person develops, becomes self-aware, and begins to understand why some
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By ‘ancients’ Piso refers to Academics and Peripatetics (v 21).
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things are desired and others are avoided. Eventually the young person actively chooses the
former and rejects the latter, bringing that person to attain the highest good by living according
to the ‘best and most suited natural condition possible’ (v 24). Human nature includes both mind
and body (corpore et animo) and ‘the human, for its part, has a constitution that provides it not
only with sense perception, but with the dominant element, intellect’, which possesses reason,
understanding, knowledge, and all the virtues (v 34).59 Piso diverges from the Stoics in
emphasizing the close connection between the mind and body.60 Cicero criticizes the Stoic
treatment of human nature. Though the Stoics maintain human nature concerns mind and body,
Cicero claims they also abandon half of human nature when they minimize the importance of the
body. The Stoics, he explains, expect human beings to disregard the body and factors that affect
the body for the sake of virtue (iv 32-34). The result is self-denial that appears to contradict the
Stoic doctrine of self-love and self-preservation. Since book 5 has a dramatic setting prior to
book 4, Piso is unaware that Cicero raises this challenge for the Stoics. His account nevertheless
appears to avoid this imbalance. Rather than deny that the body is important, Piso explains that
we seek the development and nurturing of all parts of ourselves, and the most valuable parts of
ourselves will be those that are most desirable (v 38). In human beings, the most valuable and
59

Note the difference between animus and anima here. Piso is referring to animus, the source of
intellect and perception, not anima, the source of life. Cicero uses animus to refer to the principle
of intellect and perception as mind, intellect, or the specifically rational soul in Tusculan
Disputations, De officiis, De senectute, Academica, De re publica, and elsewhere. It might be
possible to translate animus in the same way as anima, i.e., referring more broadly to ‘soul’ or
the principle of life, but Cicero appears to attend to differences between the terms. This care
might be a product of the Stoic-Academic engagement, since for the Stoics soul is entirely
rational, lacking the Platonic and Aristotelian non-rational parts of soul.
60
While mind is more important than body, mind and body are analogous to one another in end,
strength, and weakness (v 35). For Piso, there is a certain way of using the body that is most in
accord with nature, which can go wrong with distortion or deformity, or presumably injury. The
same is true analogously in the case of the mind. Most interesting is Piso’s account of the ways
in which mental flaws manifest themselves physically. Slouching and looking lazy, he says, are
contrary to nature and markers of a weak or decadent personality (v 35).
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thus most desirable parts amount to the intellect.
Piso wants to establish a hierarchy within our nature that is united with the Stoics and
maximizes the significance of mind as our best constituent part and the key to best preserving
ourselves without dismissing our corporeal nature. This understanding of human nature helps us
live in a way that fulfills both mind and body to the fullest. Once we possess mind and body ‘in
their fullest natural perfection’, there is a stopping-point ‘where nature rests’ that is crucial to the
ethics of the Old Academy. The limit is the maximal activity of the parts of our nature, the
flourishing of both mind and body, that is the supreme good (v 44). Piso thus establishes our
supreme end both as a surge in activity and as a limit or resting point. Our nature, insofar as it
wants its parts to be maximally realized, seeks to have a bodily condition that maximally accords
with nature. An ill, pained, or weak body cannot maximally accord with nature and thus brings
our whole nature to suffer (v 47). Though the mind is more important than the body, Piso makes
it clear here that the body cannot possibly be overlooked.
That Piso is a competent philosopher also speaks well of Cicero’s criticism of Stoic
neologisms. For Cicero, Piso’s position is superior to the Stoics’ in part for his avoidance of
jargon. What Zeno called preferable and more worthy of selection, Piso claims, his own system
calls happier (v 88). This means that Piso openly admits there is only a terminological difference
between the Old Academy and the Stoics concerning external and bodily goods. As discussed
earlier, new terms devoid of new meanings are useless. Piso appears to share this view and
acknowledges that his system has a terminological benefit over the Stoics. He claims his own
vocabulary is better than theirs precisely because he calls familiar things by familiar names
instead of making up new words (v 89). One of Piso’s strengths, then, is in avoiding the
meaningless invention of empty jargon.
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Piso is thus united with the Stoics in the tradition of the ancients, yet he avoids the
problems that emerge from distinctly Stoic claims. Since the supreme good is in the peak
development of mind and body, human beings are not meant to be idle but to act (v 54-58). The
natural course of human development shows that work proper to human beings begins with
‘seeds of virtue’ that build slowly but surely to finer things in the realization of virtue itself (v
59). Developing virtue is more worthwhile than the excellences of body, and is inherently
concerns our interactions with others (v 60, 67). It is the nature of virtue to bring the individual
into relation with the community. Through virtue, therefore, Piso is able to establish the
naturalness of the city and politics. Engaging in virtuous activity helps us to appreciate and
preserve things that are good in themselves (v 69). Things good in themselves include on the one
hand mind and body, where the ultimate good is realized, and on the other hand, external goods
like friends, family, and country. Though these things are good in themselves, they cannot be a
part of the supreme good. If they were, the supreme good would be outside of the individual’s
control and unrealizable, which is unacceptable for Piso, the Stoics, and, arguably, the
Epicureans (v 68). Piso’s adherence to Peripatetic ethics through the Old Academy is fairly
comprehensive and reflects his competency as a well-learned philosopher.
Piso concludes his overview of Antiochian ethics by urging Lucius to consider the full
value of virtue. He contends, ‘You will then be left in no doubt that those who possess the highminded character and the uprightness to attain them live happy lives… It is true that what we
count as bodily goods do make a contribution to the happiest life. But a happy life can exist
without them’ (v 71). Piso is attempting to reconcile the Stoic idea that virtue is sufficient for
happiness with the Aristotelian position that happiness requires virtue and other some other
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goods.61 Cicero says that he would like to give virtue as much power as possible, but he cannot
figure out how Piso could comfortably reject the Stoic notion that virtue is the only good and
also hold that virtue is sufficient for happiness. If there are good things other than virtue, Cicero
presses, then how could virtue be sufficient for happiness? (v 77) Since Piso’s own view, in
contrast to the Stoics, seems to use the notions of good and evil that are applied in daily life—
where sound body and wealth are called ‘good’ things and disease and ugliness are called ‘evil’
things—then wisdom or virtue is not sufficient for happiness, and the wise person is vulnerable
to evils (v 81).62
The Antiochian position represents a politically compelling ethics. Antiochians prioritize
virtue, but they also care about external goods. Virtue seems necessary to restore Roman values
and save the constitution. Insofar as Cicero is concerned with using philosophy to save the
Roman republic, he must be invested in promoting an ethical system that places exceptionally
high value on virtue. Yet virtue’s high value cannot overpower the value of other goods if we are
to avoid the political pitfall of the Stoics, namely, that vice alone—not death, enslavement, and
loss of one’s home—is to be actively avoided. The position that Piso presents is far more
sensible and more likely to raise a capable, virtuous generation to save Rome.
Though Piso’s position is strong in many ways, the attempted reconciliation between
Stoic and Aristotelian ethics is unsuccessful. Piso maintains ‘being wise is indeed insufficient for
the happiest (beatissime) life…but is certainly enough for a happy (beate) life’ (v 81). He allows
for many different goods, and he maintains that the Stoic notion that the wise person is happy
without qualification regardless of his or her circumstances is foolish. Yet he cannot successfully
61

Here I am agreeing with Annas 2001, 141n50.
In Zeno’s case, virtue was sufficient for happiness because nothing else was properly
considered ‘good’. In this way, no matter what challenges fortune throws at a Stoic, that Stoic is
not in fact being afflicted by real evils and can remain happy.
62
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respond to Cicero’s question about the relationship between the sufficiency of virtue for
happiness and the role of external and bodily goods. Piso’s Antiochian position has many
strengths over the other positions presented in the text, and Piso’s exposition is exceptionally
well done. Annas 2001, 150n70 astutely claims ‘Piso has won the rhetorical battle…Cicero
leaves it to the reader to judge the importance of the philosophical argument against the elegantly
presented theory’. The importance of philosophical argument must be more important than all of
the other features of good philosophical contributions for Cicero. Piso’s presentation and
Cicero’s reply therefore suggests that the philosopher must prioritize the strength of the
argument.

Cicero’s lesson
Cicero’s treatment of the Hellenistic schools is often distorting. He gives flat readings to
their positions in order to highlight something. I have argued that Cicero presents the schools as
he does in order to educate his readers about the best and worst practices in philosophy.
Contrasting himself with the negative example of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians,
Cicero demonstrates a better way of doing philosophy. Philosophers should be competent. They
should avoid unnecessary jargon. They should honor their predecessors, particularly when their
predecessors have done good work. Above all, they should develop strong philosophical
arguments. The Epicureans demonstrate incompetence, and the Stoics fall on account of their
jargon and lack of respect for their predecessors. Piso’s Antiochian account falls because, though
it is politically promising, it is not a sufficiently plausible theory.
In this final section I review the ways in which Cicero does possess the qualities he
claimed the other philosophers lack, and argue that Cicero’s demonstration of a better
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philosophical practice engages the basic features of classical skepticism.63 In the Introduction, I
draw from three major features of Academic skepticism that Harald Thorsrud elucidates: ‘(i)
relieving others of falsely believing they know what they don’t, and (ii) revealing the most
probable solutions to the problems discussed while (iii) concealing his own opinion so as not to
interfere with the rational autonomy of the participants’ (Thorsrud 2018, 51). In addressing De
finibus specifically, I make a few adjustments to (i) and (ii). I apply (i) as the rejection of
positions that do not withstand scrutiny, (ii) as the suspension of judgment that accompanies
such rejection in addition to the use of Carneadean probabilism to advocate indirectly for
qualified, skeptical eudaimonism. To (iii) I assume that ‘concealing his own opinion’ applies
primarily to Cicero’s explicit statements.
Cicero rejects the other philosophers for failing to possess the qualities identified above.
Those positions fail to withstand Academic scrutiny. Cicero challenges each position with the
aim of undermining the dogmatic confidence of his interlocutors. He exposes internal
inconsistencies and prematurely drawn conclusions. His own method contrasts theirs. If Cicero
considers himself a teacher to his readers when he manipulates other philosophers to contrast
with himself, he must show how he possesses the qualities he claims they lack. The opening
pages of De finibus analyzed earlier attest to Cicero’s competence and avoidance of jargon.
Recall that Cicero argues that philosophy is most appropriate for someone with the reputation
Cicero has (i 1-12). His knowledge of the schools is on display for the entire text, and he calls
attention to the appropriateness of developing specialized vocabulary and the translation of
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‘Dogmatic’ skeptics claim that nothing can be known; ‘classical’ skeptics make no such claims
(Burnyeat and Frede 1998, 127-128). Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Pyrrhonians all belong to the
classical category. Despite their many differences, they all seem to depend on a practical
criterion such as Carneades’ to pithanon or probabilis. This makes it possible for the skeptic to
withhold assent and still act.
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Greek into Latin.64 Cicero’s respect for his predecessors, and his fellow philosophers in general,
is more complex. Cicero is not giving a very charitable presentation of his fellow philosophers in
De finibus, but this does not necessarily mean that he fails to honor his predecessors. For each
philosophical school, Cicero names potential points of revision and agreement. He agrees with
Epicurus’s claim, for example, that ‘there is as much pleasure to be derived from the humblest
provisions’ as from extravagant feasts, ‘if this amounted to a denial that the qualities of one’s
supplies has any bearing on the happiness of one’s life’ (ii 90).65 Cicero claims that this is not
what he thinks Epicurus had meant, but his possible agreement suggests that there are parts of
the Epicurean position that could be revised and accepted. This is also clear when he criticizes
Epicurus’ concept of pleasure and states that he would accept static pleasure as the first drive of
infants because it is consistent with self-preservation (i 31). Cicero suggests he is open to the full
meaning of the Epicurean end, if he were to give it a fair presentation.
He does the same with the Stoics and the Antiochians on more than one occasion.
Concerning intermediates, Cicero claims ‘if Chrysippus is saying that certain [goods of the body]
are eclipsed or disappear [compared to virtue], then I would agree’ (iv 29). He also suggests that
the Stoics improve their argument about human nature: ‘Instead of saying that every animal, as
soon as its born, is devoted to loving itself and is concerned with self-preservation, why not say
the following? Every animal is devoted to the best part of itself and is concerned with the
security of that one part; no other nature has any other aim than to preserve whatever is best in
itself’ (iv 34). Some aspects of Stoic theory that are compelling, but the Stoics would do well to
make some revisions to strengthen that position and make it a more viable view. Similarly, he
offers a way out of Piso’s problems with the happy and happiest life if Piso allows there are
64
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This is evident in De finibus i 6-12 and in Cicero’s praise for Cato’s translation at iii 40.
Cicero would agree, but ‘enthusiastically so, since he would be speaking the truth’.
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different degrees of happiness (v 81).
In undermining the other positions, Cicero expresses all of the qualities he suggests a
philosopher should possess. It is additionally important that a philosopher should develop
philosophically strong arguments and ideas. For the Academic, this means Cicero must in
practice not accept any ideas or arguments that seem implausible. Epicurean ethics is
implausible, he claims, because it advocates for pleasure without limit. Virtue, on this reading, is
subservient to pleasure and cannot keep the pursuit of pleasure from causing harm to well-being
(iv 37). As such, it is unlikely to nurture virtue in a way that might save the Roman republic.
Stoic ethics is implausible because it requires that we attend to virtue alone. This neglects half of
one’s good and makes it unlikely that Stoics can be effective political agents. Upon rejecting the
positions that could not withstand scrutiny, Cicero brings his readers to consider the Antiochian
position.
Piso presents by far the best position under explicit consideration in De finibus. He gives
the strongest possible position to virtue, yet he allows that external and bodily goods play an
important role in securing one’s happiness. Cicero swiftly eviscerates the idea that the happy and
happiest life can be distinguished as a reconciliation between Stoic and Peripatetic ethics.
Though Cicero’s reply matches the strength of Piso’s presentation, he does not prevail over his
interlocutor here as he prevails over Torquatus and Cato. There is some suggestion that Piso
depends too much on eloquence, but the readers are left with the impression that they have just
witnessed an excellent philosophical discussion.
Though the other characters accept the Antiochian position, Cicero suspends judgment
about the best possible theory. The closing of book 5 is likely a dramatic representation of the
relationship between an exoteric and esoteric view. The interlocutors resemble most readers of
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De finibus. They accept the Antiochian position as the best and most politically useful one. This
is a safe and effective theory for many to accept. Cicero’s unwillingness to accept that position is
a suggestion that the classical skeptic will not be persuaded by Piso’s exposition. The esoteric
position maintains the best philosophy suspends judgment.66 Thus, upon rigorous analysis and
critique of the Epicurean, Stoic, and Antiochian summum bonum, Cicero’s judgment remains
somewhat inexplicit and unarticulated; his ‘scepticism is an emergent property of the dialogue as
a whole’ (Brittain 2016, 26).
The esoteric skepticism that Cicero practices would be ineffective if placed in the hands
of unprepared individuals. Suspension of judgment applies to arguments and sense-perceptions,
and is grounded most clearly in the Academic response to the cognitive impressions Stoics rely
on as the criterion of truth.67 By abolishing the criterion of truth, the Stoics reply, Academics
cannot act on any impressions, and therefore cannot act at all. In response to this, Carneades
develops his own criterion, often called a ‘practical’ criterion, that allows someone to ‘assent to
non-cognitive but probable impressions, as long as he realizes that he may be wrong’ (Allen
1994, 89). Accepting what is probable allows for the Academic to act according to what seems
best and be confident in, but not absolutely certain of, that acceptance. Under the guidance of
Carneades, skeptics can say that knowledge is not likely possible without becoming dogmatic
skeptics and asserting that no knowledge is possible. In the words of Michael Frede, ‘it is a
matter of probability for Carneades that nothing can be known’ (Burnyeat and Frede 1997,
141).68
66

Brittain 2016 argues specifically that this reflects the skepticism of the New Academy rather
than the Old Academy. He defends this position in part on the grounds that he is similarly noncommittal in his Academica concerning the possibility of knowledge.
67
Academics maintain that false and true impressions can almost always be mistaken (see, for
example, Academica ii 48, 56-57).
68
This is also expressed at Academica ii 110.
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Cicero does not clearly reject the Antiochian position in the same way he does for the
Stoics and Epicureans, but neither does he accept it. He never explicitly gives an alternative to
Piso’s position. He thus appears to suspend judgment between accepting and rejecting the Old
Academy. He leaves his audience to form their own judgment about the Antiochian position.
Without articulating eudaimonism explicitly, Cicero assumes a eudaemonist position throughout
the course of the text and he does not challenge the fundamental premise that human beings
strive for happiness and well-being. He even has Piso make use of the Carneadean division,
which suggests we must take virtue seriously to have a worthwhile end. This worthwhile end is
most plausibly a eudaimonistic one. Upon rejecting the best ethical positions available, Cicero
leaves us with one plausible but unarticulated position: we likely should accept eudaimonism but
reject all currently existing paths to happiness. The esoteric view, a nuanced skeptical
relationship to eudaimonism, is effectively kept from all but the most careful readers best suited
to adopt the kind of skepticism Cicero practices.
Having an esoteric and an exoteric position makes good sense given the political
circumstances under which Cicero writes. The Academic skepticism that he himself practices
might not be useful—and could perhaps be harmful—if used improperly. Improperly used
skepticism would be a dogmatic refusal to consider or provisionally accept that which seems
plausible. In action, misapplied skepticism results in a failure to defend worthy causes. When
used properly, Academic skepticism could help maintain political stability. Since Academic
skeptics defend no dogmatic doctrines and are always ready to further evaluate what seems
plausible, they are unlikely to lead the state into ideological, unnecessary, or unwinnable
conflicts. While Cicero aims to aid his readers in their philosophical training, he demonstrates his
Academic skepticism esoterically because he only wants his readers to take up such a practice
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when they are ready to do so effectively. For those who are less prepared to practice Academic
skepticism, Cicero suggests the exoteric, Antiochian position. The Antiochian position accepts
eudaimonism that is constituted primarily by virtue and secondarily by the possession of other
goods. Most, or arguably all, who adopt this position will be benefitted individually by the
Antiochian system. Furthermore, nearly every citizen could adopt without risking damage to the
state.69
Cicero’s presentation of the different theories in De finibus is carefully constructed. He
manipulates the positions of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians in order to show his readers
that philosophers should express a few key qualities. Cicero’s criticisms of the schools highlight
their failure to express one of more of these qualities. This is especially true when he considers
the concept of originality and the innovations specific to different schools. In addition, Cicero
himself appears to possess all of the qualities that he attributes to the philosopher. Over the
course of De finibus, therefore, Cicero helps teach his readers how to do philosophy and identify
good philosophers from mere imitators. He guides them to identify the qualities of the
philosopher, and to recognize that Cicero’s own position, adopting eudaimonism but rejecting
the positions of the Hellenistic schools, appears to be the best of all available options.
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This also reflects a sophisticated Platonism in which the best philosophers are most qualified
to rule. Cicero therefore suggests the best sort of philosophy, while encouraging his readers to
embrace a more obviously politically useful philosophy.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE APPEAL TO NATURE

Cicero’s De finibus is arranged in an unusual way. It develops over the course of three
fictitious philosophical dialogues, each dedicated to the ethical position of a different Hellenistic
school, divided into five books. The first dialogue, centered around the presentation and
refutation of the Epicurean position in book 1 and 2, respectively, has the dramatic date of 50
BCE. The next two books are set in 52 and contain the second dialogue, detailing and refuting
the Stoic position. The final book is slightly different from the rest of the text in that it contains
both the exposition of and rebuttal to the position of the Old Academy or Antiochus, but it stands
out most notably on account of its dramatic setting. Book 5 takes place long before the others in
79, at the ruins of the Academy in Athens, when the interlocutors were studying abroad in their
youth. There are two compatible ways to interpret this arrangement: (1) the arrangement reflects
the progression in argument quality from lowest to highest, and (2) some argument in the text
will require that we return to Cicero’s youth for an answer. The first interpretation is consistent
with those who argue that the absence of a book 6 to rebut book 5 indicates Cicero favors the
Old Academy as the best philosophy. The second interpretation entails the identification of a
suitable argument that would bring Cicero to address something from his youth. I consider the
best candidate to be what Brunschwig calls the ‘cradle argument’, an important argument that
appears in several forms throughout the text.
In this chapter I develop the second interpretation in a way that is consistent with the
first, arguing that Cicero arranges the dialogues of De finibus to mirror dramatically the ‘cradle
argument’ ubiquitous in Hellenistic philosophy. A ‘cradle argument’ makes an ethical claim

62

through an appeal to nature that emphasizes the desires and behaviors of the very young. When
the Hellenistic schools appeal to nature, they look to the ‘cradle’, or infancy, as an uncorrupted
source from which we may determine our appropriate human end.70 Hellenistic philosophy is
indeed replete with references to the very young. The Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians each
have their own versions of the cradle argument in De finibus. My argument begins with an
examination of the basic contents and criticisms of the ‘cradle argument’ as presented by
Torquatus, Cato, and Piso. I find that Cicero rejects the cradle arguments as presented by each
Hellenistic school, especially the Epicureans and Stoics, because of their contents. In particular,
he most consistently objects to their use of pre-rational infants to determine what is good, bad, or
best for rational human adults. Cicero’s criticisms of the arguments’ contents do not imply that
he rejects their desire to find a natural foundation for ethics. Next, I show that Cicero actively
seeks such a foundation and locates the origin of ethically relevant ends in his youthful
philosophical studies, when he had already attained the intellectual maturity necessary to begin
philosophizing. The reverse chronology of De finibus allows Cicero to appeal to his youth in
years but maturity in reason at the end of the text, in the philosophically and rhetorically most
impressive section. This allows Cicero to replace the most problematic aspect of the appeal to
origins, the reliance on pre-rational infants, with an origin located in his educational prime,
already rational and improving himself through philosophy.

Rival appeals to the young
At De finibus v 55 Piso, representing the Antiochian position, proclaims ‘all of the
ancient theories, especially the one I espouse, visit the cradle, in the belief that the easiest way of
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This argumentative strategy was coined the ‘cradle argument’ by Brunschwig 1986.
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understanding nature’s intentions is to look at early childhood.’ An appeal to the natural origin is
the general approach of the ‘cradle argument’; I apply the phrase ‘appeals to the young’ to
represent what occurs in the dialogue. Stoics, Epicureans, and Antiochians all attempt to discern
the proper human end from observable infant behaviors. Accordingly, all appeals to the young in
De finibus are similar in structure and contain the same three features: (i) they begin as close as
possible to the birth (natum) of an infant, (ii) they ascertain the first desires of the newborn from
its behavior, and (iii) they draw conclusions concerning the summum bonum from those desires.
The Epicurean cradle argument in book 1 guides us from newborns toward the pursuit of
pleasure and freedom from pain. Torquatus presents the Epicurean ‘cradle argument’ at i 30
when he states,
Every animal as soon as it is born seeks pleasure and rejoices in it, while shunning
pain as the highest evil and avoiding it as much as possible. This is behavior that
has not yet been corrupted, when nature’s judgment is pure and whole. Hence he
denies that there is any need for justification or debate as to why pleasure should
be sought, and pain shunned. He thinks that this truth is perceived by the senses,
as fire is perceived to be hot, snow white, and honey sweet. In none of these
examples is there any cause for proof by sophisticated reasoning; it is enough
simply to point them out. He maintains that there is a difference between reasoned
argumentative proof and mere noticing or pointing out; the former is for the
discovery of abstruse and complex truths, the latter for judging what is clear and
straightforward.
The first feature (i) of the Epicurean appeal to the young is justified on the grounds that their
‘behavior is not yet corrupted’ (depravatum). Observable infant behavior is understood as an
undisturbed reflection of nature’s inclinations. The extent to which the argument is based on
empirical observation is disputed. This matters little to the basic interpretation of the argument,
however. Infants might cry when they are uncomfortable, lonely, hungry, or feeling pain for
some other reason. Caregivers soothe them by attending to one of these unpleasant sensations.
Generally the infant stops crying upon the satisfaction of its desires when the unpleasant
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sensation is relieved. Thus the second feature (ii) identifies desires from these observable
behaviors. In other words, the Epicureans frame newborn behavior as pleasure-seeking and painavoiding. The third feature (iii) should demonstrate an inference to the summum bonum. Instead,
Torquatus claims the Epicureans require no inference. Pleasure-seeking behavior in infants, and
arguably adults, is so obvious to the Epicureans that it requires only ‘mere noticing or pointing
out’ rather than ‘argumentative proof’.71 The prescriptions of nature as observed in the infant
behavior, behavior that reflects nature without distortion, are practically self-evident.
The Stoics, like the Epicureans, adopt the first feature (i) on the grounds that the
inclinations of nature are uncorrupted in infants. They differ from the Epicureans with respect to
the other two features. Cato explains,
Every animal, as soon as it is born (this is where one should start), is concerned
with itself and takes care to preserve itself. It favours its constitution and whatever
preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever
appears to promote its destruction. In support of this thesis, the Stoics point out
that babies seek what is good for them and avoid the opposite before they ever
feel pleasure or pain. This would not happen unless they valued their own
constitution and feared destruction. But neither could it happen that they would
seek anything at all unless they had self-awareness and thereby self-love. So one
must realise that it is self-love which provides the primary motivation. (iii 16)
Assuming that nature is most present or visible in the very young, the second feature (ii) of
Cato’s cradle argument interprets infant behavior in terms of survival. Shelter, food, and comfort
are things that promote the survival and thriving of the infant. It is possible that the same things
that preserve the infant’s constitution (milk and clothing, if not human affection) are also
pleasant. Though these objects might also be pleasant, Cato’s brief summary emphasizes that
survival is primary and pleasure secondary. Nature appears to be inclined more to preserve itself
than to experience pleasure, so the infant desires self-preservation ‘before they ever feel pleasure
71

This is supported, no doubt, by the Epicurean doctrine that sense-perceptions are true (see
Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus 46-53).
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or pain’. 72 Pleasure can even serve self-preservation by indicating the body is in good working
order.
Stoics and Epicureans diverge concerning features (ii) and (iii). They differ significantly
in feature (iii) because the Stoics depend on argument where the Epicureans deem argument
inappropriate. Torquatus made it clear that some truths, including the pleasure-seeking behavior
of infants, were so evident that there should be no formal argument but only ‘pointing out’.
Cicero emphasizes the point when he narrates ‘Epicurus himself said that pleasure is not a matter
for argument, since the criterion for judging pleasure is located in the senses’ (iii 3). The Stoics,
of course, depend on a more technical and rigorous incorporation of argument at every level of
philosophy than the Epicureans.
The Stoic emphasis on argument is notable in at least two ways in this passage. It is
immediately present when Cato emphasizes the birth of the animal as ‘where one should start’, a
methodological point. Additionally, their identification of self-preservation as a first desire
depends on familiarity with Stoic system since self-preservation is itself a complex concept.
Infant behaviors that are self-preserving are in accord with nature that is itself, over time,
revealed to be rational. For the Stoics, everything has a place in the general rational order of
things. The infant, driven by the instinct to preserve itself, engages in actions that are
‘appropriate’ for its nature. Cato explains the development of human nature at iii 20:
the initial ‘appropriate action’…is to preserve oneself in one’s natural
constitution. The next is to take what is in accordance with nature and reject its
opposite. Then such selection becomes continuous, and, finally, stable and in
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Desire for self-preservation may be temporally prior to any experience of pleasure or pain, or
it might be prior in the sense of being primary. Pleasure might supervene on the acquisition of
objects of self-preservation, making the acquisition primary and the pleasure secondary.
Brunschwig 1986, 134 maintains that Cato holds the former, temporal position. This is in stark
contrast to the position of fellow Stoic Hierocles, who argues that sense-perception is present at
birth (140). The diversity of cradle arguments does not pose a difficulty here, as Cato means first
and foremost to distance his position from the Epicureans.
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agreement with nature. At this point that which can truly be said to be good first
appears and is recognized for what it is.
As the infant matures over the course of her life, she is able to engage with nature in different
ways. Eventually she gains the insight that ‘appropriate’ actions fit her needs (Cooper 1999,
437).73 In other words, self-preservation is each living being’s relation toward its own nature as
much as it is that being’s relation to external objects, or nature more broadly. It acts, in this
sense, as a middle term in a syllogism. Through self-preservation, the human infant relates to
itself and to its nature as a benevolent, rational being, since self-preserving behavior requires
some self-awareness with attendant self-love. Feature (iii) of the Stoic appeal to the young has a
different basis from that of the Epicureans, logical argument rather than mere observation.
The Epicureans stand out most for their identification of pleasure as the first object of
desire of infants and also the highest end for adults. Cato draws hard line between the Epicureans
and Stoics concerning the first objects of desire and the use of argument. Cicero’s treatment of
the Old Academy highlights their similarities with the Stoics more than their differences. This is
largely due to the fact that the Old Academy claim a united history, inclusive of Stoicism,
beginning with Socrates.74 In the words of Inwood 2014, 46, ‘given the shared pedigree of the
Stoics and Aristotelians—all roads lead back to Socrates and in this case both lead to Socrates
via the same intermediary, Plato’.
The shared tradition that the Old Academy endorses has significant influence over their
appeal to the young. For example, Piso’s view that ‘the whole question of ends, and as it were
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Striker 1996, 229 endorses a similar position, arguing the insight of the mature person might
not be simply that she is rational, but rather that nature’s order is best.
74
Antiochus’ position is difficult to establish with certainty on account of the complexity of his
exchange with the Hellenistic schools and the limited textual evidence that remains. Striker
1996, 269 finds that Antiochus unifies the Old Academy and Peripatos to criticize Stoic theory.
Her position is not inconsistent with the one I adopt here—Antiochus adopted some parts of
Stoicism but was critical of others.
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the outer limits of good and evil, begins from what we described as being well-adapted and
suited to our nature’ indicates that the Old Academy, like the Stoics, emphasize self-preservation
(v 23). He explains (v 23-24):
Let us follow the tradition of the old schools, one that the Stoics also utilize, and
begin in the following way: Every living creature loves itself, and as soon as it is
born strives to preserve itself. For the purpose of its life-long protection, nature
bestows on it from the beginning a desire for self-preservation and for
maintaining itself in the best possible state according to nature. At first the
arrangement is vague and uncertain, so that the creature merely gives itself some
basic protection regardless of what species it belongs to. It has no understanding
of what it is, or what it might become, or what its own nature is. Then it develops
a little, and starts to realize how things affect it and are related to it. It gradually
begins to acquire self-awareness, and to grasp the reasons why it possesses the
desire that I spoke of. So it sets about pursuing things which it perceives to be
suited to its nature, and shunning their opposites. The object of every creature’s
desire, therefore, I take to be found in what is adapted to its nature. Hence we
arrive at the highest good, to live in accordance with nature in the best and most
suitable natural condition possible.
Piso, like the Stoics, begins with self-love and self-preservation for feature (ii). For both schools,
we seek objects that are best suited to our nature because they preserve out nature and selfpreservation is the first desire. The main difference is that the Stoics allow that goods of the body
might be worth pursuing, but they clearly prioritize mind over body in asserting that the only
object of real value is virtue (iii 50-58).75 The Antiochians and Old Academy maintain that
preserving both mind and body is valuable. Caring for mind and body and satisfying their desires
in a way that brings them to ‘their fullest natural perfection’ is ‘where nature rests’ (v 44).

Cicero’s apparent rejection of the cradle arguments
Each cradle argument is challenged in De finibus. Cicero rejects the Epicurean argument
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Note here (as in footnote 48 of chapter 1) there is a distinction between animus, the source of
intellect and perception, and anima, the source of life. The former is translated as ‘mind’, the
latter as ‘soul’.
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for failing to connect the kinetic pleasure he claims they identify as the first object of desire with
the mature pursuit of freedom from pain. The Stoic cradle argument is rejected because its first
object of desire, self-preservation, is contradicted by Stoic neglect of the body for the sake of the
mind. The Old Academy’s version is rejected because it leads to a problematic end. In this
section I examine Cicero’s challenges to each school in order of appearance and show that he
finds the same flaws in all of them: they fail to reconcile our natural or biological origin with our
ethical end, and they begin with infancy. This is important because it allows Cicero to posit a
new origin to consider, as I address in the next section.
Cicero’s objections to the Epicurean cradle argument has two components. First, he
objects to their identification of pleasure as the highest end and first inclination. Second, he
claims that they fail to reconcile the two kinds of pleasure they identify. His rejection of pleasure
is grounded primarily on the Epicureans allegedly ‘[giving] pride of place to what [they] claim
nature herself ordains and approves, namely pleasure and pain’ (i 23). He argues that humans are
made for better things than mere pleasure, citing bravery in the face of danger and even the
refusal of natural duties and affections, i.e., father’s love, for the sake of virtue (i 23-25). Cicero
is arguing for virtue to be taken seriously. Epicurus, he claims, makes virtue the servant of
pleasure so that it has only instrumental value in bringing about pleasure and freedom from pain
(ii 37, 69).
Pleasure in itself is an inappropriate human end for Cicero, but the position is made
worse by Epicurus’ lack of clarity about by the term. The Epicureans distinguish two kinds of
pleasure, kinetic and static. Torquatus explains ‘a quenched thirst is a ‘static’ (stabilitatem)
pleasure, whereas the pleasure of having one’s thirst quenched is ‘kinetic’ (in motu)’ (ii 10).
Cicero entertains the possibility that Epicurus might mean kinetic pleasure, taken to be sensory
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delight to be the highest good. He maintains this is a very weak ethical position, easily
overturned by his objection at i 23.76 The alternative to positive, delightful sensory pleasure, or
kinetic pleasure, is a concept of pleasure as absence from pain, or static pleasure. Static pleasure
is more independent than kinetic pleasure and more consistent with the higher, intellectual
pleasures that human beings can enjoy. Cicero prefers static pleasure as the summum bonum over
kinetic pleasure. He goes so far as to claim that static pleasures would be derived from selfpreservation, implying his potential endorsement of such a position (ii 31).
On Cicero’s assessment, Epicureans do not clearly prioritize static pleasure over kinetic
pleasure. In the cradle argument, Cicero contends, Epicureans rely on infants and children, who
seem to choose kinetic pleasures over static ones and need guidance to choose the objects of
static pleasure. We might understand this with a simple example from daily life. If a small child
is presented with a large plate piled high with cookies, she will take more than one serving. Left
to her own devices, she is likely to consume cookies until she gets a stomach ache. The mature
ability to limit one’s consumption of pleasant things is akin to pleasure as freedom from pain,
which is the proclaimed highest end. Any such proclamation is first challenged by Epicurus’ own
admission in that he ‘cannot imagine anything good without Aristippean pleasure’, according to
Cicero (ii 20). The priority of static pleasure is thus called into doubt. Second, the Epicurean
cradle argument bases its identification of static pleasure as the highest end on the basis of the
natural drive infants have. On Cicero’s reading, this means Epicurus grounds static pleasure in
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This is a misrepresentation on Cicero’s part, as the Epicureans do not say that pleasure—even
kinetic pleasure—is delight of the body. It is better understood to be the alleviating of some
discomfort or the satisfying of a need, physical or psychological. Rist 1972, 105-110 and 122126 provides a helpful summary of the kinetic and katastematic pleasure as presented by
Epicurus and Cicero. In particular, he argues Cicero overlooks the distinction between aponia
and ataraxia, which characterize freedom from pain with respect to the body and mind,
respectively (105).
70

kinetic pleasure.77 Epicureans fail to see the logical problem of grounding the more independent,
self-sustaining static pleasure on the dependent, fleeting kinetic pleasure.78 As a result, Cicero
rejects the Epicurean appeal to the young because it selects an unsuitable end and lacks logical
support. He does not condemn the inclination to appeal to the young.
Cicero does not reject the Stoics’ cradle argument on account of the first object of desire
they identify. He is sympathetic to self-preservation as the first desire. His criticism unfolds from
the Stoics’ concept of human nature, which consists of both mind (animo) and body (corpore). If
our first natural desire is for self-preservation, it should therefore encompass care for both mind
and body. Cicero explains that the Stoics expect human beings to disregard the things that affect
the body for the sake of the mind in general, and virtue in particular (iv 32-34). Stoic self-love
requires that humans minimize an essential component of the human self. Cicero maintains that
if the Stoics would emphasize preservation of the best part of oneself, then the conflict would be
resolved (iv 34).79 They could then minimize the need for sound body and maximize concern for
developing virtue and wisdom that they extol as the human telos. Without this the Stoic path to
virtue involves contempt for half of human nature, according to Cicero. The desire for selfpreservation identified in the infant, our natural origin, conflicts with the expectation that we
should reject the body for the sake of virtue as adults. In other words, the Stoics cannot reconcile
the first identifiable desire with the highest end.
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Cicero gives the Epicurean argument an absurd form: ‘since the natural impulses of children
and animals are directed towards kinetic pleasure, therefore katastematic pleasure is the summum
bonum’ (Rist 1972, 106).
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In a move likely designed to highlight Torquatus’ inadequate argumentative training, Cicero
has Torquatus rely on the difference between the kinds of pleasure without ever formally
establishing that difference.
79
Cicero claims the Stoics could avoid inconsistency if they would say ‘every animal is devoted
to the best part of itself and is concerned with the preservation of that one part; no other nature
has any other aim than to preserve what is best in itself’ (iv 34).
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Cicero offers less criticism against the Antiochian cradle argument. He remains
sympathetic to self-preserving desires, as he did in the case of the Stoics. Piso’s account is
consistent with oikeiosis, by which the Stoics say we become familiar with that which is suited to
our nature. Even though Piso has adopted some of the most fundamental Stoic points, he deviates
enough to avoid their flaws. Cicero had criticized the Stoics on the one hand for emphasizing the
mind to the detriment of the body, turning Stoic self-love into a kind of self-destruction (iv 32).
Piso, on the other hand, maintains ‘we all by nature think of ourselves desirable in our
entirety…[and] it must be the case where a whole is desired on its own account, its parts are too’
(v 46). Virtue is extremely valuable in its own right, but this does not require casting off concern
for sound body and good health, which are also valuable in themselves. Piso also does not
require self-awareness and self-knowledge from birth as the Stoics do. He is thus able to preserve
the best of Stoic theory without necessarily committing to its problematic components.
It might be that Cicero is personally endorsing the cradle argument as the Old Academy
and Piso take it up. While they still assume it is possible to make assertions about the nature of a
living being and deduce from it the highest end for the human being, they at least seek a
comprehensive and rigorous analysis of all possibilities before settling on what they think the
most appropriate answer is. It is possible that he accepts their assumption that turning to young
beings tells us something about their nature, and that their nature tells us something about their
proper end. Recently it has been argued that Cicero has an Antiochian trajectory in the De finibus
because he appears to favor the Old Academy and Antiochians in two ways. First of all, Cicero
adopts an Antiochian position here by saying Antiochus was right to say that the disagreement
between Stoics and Peripatetics was only verbal (Schofield 2012, 243). Second, the structure of
the text implies that Cicero does not object to Antiochus’ theory as much as he does to
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Epicureanism and Stoicism (246). In response to this, some maintain that Cicero does indeed
favor the Academy in De finibus, but that the Academy is not necessarily the Old Academy
(Long 2015, 188-197). The arrangement of the text leads perhaps to a stalemate on the question
of Cicero’s possible endorsement of the Old Academy. This is reinforced by his professed
allegiance to the New Academy, which adheres to no official doctrine. The acceptance of any
fact or theory from such an Academic can be only provisional. Remaining is the fact that
Cicero’s objections to the particular commitments of Epicureans and Stoics in the cradle
argument do not require a complete rejection of their turn to nature. If this does amount to some
kind of acceptance, it is tenuous acceptance and little more.
The cradle argument Piso presents seems to be the best option of the three, but the
Antiochian position may go too far to preserve both mind and body, discussed in book 5 as virtue
and external goods. Piso explains that the first desire of self-preservation helps the human being
pursue things well-suited for its nature and ‘live in accordance with nature in the best and most
suitable natural condition possible’ (v 24). The Old Academy’s commitment to self-preservation
requires that they value external and bodily goods in addition to virtue. Since the Antiochians
‘regard the bodily attributes as goods’, he maintains, they must also say ‘what conduces to them’,
including friends, family and wealth, are good as well (v 80). This means that virtue can be
sufficient for the happy life for Piso and the Old Academy, but the happiest life would require
other good things (v 81). Where the Stoics had denied too much of human nature for the end to
be consistent with the first desire they identify, the Antiochians seem to indulge human nature
too much and end up with the implausible distinction between the happy and happiest lives as the
highest end.
Cicero’s criticisms of the different cradle arguments suggest he expects a cradle argument
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to be consistent with the broader theory to which it belongs, and to unite the proposed beginning
with the highest end. They may reveal a tension between two senses of nature found in ancient
ethical theories.80 One sense, ‘mere nature’, refers to biological necessity and development,
while the other fuller sense, ‘nature’, refers to the end pursued in ethics (Annas 1993, 144).81 The
cradle argument in all of its forms is designed to lead us from the mere nature of the infant to
nature as mature telos, reconciling what is necessary and given with that which is chosen. This is
especially clear in Stoic oikeiosis, through which natural familiarization to what is naturally good
for us is supposed to occur, and habituation to virtuous action brings human development from
its early stages (characterized by mere nature) to its full nature (Annas 1993, 149).82
Cicero’s dissatisfaction, especially with Stoic and Epicurean appeals to the young, may
be understood in light of ‘mere’ nature and nature as an end. An appeal to the young should
connect young humans and their first desires to their summum bonum, but Stoic and Epicurean
doctrines fail sufficiently to reconcile beginning with end. Their starting point is either
inconsistent with the end prescribed or, for the Epicureans, leads to depravity. A good appeal to
the young must find a starting point that is worthy of human beings in order to bring these two
senses together. In the next section I argue that Cicero’s own appeal to the young, through which
he indirectly posits a highest end that is worthy of human beings, reconciles the two senses of
80

In her chapter ‘Aristotle: Nature and Mere Nature’ Annas 1993 discusses the two senses of
nature in Aristotle, particularly the Nicomachean Ethics. ‘Mere nature’ is given and necessary,
while ‘nature’ is given a stronger sense as an end (145-146). She argues that the two senses of
nature are relatively minor in Aristotle but precipitate the two senses of nature central in
Hellenistic philosophy. She credits Irwin’s glossary in the Nicomachean Ethics for making this
distinction.
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See also Holmes 2014, 570 that argues for these two senses of nature: that which is given and
that which is a goal. She argues moreover that the Stoics attempt to bridge the gap between the
two senses of nature through oikeiosis.
82
This may also hold for the Epicureans insofar their Epicurean cradle argument supposes we
begin by desiring kinetic pleasures, but with experience of pleasure and pain and the
development of virtue, humans come to realize the superiority of static pleasures.
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nature.
The final critique Cicero offers against all presented versions of the cradle argument is
that their appeal to infancy is a mistake. A successful cradle argument should help propel human
beings from one sense of nature to the other, but art seems to be a more reliable method to guide
such a transformation. To Cicero, mere nature is unreliable. He explains, ‘in truth I have no faith
in the judgment of animals. Their instincts can be corrupt without being corrupted. One stick
may deliberately be bent and distorted, another grow that way. So too an animal’s nature may not
have been corrupted by bad upbringing but of its own nature be corrupt’ (ii 33).83 Cicero reduces
the pre-rational newborn to mere animal behavior that cannot be trusted for purposes of ethical
argument. The arts are central in Cicero’s response to Cato, for example. The comprehensive
breadth and vast depth of the work of Stoic predecessors, namely, successors of Plato and
Aristotle, is extolled by Cicero. Particularly important to him are the arts pertaining to rhetoric.
Reasoning and oratory are carried out by two arts for Cicero—the arts of discovery and argument
(iv 10). The great benefit of art is the possibility of progress. The hard work of those who have
come before can teach the young and provide the foundation for further development. Cicero
writes, ‘there may be some of great natural talent who acquire verbal fluency without systematic
study. But in this field art is a safer guide than nature. To pour out words like a poet is one thing.
To arrange what one says in a methodical and organized manner is quite another’ (iv 10). His
preference for art over natural talent reflects his preference to choose a suitable end for humans
over seeking its origins in early childhood development.
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It is not unusual for a philosopher with a skeptical affiliation, particularly an affiliate of the
New Academy but perhaps for the Old Academy as well, to withhold assent over even a rare
exception. Contemporary and later movements in skepticism also uphold this. Sextus Empiricus,
for example, uses conflicting appearances and other similar counterexamples to rule out the
possibility of certain knowledge for the Pyrrhonists.
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There are some suggestions that the other schools have some reservations about nature to
qualify their appeals to the young. Stoic appeals to the young do not always refer back to the
cradle. They sometimes appeal to children ‘whom we can observe taking delight in having
worked something out for themselves even where there is no ulterior motive’ (iii 17).84 Such
children have rational development and abilities beyond the infant. Thus they may be a more
reliable source for the highest end than the infant. Even the Epicureans, depicted as incompetent
by Cicero, hold that learning about nature by mastering physics is important to successfully
adopt Epicurean maxims.85 Cicero likely minimizes these ideas because they aren’t represented
in the cradle arguments the schools use. Through Cicero’s eyes, we can imagine, the Stoics and
Epicureans are making a mistake not to use these ideas, which make the origin more amenable to
learning the arts and more capable of reaching the highest end.

Cicero’s own appeal to the young
Despite Cicero’s criticisms of the various cradle arguments, he is consistently neutral or
sympathetic to the identification of self-preservation as the first object of desire and the general
inclination the schools all have to find a natural foundation for ethics. His rejection of the cradle
arguments of the Stoics and Epicureans, and to a lesser extent the Antiochians, is more precisely
a rejection of the specific details. Cicero does not completely reject an appeal to the young. In
this section, I argue that Cicero actually offers his own highly revised appeal to the young with
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The pursuit here seems to be pleasure in itself, outside of any practical concerns, and
Brunschwig 1986, 135 notes that this appears to conflict with the claim that children pursue what
is useful without concern for pleasure.
85
It is unlikely that Cicero is ignorant of the Epicurean emphasis on studying nature. It is most
plausible that he resists acknowledging this study of nature because mere or biological nature can
be unpredictable and possibly lead us astray from the higher goods that we most appreciate upon
reaching intellectual and biological maturity.
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two component parts in De finibus: first, and more subtly, he arranges the text to demonstrate the
true human summum bonum. Second, and more directly, he emphasizes the role of art in
intellectual and personal development. I explain both these strategies Cicero uses to arrive at his
account of the human end and to resolve the tension between the two kinds of nature. In these
ways he can plausibly argue for a human end without relying on a dogmatic system.
The De finibus divides into three dialogues over five books. Their progression from
Epicureanism to Stoicism into the Old Academy is not unexpected. It parallels Aristotle’s
presentation of the three possible lives in Nicomachean Ethics i 1095b17-19, where the life of
gratification comes first and is to be avoided; second is the life of politics, a suitable but not ideal
life; third and best, the life of contemplation. Cicero claims Epicurean philosophy is the easiest
and most well-known of the contemporary ethical theories, making it a good entry point for the
discussion (i 13). Cicero characterizes Epicureanism as the bottom of the philosophical ladder
and unfit for human beings, particularly serious and politically involved Roman citizens.86 He
dismisses everything about their philosophy from their physics to their ethics. He objects to their
relative ignorance of argument and blames Epicurus for his neglect of definition and scorn for a
liberal education.87
After Epicureanism, Cicero moves on to the Stoics in books 3 and 4. In turning toward
the Stoics, Cicero has his readers and interlocutors take a definite step toward a more
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Rist 1972 argues that Cicero completely misrepresents Epicureanism. Gosling and Taylor
1982 argue the softer position that Cicero underestimates Epicurus and his followers. Stokes
1995, 147 allows that Cicero misrepresents Epicurus’ position, but emphasizes that ‘one ought to
characterize as justly as possible Cicero’s way of arriving at such an interpretation’. Warren
2016 and Frede 2016 both admit Cicero’s treatment of Epicureanism is unfair, but maintain that
his criticisms focus on important problems in their philosophy. Morel 2016 also admits
unfairness but interestingly argues that Cicero’s portrayal of Epicureanism is a carefully
engineered foil to his own concept of virtue as intrinsically good.
87
This occurs in several places and most prominently De finibus i 19-20, 22 and ii 18, 27.
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methodological, respectable philosophy than Torquatus could provide in book 1. The tone is
immediately more scholarly. Cicero happens to encounter Cato upon arriving at Lucullus’ library
to borrow some Aristotle notebooks, both men actively pursuing philosophy in their free time (iii
7-10). Their discussion begins when they both express their concern for Lucullus’s education and
join responsibility for his intellectual development (iii 8-9). The characters are being shown in
the most scholarly light possible. This anticipates the more technical discussion. The Stoics are
better trained in argument than the Epicureans, and they build from the significant contributions
that came before them to push argument form and content as far as possible. Cato’s presentation
of Stoic philosophy meets the scholarly expectations established by the tone of the dialogue.
With great care for language and clear mastery of both Greek and Latin, he outlines the many
fine distinctions of Stoic ethical theory. He selects terms for technical Greek Stoic terms,
including axia, homologia, and kathêkon. Cicero congratulates Cato for speaking precisely and
clearly about Stoic philosophy at iii 40, even ‘committing to memory all of the vocabulary you
are using to express your themes’. The Stoics represent a more advanced stage in development,
consisting in a better understanding of argument and the history of philosophy than the
Epicureans.
Readers would expect the final dialogue to contain the most refined and admirable
philosophy, and they would not be disappointed. Piso’s presentation of Antiochus and the Old
Academy appears to offer the most sophisticated of the theories examined in De finibus (even
though Cicero is not convinced).88 This is because mastering the philosophy of the Old Academy
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The Old and New Academy represent a divide in Academic skepticism. The New Academy, to
which Cicero states his allegiance in Academica, is characterized by radical skepticism that
rejects the possibility of knowledge. Philo of Larissa posits a unity thesis in which radical
sceptics are said to be allow for knowledge that is uncertain, i.e. non-Stoic, in some
circumstances (Brittain 2001, 22). Antiochus, the student of Philo of Larissa, eventually appears
to allow Stoic forms of knowledge, but it is unclear whether Antiochus thinks the Stoics correct
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requires comprehensive understanding of all ancient philosophy. The discussion is also advanced
because Piso is the most rhetorically polished interlocutor in De finibus except, perhaps, Cicero
himself. His presentation is clear, direct, and eloquent. Cicero thinks eloquence is not a
requirement for good philosophy, but good philosophy that is presented well is best of all, and it
proves effective here.89 Cicero’s cousin Lucius, whose philosophical allegiance is at stake, is
won over immediately by Piso’s speech (v 76). The dialogue draws to a close when Cicero
claims Piso must strengthen his argument, but the other interlocutors are deeply impressed by
Piso’s exceptional speech. Cicero’s reply matches the strength of Piso’s presentation, yet he does
not prevail over his interlocutor here as he does in the first two dialogues.90 While there are
suggestions that Piso depends too much on eloquence and not enough on philosophical might,
the readers are left with the impression that they have just witnessed an excellent philosophical
discussion.91
The philosophical depth and respectability of the theories presented clearly increases over
the course of De finibus, and the implication of this progression continues to be the subject of
much debate: Cicero could be agreeing with Antiochus, agreeing with Piso, agreeing with the

Ancient thought, or if Stoic theory replaces that of the Ancients (compare Bonazzi 2012 and
Brittain 2012).
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At i 14-15 Torquatus states that Cicero and Triarius dislike Epicurus because he is less
eloquent than other philosophers, but Cicero insists that he does not demand eloquence of
philosophers. Elsewhere he praises the union of eloquence and good philosophical argument (see
Ac. i 8-10, De fin. iv 6, 24, v 1).
90
By contrast, the first dialogue ends when Torquatus expresses the ability or perhaps need to
refer Cicero to other ‘authorities’ and ‘more experienced practitioners’ (ii 118). Though he seems
confident that better philosophers can come up with answers to Cicero’s challenges, he is not
himself capable. The second dialogue ends with Cato asking Cicero to promise to hear his
refutation soon, but Cicero has the final word (iv 80).
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Cicero at v 85 says that the conversation is ‘wandering from the point’ and attempts to bring
Piso back to the philosophical question at hand. Pomponius’ approval of Piso’s exposition at v
96 is entirely on the basis of presentation and excellence in speaking.
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Academic tradition, or synthesizing his own position through Piso.92 I will not address these
questions here, but rather direct my attention to the inverted correlation between the
improvement in quality of discussion, and the regression of the text through time. The first
dialogue takes place in 50 BCE and the second in 52, but the third occurs long before, in 79,
meaning that the last dialogue occurs at a quite different historical time.93 The circumstances
under which the characters are living in the early 50’s are strained. Civil war is erupting in 50,
and the readers know the characters will be dead soon after the dialogue occurs.94 At 52, the time
at which the second dialogue is set, the characters are on the eve of that war, and we know that
Cato will die according to Stoic principles, choosing death over submission to Caesar’s rule. In
79, by contrast, we find ourselves in Athens during the youthful philosophical studies of Cicero
and his friends. The overall effect is a regression through time that abruptly drops the reader at
the beginning of the adult lives of these men whose careers occur in times of tremendous conflict
and loss.
The reverse chronological order means that the arguments that appear in the later books
cannot depend on the arguments that appear in earlier books. Since the books operate with
relative independence, the three dialogues could have been arranged in any order of Cicero’s
choosing. In fact, arranging the dialogues chronologically might have made more sense for the
audience. So why order them in reverse? Some of Cicero’s motivation may be personal. Writing
in the difficult times, Cicero may be returning wistfully to the simpler, happier days of his youth
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These positions are suggested by Tsouni 2012, 32; Schofield 2012, 246; Long 2015, 195 and
Inwood 2014, 72, respectively.
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The dramatic date of the first two dialogues is less certain. Tsouni 2012, 131 dates De fin. i-iv
at 52. If Tsouni is correct, my main point, that the dramatic date of the final dialogue is
unexpected and philosophically meaningful, does not change.
94
Annas 2001, xvi deduces Torquatus is killed in 48 following military defeat, citing Mitchell
1966, 32-31.
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when the republic was stable.95 However well-grounded such historical and psychological
arguments are, they do not rule out the possibility that Cicero has philosophical reasons for
structuring the text as he does. So what might his arrangement contribute philosophically? I have
already suggested that the arrangement of the dialogues provides a course in philosophical
development Cicero hopes to provide his reader, but a further philosophical point emerges from
the reverse chronological structure of his text.
This subtle point gained from the arrangement is that Cicero manages to have the entire
text enact a version of the cradle argument. Part of Cicero’s resistance to Stoic and Epicurean
appeals to the young is grounded in the fact that he sees nothing of value in mere or biological
nature for ethics. Biological nature can be unpredictable and could quite possibly lead us astray
from the higher goods that we most appreciate upon reaching intellectual and biological
maturity. Cicero makes this clear to Torquatus when he says, ‘in truth I have no faith in the
judgment of animals…an animal’s nature may not have been corrupted by bad upbringing but of
its own nature be corrupt’ (ii 33). For Cicero, ‘mere’ nature would include natural talent that can
be juxtaposed to the end of the acquired arts. Cicero therefore appeals to the young who are
engaged in education and cultivation of skill over the young who simply have undeveloped
talent. Therefore, Cicero appeals to his youthful engagement with philosophy as the suitable
starting point from which to seek the summum bonum.
There may be several advantages of perfected art over raw natural talent, three of which
are relevant for Cicero’s appeal to the young. First, art provides a more stable foundation for
action than natural talent. In response to Cato’s Stoic position, for example, Cicero demonstrates
the superiority of the art in rhetoric through discovery and argument. He writes, ‘there may be
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Annas characterizes the text as ‘nostalgic’, and others argue that Cicero uses philosophy as
therapy in the difficult years leading up to his death, including White 1995.
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some of great natural talent who acquire verbal fluency without systematic study. But in this
field art is a safer guide than nature. To pour out words like a poet is one thing. To arrange what
one says in a methodical and organized manner is quite another’ (iv 10). Second, art makes
progress possible. When a person begins to learn some art, she makes progress toward mastery
over time. Third, the art itself progresses when individuals learn from and build upon the
foundation established by those who have come before them. This means that art and education
propel human beings from what is given and necessary to what is chosen—they propel us from
one sense of nature to the other in a way that Stoic and Epicurean appeals to the young were not
able to do.96
Cicero’s preference for art over natural talent is reflected throughout the entire text in two
ways. The first I have shown above, namely, that the progression of the text parallels
improvement in philosophical discussion. Second, Cicero increasingly emphasizes education as
the text progresses. Cicero builds his educational theme to have a weak presence in the first
dialogue, a strong presence in the second, and an indisputably central presence in the third.
In the first dialogue, the characters are not philosophically effective. Cicero notes that
Torquatus is ‘learned in every philosophical system’, but this learning does not appear to help
him much in the discussion (i 13). Julia Annas summarizes Torquatus’ participation well when
she says he is ‘depicted as having got hold of a few simple ideas, presenting them in a crude,
bludgeoning way and unable to argue for them or meet criticisms; he is constantly deferential to
Epicurus, reverently quoting or paraphrasing the Master’s words’ (xvi). In addition to Torquatus,
Gaius Triarius, ‘a young man of exceptional seriousness and learning’, is present but doesn’t
participate (i 13). Triarius offers nothing of philosophical relevance himself. He complains that
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This is further developed by the depiction of Cicero and Cato in the most scholarly light
possible at De finibus iii and iv.
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Cicero is being too harsh in his assessment, usefully giving Cicero the opportunity to explain that
disagreements in philosophy must be clearly stated without ‘ill-tempered dispute, and willful
controversy’ which are ‘unworthy of philosophers’ (i 27). In other words, Triarius is a kind of
prop that allows Cicero to explain the practice of philosophy explicitly.
Torquatus can recite the works of his master, but struggles to defend his position against
Cicero’s skillful attacks. Cicero suggests Epicurus himself should be blamed for his inadequately
trained interlocutor. After all, Epicurus ‘despised dialectic’ (ii 18). According to Cicero,
Epicurus’ relative ignorance in argument, neglect of definition, and scorn for a liberal education
disadvantages his followers in every important philosophical area. Cicero’s treatment establishes
Epicureanism as the least respectable philosophy with the least qualified practitioners. As a
philosophical system that emphasizes pleasure over virtue, it is unfit for human beings,
particularly serious and politically involved Roman citizens.
Education therefore seems most apparent in the first dialogue because it is neglected by
the Epicureans. As a result of this neglect, Epicureans fail to make progress both individually
and as a group. The problems of Epicurean physics, for example, are the result of Epicurus’
resistance to education beyond physics. To Cicero, Epicurus’ physics is weak for two reasons: he
follows Democritus too much, and where he does deviate from Democritus he makes bigger
mistakes. Cicero writes that Epicurean physics is ‘totally derivative (alienus)’, that is, unoriginal
(i 17). Because Epicurus fails to critically assess Democritus’ theory, he ends up adopting the
same errors Democritus had made. Both thinkers accept that atoms and void make up the world
but, Cicero alleges, neither one provides any account of an efficient cause, or force that brings a
thing into being (i 18).97 Just as Epicurus failed to improve on Democritus, so too Torquatus fails
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For a more complete account of Cicero’s critique of Epicurean physics, see chapter 1.
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to defend the Epicurean position in discussion with Cicero.
The second dialogue has a more scholarly dramatic setting: Cicero happens to encounter
Cato upon arriving at young Lucullus’ library to borrow some Aristotle notebooks, both men
actively pursuing philosophy in their free time (iii 7-10). They begin discussing their concern for
Lucullus’s education and agree to take joint responsibility for his intellectual development (iii 89).98 Their shared concern for philosophical education suggests the Stoics and Academics place
similar value on education. This is part of why Cicero’s critique centers around the success or
failure of the Stoics to acknowledge their debts to their interlocutors and their development of
new terminology.99 Becoming proficient in philosophy means studying the work of one’s
predecessors in order to critique and improve the discipline over all. In other words, it
demonstrates the process by which an individual becomes proficient in an art as much as it
reflects the process by which a discipline advances over the course of several generations of
practitioners.
The final dialogue contains the strongest, most respectable philosophy in a dramatic
setting that is unequivocally and completely educational. The dramatic setting places the
characters in Athens in 79 BCE, during Cicero’s youthful philosophical studies. Cicero and his
companions are in Athens with the sole purpose of gaining an education. They wander around
the ruins of the Academy, marveling at the philosophical history of the place, when they begin
their discussion. The emphasis on philosophical education is anything but subtle—and it is
underscored by the fact that Cicero and Piso are vying for the educational commitment of
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Lucullus was born in 64 BCE, which makes him a teenager during this dialogue. This means
that his education is at stake when he is old enough to engage with philosophical positions. The
setting of the second dialogue therefore reinforces Cicero’s rejection of the appeal to the cradle
argument and his turn instead to the rational human for guidance about the best human end.
99
See chapter 1 for a more complete treatment.
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Lucius, Cicero’s cousin. This increased emphasis on education matches the Old Academy’s
ability to demonstrate what progress in philosophy looks like. Antiochus posits the unity of the
philosophical tradition, which is complemented by the Old Academy’s considerable knowledge
of the history of philosophy.100 Antiochus and his followers readily acknowledge that they, the
Stoics, and the rest of the inherited tradition all share in the same starting points of self-love and
self-preservation (v 23-24). Whereas the Stoics lose humility when they make progress in
philosophy, the Old Academy is suitably modest in recognizing its debts to its philosophical
precursors.101 The Old Academy appears to represent the next progression in philosophy from
the Stoic position. As such, it is the most promising position for developing the expertise of
individuals and for advancing philosophy as a discipline.
Unlike natural talent, education allows for progress at the level of the individual and the
level of the discipline, and it produces consistently superior results. In philosophy, therefore,
Cicero’s search for a suitable origin for the best human end is satisfied by the youths practicing
philosophy together in De finibus v. A starting point in young adulthood rather than infancy has
a number of benefits.102 First, Cicero is able to rely on the rational development and intellectual
pursuits of the philosophy student. Epicureans and Stoics would undoubtedly object that social
demands and expectations would corrupt our desires before a philosophical education begins.
Yet meaningful relationships and education inherently depend on the influence of other people
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For example, see v 7 and 12-17.
Including Piso’s explicit adoption of Carneades’ ethical division (v 16).
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Cicero’s turn to rational maturity and the origins of philosophical study to determine the best
human end represents an appeal to origins that a rational person would prefer. In some sense,
Cicero’s appeal to rationally mature youth embraces Carneadean probabilism. The probabile is
not just that which seems clear and distinct by sense-perception. The probabile is the position
that is determined to have the most rational support upon rigorous critical examination.
101
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and society more broadly. Furthermore, some good things are only possible with the aid of such
relationships and education in the first place. The dialogues suggest first of all that philosophy is
not done in isolation, for example. Lively and respectful discussion among friends is the most
fitting setting for the pursuit. The true corruption, implied by the nostalgic tone, comes with the
struggles of adults dealing with crooked political schemes or structures that bring about political
decay. Second, the starting point and end point are brought more closely together than they are in
the arguments of the Stoics and Epicureans. Thus Cicero argues his own appeal to the young,
emphasizing young adulthood over infancy, in a way that preserves his position-less Academic
method. He uses the structure of his text so that the end of the text features the very origins he
considers most appropriate for the summum bonum.
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CHAPTER THREE
TRUTH-DISCLOSIVE TERMINOLOGY IN DE FINIBUS

Cicero’s training in rhetoric and his career in the forum suggest that he is invested in the
power of words. The craftsmanship evident in De finibus proves as much. In the preceding
chapters, I have shown that Cicero is more purposeful and clever in writing De finibus than most
commentators through the 19th and most of the 20th centuries allow. They generally find Cicero’s
assessments of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians misleading. Recently, great strides have
been made in restoring Cicero’s philosophical reputation. Fresh interpretations argue the
apparent unfairness in Cicero’s presentation is the purposeful product of useful, flat readings of
other philosophers.103 I have shown that flat readings allow Cicero to create space for philosophy
in the Roman context, and specifically for a skeptical eudaimonism in ethics, in my first chapter.
In my second chapter I show that he readily manipulates the cradle argument of the other
philosophers in order to convey his own more subtle appeal to youth and education. Increasingly
it seems that nearly every detail in De finibus is laden with purpose. Cicero’s care is often
manifest in the complexity of his writing. Though the ‘cradle argument’ occurs at three discrete
times in the text, for example, Cicero’s analysis cannot be understood unless the reader, perhaps
against intuition, considers the structure of the entire work.
Cicero’s craftsmanship is equally evident in his use of terms related to transparency and
the disclosure of truth. In this chapter, I argue that Cicero’s use of truth-disclosive terminology
indicates that we should take some positions presented in De finibus more seriously than others.
Some recent research on Cicero’s philosophical works has taken note of Cicero’s use of
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Morel 2016 argues that Cicero’s rejection of Epicureanism is a carefully engineered foil to his
own concept of virtue as intrinsically good.
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language, including Barnaby Taylor 2016 and Silvia Pieroni 2016. Pieroni is thorough in
documenting the use of habeo plus the perfect participle across Cicero’s works, sensitive to
context and grammatical purpose. Taylor argues Epicurus uses ordinary language instead of
definition because it is clearer ‘in two significant senses: first, terms feature transparent
psychological connections to the primary conceptions subordinated to them that enable the
inquirer to access each primary conception with ease’ and ‘[second], the primary conception that
is subordinated to a term is self-evident and so stands in need of no proof or demonstration’
(Taylor 2016, 56). Though Pieroni’s work does not directly apply, my analysis adopts Taylor’s
emphasis on transparency in access to concepts.
I have focused my analysis on a handful of key words in the De finibus that relate to
transparency insofar as they refer to the presence or disclosure of truth: apertus, perspicuus,
plane, clarus, and illustris. 104 I call these terms ‘truth-disclosive’ insofar as they disclose some
relation between truth and argumentative claims or observations.105 Among these, apertus,
perspicuus, and plane are used most consistently to reflect some relation to truth; clarus and
illustris are used to illustrate some ‘clear’ example of moral goodness.106 These terms seem of
104

My usage summation for each term under consideration includes all of its forms (verbal,
adjectival, adverbial, comparative, etc.). I set plane apart in the adverbial form to reflect its usage
in the text.
105
I understand ‘truth-disclosive’ terms to function as either ‘truth-telling’ or ‘truth-indicating’.
In ‘truth-telling’ they may express what is taken to be true directly, and in ‘truth-indicating’ they
may signal the presence of truth in some indirect way. An analysis of the usage patterns of truthtelling and truth-indicating functions of these terms might be productive in the study of De
finibus and Cicero’s other philosophical works, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
106
I have excluded praeclarus from my analysis of clarus here for three reasons. First, it is
difficult to discern whether when Cicero uses the prefix prae- it is intended to intensify clarus or
to improve the sound and general rhythm of any sentence. Second, praeclarus well outpaces
clarus in usage to the point that most of the subtlety in usage is lost. Third, there are a few places
where praeclarus may be used to indicate clarity of evidence, but the translation could equally
refer to that evidence as a shining example in a way similar to clarus (see iii 19, 26; v 79). The
relationship between moral examples and clarity in perception and knowledge in this text
deserves further attention but is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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special interest because they stand juxtaposed to the intentional obscurity of Cicero’s writing.
Cicero’s use of truth-disclosive terms serves two purposes. First, it challenges careful readers to
consider the concepts of transparency and obscurity in philosophy, casting some doubt on their
ability to discern Cicero’s own position. Second, it suggests the Stoic and Antiochian positions
are stronger than the Epicurean one because they use better terms to disclose truth.
To this end I show there are clear usage patterns for the truth-disclosive terms through my
analysis of term usage, in effect validating De finibus as a highly contrived work of philosophy.
Next, I argue the roles of plane, apertus, and perspicuus suggest Cicero’s own position is
undecided between the Stoics, Antiochians, or suspension of judgment. Since an answer cannot
be given with certainty concerning Cicero’s own position, I finally show that the highly
contrived nature of the work employs the terms under investigation specifically to aid the readers
to become more careful thinkers and ask the most talented to judge for themselves the theory that
seems most plausible.
Cicero’s use of truth-disclosive terms reveals several patterns across the five books of De
finibus. All but the first are represented visually in Tables 2 and 3. In sum, I find:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

all truth-disclosive terms under investigation appear in book 1.
Torquatus uses all terms except plane, but Cicero’s character is
selective and appears to privilege plane,
apertus and plane share the same frequency in books 1 and 2,
apertus and plane share the same frequency of usage in book 3, after
which apertus remains infrequent but use of plane rises,
apertus and plane peak in book 2, where perspicuus drops to its lowest
frequency,
perspicuus peaks in book 4, where apertus and plane are at their
second-lowest frequencies,
plane and perspicuus share the highest frequencies in book 5,
clarus and illustris follow similar paths; they have the lowest
frequencies in book 4 and 3, respectively, and peak with the same
frequency in book 5.
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In the sections that follow, I discuss the usage of these terms and the interpretive value of
all seven observations, organized by participating term(s). In the first section I analyze apertus
and plane to demonstrate that Cicero is choosing his words carefully and using them artfully. In
the second section, I analyze the meaning and usage of perspicuus compared to apertus and
plane. My analysis suggests there is an overarching pattern or organization for the various truthtelling terms that help the ideal reader differentiate what is in fact clear or straightforward from
what is not. Plane is given special status on account of Cicero’s exclusive usage of the term in
books 1-4. In Book 5 the reversal in character usage is surprising and suggests Cicero privileges
the Antiochian position. That perspicuus and plane are the two most frequently used truthdisclosive terms in book 5 suggests Cicero is also sympathetic to the Stoic position. In the third
section, I show that clarus and illustris are straightforward in a different mode than the rest of the
terms under consideration. Taken together, these truth-disclosive words suggest that Cicero is
struggling to choose between the Stoic and Antiochian positions and may suspect judgment
about them. This demonstration helps turn his most careful and qualified readers to grapple with
the relative strengths of the Stoic and Antiochian positions and make their own judgment.
Table 1

Truth-disclosive terminology in De finibus
apertus
book 1
book 2
book 3
book 4
book 5

clarus
4
8
1
1
2

illustris
3
1
1
0
4

2
1
0
2
4
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perspicuus plane
3
1
6
8
6

4
8
1
2
6

Table 2

Truth-disclosive terminology in De finibus
Frequency

10
8
6
4
2
0
book 1

book 2
apertus

clarus

book 3
illustris

book 4
perspicuus

book 5

plane

Table 3

Truth-disclosive terminology in De finibus
Frequency

10
8
6
4
2
0
book 1
apertus

book 2
clarus

book 3

book 4

illustris

perspicuus

book 5
plane

Apertus and plane: definitions and usage frequences
Of all of the truth-disclosive terms considered here, apertus and plane are especially
important. They are involved in most of my observations, and their relationship demonstrates
some level of careful consideration in word selection. Let us begin by clarifying what the terms
mean. Apertus means ‘without covering’ or ‘uncovered’. It is the perfect passive participle for
the verb aperio, which has a literal and a more figurative meaning. Literally, it can mean to
uncover or lay bare physical objects; to make visible, show, or reveal. Figuratively, it may refer
to mental objects, in which case it means to disclose something unknown, to unveil, reveal, make
known, unfold, prove, or demonstrate. Apertus also describes mental objects that are open, clear,
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plain, evident, manifest, or unobstructed, and may refer equally to written and verbal expression.
Adverbially, it means plainly, clearly, freely, without reserve.107 The figurative and adverbial
meanings of apertus have the most overlap with the meanings of plane. Plane is an adverb
derived from the adjective planus. Planus literally refers to a surface that is flat or level;
figuratively it may refer to objects of thought, including ideas and language, as plain, clear,
distinct, and intelligible. Plane is often used figuratively and translated as plainly, evenly;
simply, clearly, distinctly, intelligibly. Though their literal senses diverge, the figurative senses
of apertus and plane emphasize the same meaning such that the two terms are similar by
definition.
The similarity in definition is reflected by their similar usage frequency in the early
sections of De finibus. Both apertus and plane occur four times in book 1, eight times in book 2,
and once in book 3, yielding the same frequencies per paragraph at .056 in book 1, .067 in book
2, and .013 in book 3. They are the most frequently used truth-telling terms under consideration
in books 1 and 2, when Cicero writes about Epicureanism. The relative frequencies of apertus
and plane compared with the other terms in book 1 suggests that Cicero chose to use those terms
in particular when examining Epicureanism. By contrast, they are among the least frequently
used terms in the presentation of Stoicism in book 3, which relies on other terms to describe
similar qualities.108

Apertus, and plane in De finibus i-ii
Apertus and plane have much in common. Their meanings can often overlap, and they are
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For general definitions and typical usage, I consult Lewis and Short’s Latin-English Lexicon
1879 and Oxford Latin Dictionary 1968.
108
I will address this further in the next section, when I analyze the use of perspicuus.
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used with the same exact frequency through most of De finibus. Distinguishing between them,
however, is of the utmost importance in De fin. i. In this part of the text, the two are dissimilar in
a few key ways: they are used by different characters, they refer to different kinds of things, and
they seem to have different levels of respectability. I address these differences before I move on
to a very brief treatment of De fin. ii. I argue that apertus is made to be an expression of certainty
founded upon rash naivety, while plane is a more serious term that describes the clarity of its
object.
Despite occurring at the same frequency in book 1, apertus and plane are starkly divided
by character. Cicero is the only character to use plane in book 1. He uses it to describe the
straightforward, direct, and simple expression of what appears to be true. Plane is also the only
term that Cicero’s character uses to indicate some kind of disclosure of what seems to be true.
Torquatus, by contrast, does not use plane. Only Torquatus uses the term apertus—in fact, he
freely uses all of the other truth-disclosive terms under consideration except for plane—and he
consistently uses the term with zeal. Take, for example, his evaluation of Epicurus’ ethics at i 57:
‘What a splendid path to the happy life this is—so open, simple and direct!’109 This enthusiasm
is not problematic in itself. We should all be enthusiastic to find a simple path to a happy life, if
in fact that path is true. Yet there is some reason to doubt the reliability of Torquatus’ judgment
in using the term apertus. He uses it to make the bold claim at i 32 that he will ‘make the whole
subject clear and expound the very doctrines of that discoverer of truth, that builder of the happy
life,’ namely, Epicurus.110 Torquatus enthusiastically uses apertus to praise Epicureanism, but he
borders on hyperbole in his assessment of Epicurus’ insights and his own abilities to ‘make the
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O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et simplicem et directam viam!
…totam rem aperiam aeque ipsa quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae
vitae dicta sunt explicabo.
110
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whole subject clear’. Doubts raised about Torquatus’ judgment are intensified by the contrast
between his high praise of Epicureanism and Cicero’s own scathing assessment. Cicero’s
criticism of Epicurean ethics both before and after Torquatus’ presentation characterizes
Epicureanism as an inappropriate and lowly ethical doctrine for human beings (i 23). Cicero
chooses not to have his character use apertus to describe something Torquatus takes to be the
straightforward, easily observable truth, and emphatically describes as apertus. This is a more
subtle way to hint at Torquatus’ and Epicureanism’s shortcomings.
Though apertus occurs with the same frequency as plane through books 1 and 2, their use
by different characters with different levels of caution implies the terms’ different uses in De
finibus. This point is further supported by the referents of plane and apertus. Note that Torquatus
uses apertus in De fin. i when he refers to Epicurean ethical theory and its contents. When Cicero
uses plane, he never refers to the contents of Epicurean ethical theory. Instead, he initially uses it
to establish the purpose and position of the dialogue with respect to its audience. Cicero opens
Book 1 by introducing his project of providing philosophy for Romans to enjoy in Latin, in
addition to or in place of the work of the Greeks. He anticipates criticism for writing philosophy
in Latin when plane first appears. He explains at i 7, ‘even if I were to translate Plato or Aristotle
literally, as our poets did with the Greek plays, I hardly think I would deserve ill of my fellowcitizens for bringing those sublime geniuses to their attention’.111 Those who would insist on
chastising Cicero for writing philosophy in Latin must have an unreasonable love of Greek
culture and ‘would want to read Greek plain and simple’ (i 8).112 Plane refers to the uncorrupted
and straightforward presentation of Plato and Aristotle in translation on the one hand and the
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Quamquam si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas,
male, credo, mererer de meis civibus si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem.
112
Nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit…
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stubborn desire to read unspoiled Greek texts instead of translations on the other. Plane in effect
directs the reader away from Epicurean ideas altogether.
Cicero uses plane to approach Epicureanism obliquely when he comments on Epicurus’
training and language selection. At i 15, for example, Cicero redresses Torquatus’ assumption
that Cicero would reject Epicurus because his writings are unsophisticated and unrefined. He
remarks, ‘you are quite mistaken, Torquatus…It is not the style of the philosopher which
offends: his words express his meaning, and he writes in a direct way that I can comprehend’.113
In this case, plane describes a strength of Epicurus’. The ability to write ‘in a direct way’ is
valuable. In contrast to this strength, plane appears at i 22 to highlight one of Epicurus’ major
oversights: ‘Take next the second main area of philosophy, the study of inquiry and argument
known as logic. As far as I can gather, your master is quite defenceless and destitute (inermis ac
nudus) here’.114 Cicero’s direct references to Epicureanism denote the simple or clear qualities of
Epicurus’ exposition (but not his theory), and Epicurus’ apparent inadequacy in logical training.
Whereas Torquatus’ references to Epicureanism through apertus contain his praise for the theory
and express his intent to clarify its contents, Cicero’s use of plane directs the reader away from
Epicurean theory. Even when he uses it in reference to Epicurus, he does not actually address
any idea from Epicureanism.
Not only does Cicero signal to his audience that he is using plane and apertus differently
by assigning them to different characters, but the kinds of things to which those terms refer is
also significantly different. I have already discussed Torquatus’ use of apertus as earnestly and
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‘Vide quantum,’ inquam, ‘fallare, Torquate. Oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et
complectitur verbis quod vult et dicit plane quod intellegam’.
114
Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae λογική dicitur, iste
vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est.
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enthusiastically endorsing Epicurus and his ethics. Because he uses the term simply, and because
the character Cicero does not use it, apertus is made to stand out as a naïve choice that indicates
Torquatus has accepted something without sufficient scrutiny. Plane, by contrast, attributes some
sense of plainness to its object. Cicero implies that merely literal translation of Plato and
Aristotle is less admirable or less exciting than his project. When he uses it to discuss those who
insist on reading only Greek, he implies that they lack refinement of taste despite their extensive
education. That Epicurus’ writing is strong insofar as it is plane could easily read as a
backhanded compliment. Thus on the one hand, plane indicates something that is truly
straightforward and clear, but on the other, it may indicate unsophistication. Cicero adjusts his
usage slightly to alter its meaning.
Saying one thing but meaning another is a hallmark of Socratic irony. When Cicero says
that something is straightforward (or says something that is straightforward) but means
something different, he draws on Socrates’ ironic legacy.115 In this case, he utilizes that legacy to
undercut the status of Epicureanism in book 1 and simultaneously introduce additional
complexity to the role that plane has. This is especially clear when Cicero refers to Epicurus as
plane at i 15 and i 22. In both cases, Cicero implies that Epicurus lacks sophistication. In both
cases Cicero also implies some measure by which he makes his assessment. When Cicero
determines ‘ut mihi quidem videtur’, literally ‘as indeed it seems to me’, that Epicurus is
‘plane…inermis ac nudis’ in logic, he must already have in mind an idea of what good logical
training is and how it informs philosophical argumentation. Cicero also refers to logic as the
‘second main area in philosophy’. This is an allusion to the formal division of philosophy that
115

In this case, Cicero both (1) says something himself that is straightforward and (2) claims that
Epicurus is being straightforward as a strength. Yet Cicero is neither being straightforward in his
assessment (since plane is condescending) nor does he mean simply that Epicurus’ directness is a
strength.
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the Stoics promote: physics, logic, and ethics. Epicurus’ inadequacy is, as a result, determined
both from Cicero’s own judgment and from comparison with his philosophical rivals. The
association of plane with some form of measure or comparison is a further dimension of plane
that gives the term a complex role in the text.
Plane can be used in at least three roles at this point: (1) it might have a simple role,
namely identifying something that is straightforward; (2) it might have an ironic role, wherein
being called straightforward means something else (unsophistication); or (3) it might be used to
refer to an evaluative context in which that which is plane is compared to other theories, ideas, or
impressions. The complex role Cicero gives to plane makes Torquatus’ use of apertus look even
more questionable. The most painful contrast appears at i 30, shortly after Cicero introduces the
term’s association with the third, complex role of plane. Torquatus notes that Epicurus
‘maintains that there is a difference between reasoned argumentative proof and mere noticing or
pointing out; the former is for the discovery of abstruse and complex truths, the latter for judging
what is clear and straightforward’.116 Epicurus, he explains, does not think that argument is
always necessary. But for Cicero, we should always be evaluating the objects we observe, the
quality of appearances of those objects, and the quality of the judgments we derive from those
objects. Cicero’s use of plane implies that we should exercise caution even in accepting what
seems plainly to be the case. To say that something, upon suitable analysis, seems obvious or
plain (plane) is a significant improvement from Torquatus’ unfounded affirmations of Epicurus.
Having linked plane with the critical examination of objects that seem obvious, Cicero in effect
gives plane greater authority than apertus. The enhances the authority of this term in two ways.
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Here Torquatus is introducing Epicurus’ ‘cradle argument’ wherein we determine the best
human end from observations of infant behavior: altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta
aperiri, altera prompta et aperta indicari.
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First, Cicero’s earlier pejorative use of plane indirectly undermines the authority of that which is
apertus. Second, Cicero’s later uses suggest it is reasonable to scrutinize even those objects or
claims that seem obvious, again undermining the legitimacy of apertus as a condition for
accepting some impression or claim as true. In particular, this makes plane more credible with
respect to gaining and furthering knowledge. Cicero’s uncharitable criticisms of Epicureanism
are explicit, but the text itself is subtle. Cicero provides two levels from which his readers can
doubt the strength of Epicureanism. The view available to all readers is expressed in Cicero’s
explicit criticisms and it guides all readers to reject Epicurean ethics. The most talented readers,
however, should notice the subtlety of plane and its roles in comparison to apertus. At a
minimum, plane introduces some expectation for critical evaluation prior to the acceptance of a
claim for careful readers of the text. The most capable few could observe from plane and apertus
that there may not be a planus or apertus answer in ethics.

Apertus and plane in De finibus iii-v
Apertus and plane differ in book 1 in that different characters use them, their referents are
different, and they have different levels of respectability. Despite their similarities by definition,
these differences are sufficient to justify a claim that they are opposed to one another in De fin. i.
Their contrasts, however, do not persist for the duration of the text. Cicero uses apertus more
frequently in book 2 than Torquatus did in book 1, for example.117 Half of these appearances of
apertus occur in contrast to language that emphasizes opacity and darkness, such as occulte,
occultus, opertus, and obscurus.118 This suggests that there is a significant difference between

117

Torquatus uses apertus three times in book 1 at a rate of .056 times per paragraph; Cicero
uses it eight times in book 2, at .067 times per paragraph.
118
See ii 5, 15, 54, and 85. Clarity is also juxtaposed to the ‘unclear’ and ‘difficulty’ at ii 18.
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that which is laid bare or uncovered and that which is hidden. In contrast to that something that is
hidden, apertus loses its naïve and enthusiastic connotation.
The term’s rehabilitation is most evident in books 3 and 4, ultimately bringing it about
that apertus and plane are both respectable truth-disclosing terms that are appropriately used by
good philosophers. The rehabilitation process begins in book 3 where apertus is used in a more
solemn argumentative context than Torquatus could muster. The Stoics and Academics engage
in significant and complex debate concerning the central questions of epistemology and ethics.
Cato, with the reputation of a being a serious person and well-trained Stoic, engages the
‘absurd…supposed view of the Academy that the final good and supreme duty of the wise
person is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold assent to them’ (iii 31). Cato’s reading of
the Academic position is a poignant response to Cicero’s subtle suggestion that we should
scrutinize even appearances that seem obvious. Unwillingness to assent to appearances on the
Stoic view amounts to being unable to choose beneficial objects over harmful ones and the
inability to act or attain wisdom. He explains ‘it is perfectly clear (apertius) that if one does away
with the notion of choosing between what is in accordance with nature and what is against, then
that highly sought after and hallowed virtue of practical reason will be completely abolished’ (iii
31). Practical reason is fundamentally the ability to choose appropriate objects of desire and
appropriate actions. By removing the distinction between what is appropriate and what is
inappropriate, the ability to discern and choose between them is eradicated.119 Cato’s reputation
lends apertus a serious tone, and the tight reasoning implied by his claim demonstrates a rigor
that Torquatus, and indeed Epicurus, were said to lack.
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In the case of medicine, for example, eliminating the normative distinction health and disease
makes it impossible to determine appropriate from inappropriate courses of treatment.
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Cato’s use of apertus redeems the term significantly, but its rescue is completed when
Piso uses the term in book 5 in connection with one of the most important arguments in the
text.120 That is, Piso uses apertus when he discusses his version of the cradle argument. The
cradle arguments of the different schools maintain a palpable presence throughout the text, and
the appeal to nature on which they depend is ubiquitous in ancient philosophy. The appearance
of apertus occurs when Piso rounds off his cradle argument at v 34 and therefore seems
important. Piso claims: ‘It is now sufficiently clear that everyone by nature loves themselves. We
must next examine what human nature is’.121 This is significant for two reasons. First, it concerns
one of the central and enduring arguments in the ethical system Piso advances. By linking
apertus with such an important argument, Cicero in effect gives the term the responsibility of
supporting the appeal to nature that is a cornerstone in all Hellenistic ethical theories. Second,
apertus is given an inferential role in that argument, signaling a shift from presenting evidence to
determining a conclusion. Thus apertus not only is used in association with a crucial argument,
but it plays a crucial role in drawing a conclusion concerning that crucial argument. Having
given apertus such an important place in Piso’s account, Cicero appropriately makes the final
usage of apertus underscore an important feature of philosophy itself. Recall that Cicero is
centrally concerned with promoting philosophy and defending his project of adding philosophy
to Rome’s cultural repertoire. It is significant, therefore, that the last usage of apertus concerns
the intrinsic value of knowledge. Piso maintains that human beings take joy in pure knowledge
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Torquatus uses the term at i 30 to justify the Epicurean cradle argument when he explains we
need ‘mere noticing or pointing out…for judging what is clear and straighforward’. Though this
is an important argument, we cannot take apertus very seriously because of Torquatus. He uses it
with even greater naïve enthusiasm when he claims he will explain the entire theory of pleasure
and pain in detail (i 32).
121
Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis apertum est sibi quemque natura esse carum, quae sit
hominis natura.
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without regard for practical advantage, and naturally pursue knowledge (v 48). He uses examples
from literary, anecdotal, and commonly observable sources before offering at v 51, ‘there is little
purpose in inquiring further into such an obvious matter’ (v 49-53).122
Compared to its naïve application in book 1, apertus is given significant responsibility in
book 5. The rehabilitation of apertus reveals two points to aid in interpretation of the truthdisclosive terms. First, the term apertus is not itself problematic. When Torquatus and likeminded enthusiastic Epicureans use it, they do so prematurely. That is, they use it
inappropriately. It is important to note that the imprudent use of apertus resembles Epicurean
imprudence elsewhere in their ethics. Cicero maintains that pain and pleasure are unworthy
criteria by which human beings can judge good and bad courses of action. In using apertus
poorly, Torquatus acts out the failures of Epicurean theory. The failure to use a term correctly
seems trivial, but its significance emerges in the broader context of De finibus. One of the major
challenges facing the Epicureans is their apparent inability to value anything without regard for
its utility—in their case, the amount of pleasure it brings.123 Recent work focusing on the conflict
between utility and friendship in Epicureanism points out that the Epicureans appear to value
friendship intrinsically.124 Despite this purported valuation of friendship, however, even the best
friendships among Epicureans cannot firmly establish such intrinsic value.125 The imprudent use
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Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere?
Even pleasure itself is in some sense instrumental to the happiness.
124
Frede 2016, 99 points out in footnote 9 that VS 52, 78, and 23 highlight the intrinsic value of
friendship.
125
I am agreeing here with Frede 2016. She argues that the three versions of Epicureanism that
Torquatus explains can be quite noble, but they never quite get around friendship’s utility
understood ‘exclusively in terms of material goods and external protection’ (113). Cicero’s
characterization of this utility may be unfair, but insofar as Epicureans make pleasure their end,
even the strongest and most enduring friendships ‘remain quite superficial if the desire for the
pleasure is not to be frustrated’ (116).
123
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of apertus is thereby one symptom of many indicating the problems of Epicureanism more
broadly.126 Second, Cicero does not limit his philosophically strong characters to one term for
discussing objects, ideas, or judgments that are straightforward. Piso is arguably the strongest
character in De finibus, rivaling Cicero’s own namesake character. When Piso uses apertus, he
does not emphasize that obvious facts need no explanation like Torquatus and Epicurus. Rather,
he has already given an account of the joy humans take in learning such that ‘inquiring further’ is
unnecessary. As a result, Piso gives apertus the meaning that plane had in book 1.
Though apertus is redeemed over the course of the text as a serious truth-disclosive word
to the point that it approaches the respected meaning of plane in book 1, ultimately there remain
differences in usage between the two. In fact there are several significant differences between
them that should not be overlooked. First, and most basically, the status of plane remains by and
large unchanged throughout the text while the status of apertus shifts. Second, apertus and plane
diverge in frequency in book 4 and 5. Apertus occurs at a rate of .013 per paragraph in book 4,
and .021 in book 5. This means that, even though it is used well by Piso, apertus is used
infrequently. Plane, like apertus, has its lowest usage in book 3 at .013 per paragraph. It is also
infrequent in book 4, where it is used .025 times per paragraph. Unlike apertus, plane makes a
dramatic rebound in book 5 with a staggering usage of .063 per paragraph, tied with perspicuus
as the most used truth-disclosive term under consideration. The third difference pertains to the
characters that use the terms. On the one hand, apertus is freely used by Torquatus, Cicero, Cato,
and Piso over the course of the text but plane is used by Cicero’s character exclusively in De fin.
126

Epicurean inability to account for things that are good in themselves without regard for
practical benefit is prominent in De fin. iii and iv. At iii 70, Cato emphasizes that the Stoics
refuse to endorse friendship and justice for their utility because ‘the same utility might ruin or
corrupt these. There can be no justice of friendship at all except where sought for their own
sake’. The Stoics tend to rely on the concept of utility with respect to the body rather than
immaterial things (see iii 17, 18, 62).
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i-iv.127 On the other hand, Quintus, Pomponius, and Piso all use plane in book 5, but Cicero’s
character does not. It follows that apertus and plane do not become fully synonymous.

Apertus and plane: conclusion
The points of dissimilarity between apertus and plane produce more problems than
solutions. If plane is the truth-disclosing word with the most integrity in book 1, for example,
why is Cicero the only major character who does not use it in book 5? Why does the usage of
apertus and plane suddenly diverge in books 4 and 5 after an extended synchronization in De fin.
i-iii? Still, these differences disclose a good deal about De finibus and its author. It is unlikely
mere coincidence that Cicero avoids having Torquatus, his least expert interlocutor, use the term
plane to discuss ideas or claims that seem obvious, reserving the term nearly exclusively for his
own character’s use. Similarly, it is unlikely mere coincidence that plane is used more often than
the others in the most philosophically and rhetorically subtle section of the text, book 5.
My analysis above confirms that Cicero is selecting and applying truth-disclosive
language carefully. I highlight the transformation that apertus goes through and its use by
various characters in the context of specific philosophical problems to show that the
respectability of the term depends on its context. Apertus is used by the philosophically
admirable and objectionable alike, in better and worse ways. Plane, by contrast, appears to hold
a place of privilege for Cicero. It is set apart from its peers because it is most often used to refer
to clarity of language and of argument. Given Cicero’s goals for his project to translate and
introduce philosophy to Romans, an emphasis on language directs plane to the heart of Cicero’s
project. Furthermore, Cicero reserves the term for his own character’s usage until book 5. On the
127

There is one exception in book 2, when Torquatus uses it in what Lewis and Short call the
‘transferred’ sense, loosely meaning ‘absolutely’ or ‘completely’.
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one hand, this could indicate that Cicero privileges plane. On the other hand, shifting plane from
Cicero to the other characters may interrupt the expectations of the readers. Why, after all, would
Cicero not use plane in the dialogue that contains the strongest ethical position? Above all, it is
unlikely that the patterns of usage in the case of apertus and plane are a product of mere chance.
The dynamics of plane in particular suggest that the readers should be diligent in subjecting even
things that seem obvious to scrutiny.

Perspicuus: definitions and usage frequencies
Perspicuus is the most frequently used truth-disclosive term in books 3, 4, and 5. The
frequency with which perspicuus occurs provides a very different pattern than that of apertus
and plane. Cicero uses perspicuus only three times in book 1 and once in book 2. Its frequency
per paragraph is .042 and .008, respectively. This is extremely low compared to apertus and
plane, but the frequency of perspicuus rises abruptly in book 3 and remains high throughout the
rest of the text. The shift is both dramatic and sustained. From book 2 to book 3, its frequency
per paragraph jumps from .008 to .079. The highest frequency follows in book 4 at .100 uses per
paragraph, and remains strong with .063 uses per paragraph in book 5.
Perspicuus is the fourth principle part of perspicio, and it can be translated as
‘transparent’, ‘clear’, ‘evident’, or ‘manifest’. Thus it may refer to objects that can be seen
through, objects that are clearly perceptible by the senses, or objects that are clear to the
understanding. The first two kinds of objects I consider the ‘literal’ uses of perspicuus. The third
kind of object, pertaining to the understanding, I consider the ‘figurative’ use of perspicuus.
Though the literal uses of the term do not appear independently in De finibus, the figurative uses
may also evoke the literal sense. The figurative sense of perspicuus can be further divided into
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two applications: evidentiary and inferential. Evidentiary applications refer to the clarity of
evidence that is being used in support of some conclusion. These in particular often imply the
literal use of perspicuus. Inferential applications refer primarily to the certainty with which a
conclusion follows from its premises.

Perspicuus: general usage patterns
Because of its notable frequency, perspicuus has a dominant presence, especially in
books 3 and 4. It differs from apertus and plane in at least two other ways. Most obviously,
perspicuus stands out from the others on account of the characters that use it. Recall that plane is
used almost exclusively by Cicero’s character until book 5, when every other major character
uses it, but Cicero does not. Perspicuus, by contrast, is generally used by the main speakers in
each section of the text: in the exposition of Epicureanism in book 1, only Torquatus uses the
term perspicuus; Cicero alone uses it in book 2’s refutation of the Epicurean presentation; Cato
uses it in book 3, where he presents the Stoic view; Cicero uses it in book 4 to refute the Stoic
view; the Antiochian presentation dominates book 5, where only Piso uses the term.128 The main
speaker of each section, no matter how well or poorly trained, uses the term similarly. Character
usage, which in the case of plane provides helpful clues to suggest when the term is being used
sincerely or not, will provide no such clues in the case of perspicuus. In fact, the use of
perspicuus by main speakers in each section indicates the consistency of the term. A common
meaning unites the evidentiary and inferential applications of perspicuus for all of the characters
that use the term throughout the text. In this capacity, perspicuus further differs from apertus and
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The refutation of the Antiochian view is also in book 5. Though it is equally important and
impressive, the interlocutors judge in favor of the Antiochian theory. On this basis I make the
claim that the Antiochian theory is dominant, making Piso the main speaker for the section.
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plane. I have shown above that plane has one primary meaning but a complex role that allows it
to be used almost ironically to undermine the purported clarity of some bit of evidence or idea.
Similarly, all of the characters would define apertus in the same way, but its meaning in the text
is colored by the character who uses it. The meaning of the terms depends on the context in
which something is called plane or apertus. Perspicuus offers an alternative pattern to apertus
and plane that reinforces my conclusion in the previous section and adds support to a contextdependent interpretation of truth-disclosive language.
The consistency of the meaning of perspicuus persists through both inferential and
evidentiary applications of the term. These two primary applications of perspicuus are apparent
from the beginning of De finibus. Torquatus draws from both applications in book 1. The
evidentiary application is present when Torquatus uses perspicuus to indicate that some point he
makes is apparent or manifest. He uses the inferential application when he uses the term to
reinforce the certainty with which a conclusion follows from premises that might be called
perspicuus in the evidentiary application. Torquatus applies the term inferentially when he says,
‘This being so, it is evident that a thing is rendered right and praiseworthy just to the extent that
it is conducive to a life of pleasure’ (i 42).129 Having presented Epicurus’ account of the human
end from i 29-42, Torquatus thinks he has demonstrated his point sufficiently to warrant a shift
to his conclusion that good things are called good because they bring pleasure. This is slightly
different from his use of perspicuus at i 70 when he explains that one theory of Epicurean
friendship is rooted in the idea that there is a ‘pact to love one’s friends as much as oneself. We
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Quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnes rectas res atque laudabiles eo referri ut cum voluptate
vivatur.
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certainly recognize that this can happen, and often observe it happening’.130 In this case,
perspicuus can only describe the quality of Torquatus’ observations of friendships in his lived
experience, and is completely unrelated to the call for the transition from premises to conclusion
or the strength of premises that lead to a particular conclusion. The applications differ because
the object to which they refer. The evidentiary application refers to some evidence in support of
a further conclusion. The inferential application represents the act of judgment by which a
conclusion is drawn from evidence. Though different by referents, in both cases the term
depends on its figurative sense to identify the object in question as ‘evident’ or ‘manifest’.
Though perspicuus is used to claim the evident or manifest nature of some evidence or
conclusion, it does not always signal that those claims are well-supported. Torquatus uses it in
earnest and with complete self-assurance. Yet in sections of the text involving Epicureanism,
perspicuus generally refers to acts of judgment that are unsupported. This contributes to the
characterization of Torquatus and his philosophy as having less sophistication and depth than the
other schools represented in the text. As a result, Torquatus’ use of perspicuus tends to
emphasize how unlikely it is that the object in question is as obvious to others as it seems to him.
This means that when Torquatus uses the term to talk about fundamental positions of Epicurean
ethics, he accidentally undermines the theory he defends.131
Torquatus’ certainty in using perspicuus to explain and defend Epicurean ethics is
contrasted by Cicero’s singular usage of it in book 2. Cicero, unlike Torquatus, uses an image at
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Quod et posse fieri intellegimus et saepe evenire videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde
vivendum reperiri posse quod coniunctione tali sit aptius.
131
Consider that Torquatus uses perspicuus in book 1 to refer to three key themes in
Epicureanism: in establishing that all behavior and action stems from pleasure and pain (i 42); in
establishing ‘that great mental pleasure or pain has more influence on whether our life is happy
or miserable than does physical pleasure or pain of equal duration’ (i 56); and concerning the
kinds of friendship (i 70). On each of these points, Torquatus inadvertently rouses suspicion.
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ii 59 to illustrate his claim ‘It is obvious (perspicuum) that if fairness, honesty, and justice do not
originate in nature, and all merely serve utility, then there is nobody good to be found’.132 In the
image, Cicero says that it would be wrong to fail to warn your enemy that he was about to tread
on a viper, even if you could benefit from his death with impunity by not warning him. The act—
or omission, in this case—is wrong regardless of how useful it would be for your enemy to die.
In effect, the image supplies the audience with an example from which they could decide that
fairness, honesty, and justice cannot merely serve utility (utilitas). While perspicuus suggests
that the point he makes is obvious, Cicero supports the claim with an argument from example. It
is surely not a rigorous argument, but the image provides at least minimal support for Cicero’s
claim that something is perspicuus or obvious to him. Torquatus’ self-assurance is thereby
designed to be unfounded; his self-assurance may disclose a hint of intellectual vanity or
rashness.
Cicero appears to have two additional motives for using perspicuus as he does. The first
motive is pedagogical, and the second is methodological. Because Cicero exhibits both
applications of perspicuus in books 1 and 2, he also introduces them to the reader in anticipation
of the more technical discussion to come in De finibus iii and iv, where perspicuus is used more
frequently than any of the other words under consideration. The reader might well need
preparation for the Stoic section of the text. It is lengthy, detailed, and deals with some close
vocabulary and translation work that Cicero calls ‘nit-picking’ (iv 6). Attentively reading such
material is a challenging and tedious endeavor, and as such it would require some training. The
methodological motivation is really focused on Stoic methods rather than Cicero’s. It becomes
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Cicero implies a modus ponens for the Epicureans: (P1) If a person acts according to things
that are not given by nature but only on utility, then that person is a good person; (P2) People act
according to things that are not given by nature but only on utility; (C) Therefore, people are
good. The argument by example is directed at proving (P2) false.
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important for Cicero to demonstrate the use of perspicuus adequately before reaching book 3
because perspicuus represents a fundamental component of Stoic argument method. Cicero
explains that the Stoic system ‘begins from propositions that are evident and [proceed]
methodically through to the right conclusion in each individual case’ (iv 8).133 Thus the
likelihood that the reader will encounter perspicuus both to refer to the quality of their evidence
or observations and the necessity of proceeding to their conclusions is all but certain.
Cicero’s motives for using perspicuus in the way that he does may be multiple. Nevertheless all
of his uses for the term—emphasizing Torquatus’ poor judgment, inferential and evidentiary
applications, and a possible pedagogical or methodological strategy—entail the same
fundamental understanding of its meaning. Perspicuus always describes that which the speaker
takes to be straightforward. The consistency of the term develops further as the text progresses.
In book 3, for example, both Cicero and Cato use perspicuus consistently to indicate what is
obvious. In one exchange at iii 19, Cato uses perspicuus when he has explained that his plain
style seems necessary for a discussion of ‘the basic elements of nature’, while a grander topic
would call for a grander style. Cicero replies that this is most fitting, and that ‘still, in my view,
when a worthy theme is expounded with clarity, it is thereby expounded with distinction. It is
surely childish to want to discuss a topic of the present sort in a rhetorical style. For one of
learning and intelligence, a clear and straightforward exposition is the aim’.134 In this case,
perspicuus describes the outcome of Cato’s stylistic choice to speak simply about simple
concepts. Cicero and Cato appear to be in agreement that the style and ideas involved here are in
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Iam argumenti ratione conclusi caput esse1 faciunt ea quae perspicua dicunt; deinde ordinem
sequuntur; tum quid verum sit in singulis extrema conclusio est.
134
‘Est ut dicis,’ inquam; ‘sed tamen omne quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici
videtur. Istiusmodi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire
posse docti et intellegentis viri.’
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fact perspicuus, and with respect to the aptness of using a straightforward style to discuss
straightforward objects. This bears a striking contrast to Cicero’s sardonic praise of Epicurus’
strength, namely writing in a direct or plane manner that is easy to understand at (i 15). Thus the
complexity of plane may be absent from perspicuus. The consistent, straightforward meaning of
perspicuus sets it apart from apertus and plane.

Cato and the perspicuus
I have argued that the term perspicuus is different from apertus and plane insofar as its
meaning remains consistent throughout. In particular, the kind of complexity that plane was able
to exploit does not apply to perspicuus. A lack of complexity, however, does not indicate a lack
of depth. Rather than play with irony and sincerity, Cicero uses perspicuus in ways that
emphasize central Stoic arguments and themes in De finibus iii and iv, as well as Cicero’s main
points against them. These include the Stoic doctrine of selecting appropriate objects and actions,
the Stoic emphasis on deductive argument structure, and Cicero’s main criticism of Stoic ethics.
The correlation between perspicuus and these crucial Stoic themes shows that Cicero chose
perspicuus over the other truth-disclosive words to highlight themes and arguments that deserve
extra attention.135
Our first clear example of the role of perspicuus comes at iii 19, when Cato explains that
he intentionally chose to use a simple style to discuss simple concepts. Further consideration of
the passage suggests that Cato is not only discussing rhetorical style. Instead, his comment draws
attention to the idea that one can choose appropriate styles of discourse for different subjects.
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There is also a likely connection between Cicero’s use of perspicuus in books 3 and 4 with
the Stoic-Academic exchange concerning epistemology, particularly since the Academics
distinguish perspicua from percepta (Academica ii 34).
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When Cato and Cicero agree that ‘a fullness of style is…scarcely appropriate’ to discuss ‘the
basic elements of nature’, they actually endorse the idea that appropriate acts are praiseworthy.136
The question of appropriate action (kathekon) is a fundamental building block of Stoic ethics.137
The correlation between the perpiscuus and the kathekon is strong. Out of the six occurrences of
perspicuus in book 3, five of them are arguably related to appropriate action. In addition to iii 19,
Cato rails against misreadings of Stoicism. Misreadings can be understood as one way of using
another’s doctrine inappropriately, but Cato makes more direct reference to appropriate action
when he says of his reply to them, ‘obvious ripostes do not need to be long ones’ (iii 31).138 In
both cases, Cato is demonstrating the appropriate action by selecting a simple style at iii 19, and
by keeping his reply brief at iii 31.
The connection between Cato’s language and appropriate action is subtle in the beginning
of book 3, and they refer primarily back to Cato’s method of exposition. The association grows
stronger when he uses perpicuus to refer to the contents of his arguments as his account
progresses. Cato refers to a number of claims concerning his Stoic position as perspicuus,
including: that the distinction between the Peripatetics and Stoics is not merely verbal (iii 41);
that wise people must ‘act in the sphere of intermediates’ or indifferents, and judge that action
appropriate (kathekon) (iii 59); that even fools ‘will act appropriately by remaining alive’ if they
have some ‘things in accordance with nature’ (iii 61); that love of one’s offspring is as natural
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and obvious as aversion to pain (iii 62). These uses share many similarities. They all depend on
evidentiary application of the term and they all bear some relation to appropriate action. About
the differences between the Stoics and Peripatetic ethical theories, for example, Cato announces,
‘to my mind nothing could be more obvious than that the dispute between these schools is
substantial rather than verbal’ (iii 41). Cato is responding to the old Carneadean argument that
the Stoics and Peripatetics use different language to express the same concepts about what
objects are called ‘good’. With this claim, Cato clarifies the parameters of ‘intermediates’ that
will be chosen for the sake of ‘good’ objects.139 Intermediates then prepare the way for wise
people to undertake appropriate action at iii 59. When Cato examines the choiceworthiness of
ending or continuing one’s life at iii 61, he is in fact providing the reader with an important
example of a key intermediate, namely life itself. Like any other intermediate, life itself can be
used appropriately or inappropriately. Cato suggests that our actions, even in choosing life or
death, are determined from the guidance of nature itself (iii 62).
The correlation of perspicuus with concern for appropriate action in De finibus iii
suggests that Cato places significant value on the term. When Cicero replies to Cato in book 4,
he does not seem to use perspicuus with similar reverence. He instead uses perspicuus to refer to
a variety of claims, ideas, or observations he thinks are obvious against the Stoic ethical position,
in which appropriate action is central. In particular, he criticizes the Stoics for their use of
appropriate action as a guide at all. At iv 46, for example, he uses perspicuus to address what
could be interpreted as a rare strength of the Epicureans over the Stoics: ‘For those whose
supreme good lies in pleasure, observe how obvious it is what actions should be done or not
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according to Carneades and Cicero (De finibus iii 41, iv 2, 5, 60).
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done.’140 Of course Cicero does not endorse the Epicureans, but he appears to value the fact that
their position provides everyone with a simple measure by which to guide their actions. The
Stoics, in his view, fail to do this and thus provide little positive direction for their adherents.
Cicero’s character, then, seems to think the Stoics would benefit from readily applicable
practical guidelines. Instead, they have sophisticated language that fails to connect to their lived
experience.
Choosing appropriate objects among intermediates and choosing appropriate actions are
two lynchpins of Stoic ethics. Cato’s use of perspicuus closely correlates with these themes in
De finibus. However strong the arguments are, and however closely they correlate to perspicuus,
the term is also used to critique the Stoics. Cicero maintains the Stoics appear to prioritize
sophisticated terminology over practical guidance, for example. He understands this to be a
practical failure. Furthermore, Cicero suggests that this failure indicates a more extensive
problem with clarity that the Stoics must contend with. Thus he poses to Cato the question,
‘should the evident clarify the doubtful or be refuted by it?’ (iv 67). He charges that the Stoics
‘try to overturn the evident with the doubtful, when you should be illuminating the doubtful with
the evident’.141 He refers specifically to the Stoic tendency to complicate concepts that were
simple for their predecessors, as when the Stoics allow ‘there is progress towards virtue’ but not
a ‘reduction in vice’ or even an increase in virtue within such progress (iv 67). The criticism
applies as much to practical concerns as to clarity of concepts and justification. Cicero
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summarizes the problem at iv 7 when he states, ‘Look how they proceed: coining new words and
disregarding tried and true ones.’ Rather than clarify concepts that already exist, he claims,
Stoics riskily posit new terms for them that are less useful than the ones they replace.142 Cicero’s
criticism may be directed to subtly differing components of the system Cato defends, but the
meaning and usage of perspicuus nevertheless remains consistent. The term’s meaning remains
unchanged from Cato’s appeals to appropriate action to Cicero’s demand for clear justification in
the case of practical action and knowledge.
The use of perspicuus is not limited to the contents of Stoic ethical arguments and
counterarguments. The term is also used discuss fundamental rules of deduction. Take, for
example, Cicero’s rejection of the Stoic conclusions ‘that all who are not wise are equally
miserable; that all who are wise are equally happy’ (iv 55). He allows that such declarations are
appealing, but upon examination they cannot be accepted on the basis of ‘common sense, the
facts of nature, and truth herself’ as embodied in what ‘logicians teach us [namely]…that if
whatever follows from a premise is false, then the premise from which it follows is itself false’
(iv 55). Perspicuus once again highlights an important feature of Stoic philosophy. The Stoics
understand logic to be one of the three constitutive branches of philosophy, and a necessary area
of knowledge to understand the rational order of the cosmos.
Insofar as perspicuus emphasizes something important in Stoic philosophy, its use is
uninteresting here. Its application, however, adds interest to its usage at iv 55 and after, at iv 68.
Cicero’s claim is notably grounded by an appeal to the authority of the logicians. While
perspicuus appears to have an inferential application here, grounding the judgment of what is
perspicuus in the observation of experts shifts the term into an evidentiary application. The
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inferential characteristics of the term’s use are muted here by its evidentiary characteristics. Still,
Cicero’s reference to the logicians emphasizes the fact that Cicero’s objection is more firmly
grounded than mere observation; it bears the demonstrative force of a modus tollens.143 There is
some sense in which perspicuus is used inferentially here, but it is not especially strong because
it calls attention to the authority of dialecticians rather than the strength of their arguments.
Cicero’s final use of perspicuus at iv 68, when he claims it is obvious that not all vices are equal,
depends on observation. It is unclear whether the evidentiary application of perspicuus at iv 68 is
intended to amplify the term’s evidentiary application at iv 55 or if it is intended to contrast its
inferential characteristics at iv 55. Regardless of the intended effect of perspicuus at iv 68, the
term seems to be able to maneuver between inferential and evidentiary applications more freely
in book 4 than we have seen elsewhere. In the end, the evidentiary applications appear to have a
primary role over the inferential applications. It follows that the primary role of perspicuus in
book 4 is to ‘point out’ what appears to be obvious based on experience.144 This is significant in
turn because it returns us to the use of perspicuus in its methodological role, where it is the point
of observation on which all argument is grounded.
Though the underlying meaning of perspicuus does not change in the text, it still has
significant depth in De finibus, particularly when it is used in the context of Stoicism. Cicero
chooses this term over the others in close correlation with some of the most important Stoic
themes, including the process of deduction itself. He additionally begins to overlap evidentiary
and inferential applications of perspicuus in book 4, where he ultimately appears to weight the
evidentiary application of the term slightly more heavily. Thus perspicuus plays a crucial role in
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the context of Stoicism to link together major ideas as well as get back to the source of all Stoic
argument in noting what is perspicuus through observations of nature.

Perspicuus in book 5
Like Cicero in book 4, Piso in book 5 relies primarily on the evidentiary application of
perspicuus, where the term is used to identify something that appears to be obvious. Also like
Cicero, the evidentiary priority does not prevent Piso from overlapping the evidentiary and
inferential applications of the term. Piso also uses perspicuus almost exclusively to discuss his
cradle argument, which is of central importance. This also reflects Cicero’s use of perspicuus to
discuss three central Stoic themes in books 3 and 4.145 The reader is left with the impression that
perspicuus is an important, respectable term.
The evidentiary priority of perspicuus is clear from the beginning of book 5. Though the
evidentiary application remains important, it also complements the inferential application for
Piso in book 5. The first use of perspicuus in book 5 occurs when Piso announces at v 16 that he
agrees with Carneades’ claim that ‘no branch of knowledge can be based on itself’, which Piso
takes to be obviously true and justifies with the support of examples.146 The evidentiary
application of perspicuus is strengthened when Piso discusses human nature. Piso states at v 31,
‘indeed it is perfectly obvious that we not only love ourselves, but do so with a passion’.147 This
reaffirms the Antiochian position Piso defends, in which the proper end for human beings is
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etiam vehementer carum esse?
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firmly rooted in self-love. The passage at v 31 appears to contain an evidentiary application of
perspicuus, the full importance and strength of which is amplified in the lines that follow, which
I explain momentarily. Before I analyze v 31 further, it is worth noting that Piso uses perspicuus
as well when speaking about human nature in concrete terms. He states, ‘evidently human beings
consist of mind and body, but the mind and its components are primary, the parts of the body
only secondary’ (v 34).148 He repeats it soon after, at v 37, when he introduces the nature of mind
and body ‘enough to give an outline of the requirements of human nature’. He uses it again to
emphasize human nature when he posits: ‘Here are some even clearer cases from nature—in fact
absolutely obvious and indubitable ones—of the desire, most evident in humans but also present
in animals, for constant activity. Continual rest is unendurable under any circumstances’ (v
55).149 In all of these cases, Piso relies on what he deems to be ‘obvious observation’.
The evidentiary application of perspicuus in book 5 is primary, but it also enters into a
dynamic relationship with the inferential application in Piso’s discussion of human nature. At v
31, Piso utilizes an evidentiary application of perspicuus to emphasize how easily it can be
observed that humans by nature love themselves. As he expands on the subject, Piso introduces a
complementary use of evidentiary and inferential applications. All actions, he continues, are
driven by self-love. We derive pleasure from objects that benefit us, and recoil from things that
harm us (v 28-31). We feel pain when we must leave our preservative friendships and families in
death (v 32). Piso claims ‘this whole area reveals more clearly than any other the power of our
nature’, namely to love ourselves (v 32). This use of perspicuus appears to be primarily an
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evidentiary application. We plainly observe fear behaviors in the face of death, and we plainly
observe human nature in those moments. Yet this use does seem to bring both evidentiary and
inferential applications very close together. It is equally possible that our nature is made evident
by human fear of death and that certain conclusions about nature follow obviously from the
evidence that is human fear of death. The two perhaps need not be exclusive. Piso seems to use
the inferential and evidentiary applications of perspicuus to support one another. This suggests
that perspicuus may be multifaceted in the right hands. It may be capable of reconciling
argumentative inference with empirical observation, at least in the case of human nature.
While book 5 does not introduce any new senses of perspicuus and appears to use it in
uninteresting, straightforward ways, it does introduce a new dimension to the analysis of
perspicuus’ use. With the exception of v 16, Piso uses perspicuus only to describe truths that are
related to his cradle argument. As I have discussed earlier, the cradle argument represents a
central tenet not only of Antiochian ethics, but Hellenistic ethics more broadly. Though plane
was sometimes used in connection to the cradle argument (see v 55 and perhaps v 35, v 58), the
use of plane in book 5 is overwhelmingly related to clarity of argument, language, and learning.
Similarly, apertus in book 5 is used once concerning the cradle argument at v 34, but its role
applies directly to the argumentative movement of Piso’s account of the argument, not the claims
of the argument itself. The other use of apertus in book 5 states the obviousness of the fact that
human beings take joy in pure knowledge without regard for utility (v 51). Thus perspicuus is
reserved for one of the most important arguments in ancient ethics. It is given a position of
privilege in book 5.
There is additional support for the privileged position of perspicuus in its definition.
Recall that perspicuus is an adjective that means ‘transparent’, ‘clear’, or more figuratively,
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‘evident’, or ‘manifest’, referring to either objects of sense or intellect. Cicero relies on the
figurative sense, which I then divided into evidentiary and inferential applications. If we step
back from the applications and back to two senses of perspicuus, we find that the literal and the
figurative are not as opposed as they might have seemed. Perspicuus is the adjectival form of
perspicio, which literally means ‘to look over or inspect thoroughly’, or to scrutinize. We
scrutinize not only the objects of sense before is, but also mental objects. This is how perspicio
means equally ‘to examine mentally, study, investigate’.150 Sensory and intellectual discernment,
though different in important ways, are two sides of the same linguistic coin. The division that I
impose on perspicuus in the figurative sense is artificial, and can be detrimental if it obscures the
close relationship between the scrutiny of sensory objects and the scrutiny of mental objects. It
might be that perspicuus has more agility than the other truth-indicating terms, since it applies to
mental and sensory objects equally.

Perspicuus: conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear not only that Cicero is choosing words carefully, but that we
might be able to develop a way to determine which terms he uses when, and some possible
reasons why. Upon analyzing the use of perspicuus in De finibus, especially book 5, the
evidentiary/inferential division I impose on the term is limited for two reasons. First, evidentiary
applications of perspicuus often refer to empirical observation, in which case sensory objects are
necessarily implicated and the literal sense of the term invoked. Since my division was only
meant to apply to figurative senses of the term, every evidentiary application entails a divisional
distortion. Second, as argued above, perspicuus is emphasized at a crucially important section of
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the text, in which the best philosopher, Piso, discusses a central ethical argument, the cradle
argument. The most important feature distinguishing perspicuus from the other words under
consideration is not that there is a literal and figurative sense—many have both senses. What sets
it apart is its responsibility for the all-important cradle argument.
The context-dependent interpretation of perspicuus cannot be denied. Torquatus uses
perspicuus in earnest, but it highlights the fact that what he says is not in fact so obvious as he
thinks it is. There are a few complicating factors to take into account in a basic analysis of
perspicuus in the Epicurean context. First, Cicero says the Epicurean measure of goodness,
pleasure, is better than the Stoic theory insofar as it makes it easy to determine the best course of
action for an individual to take (iv 46). Second, Cicero might be suggesting that we can
sometimes defer to the Epicurean preference to merely ‘point out’ what is truly obvious.
Whether these factors amount to a significant redemption of Epicureanism is unclear, but
Cicero’s motivations for using perspicuus are in any case different when dealing with Epicureans
than his motivations in using the term with the Stoics. In the case of the Stoics, Cicero
established that which is perspicuus as the fundamental starting point for Stoic inquiry and
argument that they share with their predecessors (iv 8). This accounts in part for the prevalence
of the term throughout books 3 and 4. Book 5, by contrast, appears to be motivated primarily by
associating Piso’s perception of the Antiochian cradle argument as obvious. Given the Old
Academy’s adoption of Stoic ideas, the presence of a fundamental Stoic term like perspicuus is
expected.
Just as the analysis of apertus and plane provoked further questions, the same may be
true here. The most pressing question is likely, which of these motivations reflect Cicero’s own
view? There is not enough evidence to decisively answer this question, but one might speculate
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as to a few possible explanations. In addition to relying more on context than its peers,
perspicuus might have an overarching development through the text as well. Such a course of
development might be useful. One possible account of the term’s development is that Cicero
could be using perspicuus in order of decreasing irony. It seems that Torquatus’ use of
perspicuus is overzealous when referring to argument and most appropriate when limited to the
Epicurean realm of sense-perception and pleasure.151 In the case of the Stoics, perspicuus is often
used appropriately as the origin of all inquiry and method. Cicero criticizes the Stoics because
their philosophy does not differ from the Peripatetics with respect to perspicua or concepts.
Cato’s claim that the disputes between the Stoics and Peripatetics concerning the objects worthy
of choice and rejection are substantial rather than verbal is unconvincing for Cicero (iii 41). By
contrast, Cicero regularly and rigorously refers to the merely verbal alterations the Stoics make
to already existing philosophy (iv 60, 74). Finally, this is complicated in book 5. Though
perspicuus appears most straightforwardly in book 5, this is where the Old Academy takes up the
term from the Stoics. Sensory and mental objects are examined with equal aplomb in the cradle
argument as evidentiary and inferential applications of the term come together. Despite the
relative strength of Piso’s position, Cicero does not explicitly endorse the Old Academy and
praises the Stoics’ consistency over the Old Academy’s. Cicero’s forceful rejection of Cato and
the Stoics is less certain in the context of perspicuus in book 5.
Perspicuus undergoes a subtle course of development. As such, it is not immediately
apparent to the casual reader. It might represent an esoteric use of perspicuus that would suggest
Cicero endorses the Antiochian theory—at least as it manifests itself in the cradle argument—
more than the others. The possibility that Cicero might consider adopting the Antiochian cradle
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argument must be considered adjacent to the evidence that Cicero rejects the Old Academy. 152
The use of perspicuus thus draws the readers to think critically about Cicero’s own transparency
or obscurity. In particular, it calls attention to the difficulties of binding Cicero to any one
position in De finibus.

Clarus and illustris
Among the words related to truth-telling that I examine, clarus and illustris have the most
varied translations. Clarus has three basic categories of meaning: visual, mental, and moral.
Consequently it might refer to the visually clear, bright, shining, or brilliant; the mentally clear,
manifest, plain, evident, intelligible; or the morally brilliant, celebrated, renowned, illustrious,
honorable, famous, glorious.153 Illustris similarly can be divided into the visual, the mental, and
the moral. It can be used with respect to visual objects to describe something that is lighted up,
clear, or bright; it can also be used as a synonym for clarus in cases of mental clarity and moral
respectability or eminence. In this section I argue first that all three of these usages for clarus and
illustris appear in De finibus, and second, that the best interpretations of the words shift both
according to the portion of the text in which they occur and according to the character using the
terms.

Clarus and illustris unite
Clarus and illustris are sometimes united in meaning and location. They work together to
emphasize the visual, mental, or moral brilliance of an object. This is initially significant in the
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earliest appearances of clarus and illustris in De finibus, which correspond primarily to Cicero’s
use of exempla. Cicero’s exempla demonstrate good acts and the incompatibility of
Epicureanism with those acts. One of Cicero’s paradigmatic examples of good action is drawn
from those among Torquatus’ ancestors that demonstrated great bravery and concern for duty
above all else (i 23-24). In response to Cicero’s examples, Torquatus defends Epicureanism at i
36 when he says,
The kind of oratory you practice, and especially your own particular brand, with
its keen interest in the past, makes great play of recalling brave and distinguished
men and praising their actions for being motivated not by gain but by the simple
glory of their honorable behavior. But this notion is completely undermined once
that method of choice that I just mentioned is established, namely that pleasures
are foregone when this means obtaining still greater pleasures, and pains endured
to avoid still greater pains.
In quo enim maxime consuevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim, qui
studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris commemorandis eorumque
factis non emolumento aliquo sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis, id totum
evertitur eo delectu rerum quem modo dixi constituto, ut aut voluptates omittantur
maiorum voluptatum adipiscendarum causa aut dolores suscipiantur maiorum
dolorum effugiendorum gratia.
Clarus here clearly refers to the men (viris) who are also identified as strong or brave (fortibus),
making it most reasonable to translate clarus in the moral sense. This is also true of i 37, where
Torquatus declares, ‘enough has been said here about distinguished people and their illustrious
and glorious deeds’.154 Clarorum clearly refers to the human beings in question, while
inlustribus and gloriosis refer to their deeds (factis). Though their referents differ in this line,
both illustris and clarus are used in their moral sense and consequently match the sense of clarus
used earlier in i 36.
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Clarus and illustris appear together one more time at i 71, where they both depart slightly
from the moral sense used above. Torquatus delineates that we owe a great debt to Epicurus ‘if
the philosophy I’ve been describing is clearer and more brilliant than the sun; if it is all drawn
from the fount of nature; if my whole speech gains credibility by being based on the uncorrupted
and untainted testimony of the senses’.155 Inlustriora and clariora, respective comparatives for
illustris and clarus, have no explicit relation to the nobility and dignity of ethical role models
here. Instead, they draw primarily on the clarity of sense perception, referring to what Torquatus
considers to be the immeasurably enlightening qualities of Epicurean theory. 156
Though the sense in which something is clear may shift in book 1, clarus and illustris
nevertheless remain united in that they change together. The two terms consistently mean the
same thing in book 1. At i 36-37, both terms clearly express their moral sense. The terms at i 71
appear to refer to the objects of sense perception more than anything else, but it is noteworthy
that they appear to shift their meanings together. The shift in meaning does not appear to alter the
impression the reader has of clarus and illustris at the end of book 1. Despite Torquatus’ shift,
the meaning of clarus and illustris in book 1 remains primarily moral.

Clarus and illustris diverge
In book 1, clarus and illustris held meanings that were bound together. Beginning in
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book 2, the two begin to diverge. Cicero continues to use clarus in the moral sense in De finibus
ii and iii. At ii 67, Cicero’s character refers to ‘those of greatest renown’ (claris viris) among
whom Torquatus should be able to find support for his ethical system, if it is in fact a good one.
In book 3, Cicero’s character uses clarus again to refer to the ‘honorable occupation’ of Cato’s
reading books at his leisure (iii 7). Though Cato’s ‘honorable occupation’ does not embody the
moral sense of clarus in the same way that the exempla do, it is a representation of admirable
qualities and actions. While clarus largely retains its moral sense for Cicero’s character, he
develops illustris independently of clarus. Unlike clarus, illustris shifts away from its moral
sense at ii 15 when Cicero’s character explains ‘Now Epicurus, in my view, does not set out to
avoid speaking plainly and directly. Nor is his subject difficult, like the physicist’s, or technical,
like the mathematician’s. Rather it is a clear and straightforward topic, widely familiar to the
public’.157 Illustris here refers to the easy and widely-known subject matter of Epicurus’
philosophy, most likely drawing on the sense of illustris that pertains to mental clarity. In book
4, Cicero’s character uses illustris once in the moral sense and once to discuss indirectly
Panaetius, whose ‘doctrines were gentler, and his style more lucid’ (iv 79).158 Books 2-4
therefore allow for the mental sense of illustris in addition to the moral sense, but clarus remains
primarily a moral word.
Piso is the only character to use illustris in book 5, and he uses clarus almost exclusively
in the same section.159 Each term occurs four times in book 5, concurrently only once at v 48.
Here Piso is announcing that he is going to discuss ‘the components of the mind, which provide
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an altogether nobler array. The more lofty they are, the more certainly they indicate the presence
of nature’.160 The translation has illustris refer primarily to the nobility of the parts of soul or
mind (animi) over the parts of the body discussed in v 47, but their nobility should be attributed
to Cicero’s use of ‘excelsiores’, which unequivocally conveys superiority. The Latin allows that
the parts of mind could ‘look more clear’ to Piso, which would depend on a mental sense of
illustris rather than the moral one. On this interpretation, illustris and clarus would be similar, if
not precise synonyms. If we admit the translation as it stands, then clarus could have a
significantly different translation from illustris. Earlier in De finibus, clarus and illustris could be
used as synonyms; here, they could either both refer to mental clarity, or they could point on the
one hand toward a value-laden moral sense, on the other toward mental clarity.
Other uses of illustris in book 5 might aid in interpreting its use at v 48. All other
occurrences of illustris in De finibus v are directed at descriptions of objects as noble and
illustrious or perhaps illuminating. Two of them are concerned with philosophy itself and the life
it fosters. At v 7 and v 11, Piso praises the course of study made possible by the work of the
ancients and the quality of their writing about the contemplative life, respectively. Piso aims the
final occurrence of illustris at the cradle argument he advances, particularly as it relates to the
Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis. At v 65, Piso observes ‘in the whole moral field that we are
discussing there is nothing so noble or wide-ranging as society between human beings, that
alliance, so to speak, of shared interests, and the mutual affection of the human species’.161
Illustris here indicates that mutual affection among human beings on the basis of shared interests
160

Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant
clariora indicia naturae.
161
In omni autem honesto de quo loquimur nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam
coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa
caritas generis humani.
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is admirable. If Piso is using the term consistently, then he most likely uses illustris in the moral
sense at v 48. Insofar as the moral sense of illustris elsewhere in book 5 also comments on the
superiority of a certain mode of philosophy and mental life, Piso implies the mental sense of
illustris alongside the moral sense. As a result it seems unlikely that clarus and illustris are
synonymous at v 48, for illustris seems to have this affiliation with moral valuation that clarus
lacks.
Of the three remaining appearances of clarus in De finibus v, two seem to rely on the
moral sense of the term, and one seems to be completely separate from the moral sense. The nonmoral sense of clarus appears at v 55. This is a paragraph in which Piso declares that all of the
Hellenistic schools justify their ethics on the basis of observations of infants.162 Piso begins the
paragraph, ‘here are some even clearer cases from nature—in fact absolutely obvious and
indubitable ones—of the desire, most evident in humans but also present in animals, for constant
activity. Continual rest is unendurable under any circumstances’.163 Clarus, here ‘clariora’,
refers directly to the observable and explanatory qualities of the examples he is about to use,
invoking the sensory and mental senses of the term. The moral sense is approached only insofar
as the cradle argument brings to mind the origin and terminus of ethical development. The moral
sense of clarus is more present elsewhere in book 5. Cicero’s character uses it in this way when
he expresses agreement with Piso at v 4, for example. He notes, ‘it is a fact that the stimulus of
place considerably sharpens and intensifies the thoughts we have about famous individuals
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For a thorough analysis, see Brunschwig 1986. Piso’s Antiochian version of the cradle
argument may hold significant influence over the rest of De finibus (see Schofield 2008, Long
2014). I offer a new reading in my own cradle argument chapter.
163
Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia naturae, maxime
scilicet in homine sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus agere semper aliquid neque ulla
condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati.
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(claris viris)’. Given the nostalgic tone and the context of praising philosophical predecessors in
this section of the text, the translation here of ‘famous’ for ‘claris’ should retain its moral sense
of being renowned and celebrated.164 Piso uses it when he declares at v 74 ‘it is our system alone
which is worthy of the student of the liberal arts, worthy of the learned and distinguished, worthy
of princes and of kings’.165
In sum, the moral senses of clarus and illustris dominate book 1. Clarus retains its moral
sense in book 2, while illustris shifts to emphasize clarity of Epicurus’ language rather than
moral examples. In book 3, the moral sense of clarus describes a good way to pass one’s time
rather than an exemplary human being. Illustris uses its moral sense once in book 4, and visual
or mental sense once to describe the clarity of Panaetius’ style. Both terms are used most often in
book 5, where they express a variety of meanings in praising noble deeds and honorable courses
of study, and in seeking clarity of understanding concerning noble things. It does not seem
possible to determine set rules for the usage of clarus and illustris in De finibus. They can be
used to represent all three of their senses, depending on context. Clarus and illustris demonstrate
the increasing complexity of the philosophical positions, concepts, and the abilities of the most
talented readers over the course of the text. Initially, the simpler moral sense is dominant. The
ordinary reader might assume that clarus and illustris only express moral brilliance but after that
the two terms are applied in increasingly diverse, contextually differentiated ways.
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It is possible for the visual or mental sense of clarus to be used here to emphasize the
brilliance of the predecessors, or to describe their example as a model that shines brightly across
time and space. In this case, whichever interpretation one chooses, the general message is
relatively unchanged; the predecessors are excellent role models and giants in philosophy.
165
Ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna
claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus.
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Clarus and illustris: conclusion
The patterns I have detected in the usage of truth-disclosive language in Cicero’s De
finibus reveal that Cicero selects his terms and crafts their application with care. As a result, he
develops the vocabulary surrounding the disclosure of truth in playful, thought-provoking ways.
Some terms can have both ironic and direct significations; others rely less on irony and more on
the senses of the term as belonging to the literal or figurative domain, or as belonging to the
realm of sense-objects, mental objects, or moral objects. A full understanding of any of Cicero’s
truth-disclosive terms, however, appears to depend on the context in which they are used. This
means that those readers of Cicero’s philosophical works that underestimate the care with which
he composed them overlook some of his most fundamental philosophical talents.
Cicero’s use of truth-disclosive terms has several implications for De finibus. First, his use of the
terms encourages his readers to think about claims of certainty with respect to objects of
perception and knowledge. When Cicero contrasts his own conscientious care with the laxity of
Torquatus’ use of the terms, for example, he implies apparently obvious claims or judgments
might be misleading. Readers should perform due diligence to determine the plausibility of each
major contributing idea in the text. Second, diligent observation of these terms suggests that
some terms reflect a better, more serious position than others. Plane and perspicuus ultimately
indicate that the Stoics and Antiochians offer the strongest positions. Third, truth-disclosive
terms do not disclose Cicero’s own position to his readers. Cicero resists endorsing the Stoic and
Antiochian positions despite their strength. This represents a dramatic suspension of judgment.
As a result, the readers must draw their own conclusions from the positions detailed in the text.
By all accounts, Cicero’s De finibus is a highly contrived work of philosophy in which he
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carefully chooses the terms he uses to assess general clarity of one’s position and expression, the
quality of evidence in argument, and the necessity of the conclusions they precipitate.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AUTHOR, CHARACTER, TRANSLATOR, TEACHER

Cicero’s philosophical works discuss a wide range of topics in Hellenistic philosophy,
but they all share a common dialogue form. In the preceding chapters I argue that Cicero is
purposefully crafting De finibus to help his readers become better prepared for philosophy and
engage his most talented readers in sophisticated ways. He aims to assist his readers in living
better lives through critical thinking, leading them to critically assess for themselves the various
positions presented. Dialogue form is one of the most effective means to attain these ends.
Cicero undertakes this project in part to teach philosophy to Rome and encourage Romans to
engage in philosophy, likely with the underlying aspiration that philosophical training will make
prominent, well-educated citizens better people who can, then, save the republic. These aims are
served well by the dialogue form. In reading a philosophical dialogue, the reader is encouraged
‘to reflect in some way upon the arguments being offered’ (Ford 2008, 33). This helps cultivate
philosophical depth and critical thinking. This form also provides the audience with a strong
model for the practice of philosophy since dialogue form ‘allows for disagreement and candid
exchange, and is thus an inherently non-authoritarian medium’ (Long 2008, 45). The readers are
thereby induced to philosophize in accord with a cooperative dialectical model (Ford 2008, 33).
For Cicero, the dialogue form is thus an ideal medium to instruct his Roman readers about the
contents and practice of philosophy. He uses it to demonstrate the nature of philosophy for his
audience, and some of the practical considerations involved in philosophizing successfully, such
as having leisure and defining one’s terms. Most importantly, he uses it to promote ‘intellectual
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discoveries, teaching discoveries to others and converting others to the life of philosophy’ (Long
2008, 48).166
Cicero’s self-identification as an Academic makes dialogue an especially appealing
medium. Academics argue on either side of a problem in order to discover the most probable
view with the most rational support. Cicero explains the value of this approach in Academica ii
60 when he offers the following exchange:
There remains their statement that for the discovery of truth it is necessary to
argue against all things and for all things. Well then, I should like to see what they
have discovered. ‘Oh,’ [the Academic] says, ‘it is not out practice to give an
exposition.’ What pray are these holy secrets of yours, or why does your school
conceal its doctrine like something disgraceful?’ ‘In order,’ says he, ‘that our
hearers may be guided by reason rather than by authority.’
Cicero values the non-authoritarian quality of the dialogue form that is crucial in encouraging the
readers to engage in philosophical practice and critical assessment on their own. Yet, as an
Academic, he goes beyond a non-authoritarian approach. He should conceal his own view as
much as possible. Philosophical dialogue provides him with a unique opportunity to obscure and
withhold his own view. Authors of a philosophical dialogue might choose to include their own
voices or not. Cicero could include himself as a character, absent himself and leave the
discussion entirely to other characters, stand in as an omniscient narrator, or develop his presence
in the text in more creative ways. In De finibus, he chooses to include himself in the text as the
author, character, and translator.167 Cicero’s use of himself calls attention to the different aims
each iteration of himself has in De finibus, in effect distancing himself from the readers. This
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Italics are Long’s.
I use ‘Cicero’ to distinguish the character in the dialogue from Cicero in his other roles. Even
as the character ‘Cicero’, Cicero gives us snapshots of his engagement with philosophy at three
different times, possibly thinking different things at each time.
167
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distance prevents readers from attributing views to Cicero and, without an authority to appeal to,
they must draw their own conclusions about the theories presented.
In this chapter, I argue that Cicero calls attention to himself in his many roles for two
reasons. First, he aims to obscure his own position so that he can lead readers to think for
themselves about the ethical positions at hand. Since his aims and method are thoroughly
Academic, Cicero is suggesting to us that his own position should be irrelevant for us when we
read De finibus. This is especially important for Cicero in his role as author and character.168
Cicero aims not to be interpreted directly for his character ‘Cicero’. This protects Cicero from
being assigned any position that he has his character take up for investigation. One of Cicero’s
central authorial concerns must be keeping his own view, if he has one, from his readers so as
not to unduly influence their judgment. Second, he aims to spark critical thinking in his readers
about the uses of transparency and obscurity in philosophy so that they begin practicing his
Academic method and weigh and determine the strongest position for themselves.

Cicero the author, character, and translator
The authorial Cicero is most visible in De finibus at the beginning of books 1, 3, and 5,
when he introduces each school of thought. This draws attention to Cicero’s authorial role in a
way that alienates his readership just enough to make them aware of the fact that they are not the
immediate audience. At the beginning of the text, Cicero addresses Brutus directly and dedicates
De finibus to him. Cicero uses the introduction to explain the goals and challenges of his project
to Brutus. His goals include translating Greek philosophy into Latin and contributing some of his
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As a translator, Cicero intends to create distance for interpretation between himself and his
character, but the intentional generation of obscurity likely ends here. There is no evidence that
Cicero uses intentionally obscure terminology to translate important ideas.
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‘own judgment and order of composition’ (i 6). The challenges include objections to Cicero
writing philosophy at all, or specifically philosophy in Latin (i 2-4). The introduction to book 1,
the most significant and extensive in De finibus, anticipates potential objections of the readers
and preemptively rebuts them. The reader is therefore made aware of the fact that Cicero is
approaching this text with some concern for the subject matter at hand in addition to an acute
awareness of his cultural context as an author rather than a character. The authorial Cicero has
different interests from the character ‘Cicero’. Awareness of the author operating independently
of both his namesake and audience diminishes the connection between them. Because the author
Cicero and his character have different aims, the reader is also less likely to directly attribute the
words of Cicero’s character to Cicero himself.
The distance generated in book 1 between the authorial Cicero and his audience is
intensified in book 3. The opening paragraphs of book 3 prepare the reader for an astute
philosophical debate with the Stoics (iii 2). De finibus iii and iv are more rigorous than their
preceding books, making it unlikely that they are intended merely to educate the uninitiated. The
authorial Cicero directly engages Brutus, ‘an erudite student of philosophy’ (iii 6). Cicero notes
it would be inappropriate to lecture Brutus as if to educate him, and instead calls on him to stand
as ‘the most impartial critic and judge’ (iii 6). The readers are invited to observe the more
philosophically impressive debate in which Brutus is the direct audience and judge. It might
serve as a model for them, or a tool to help them grow from the more basic analysis of
Epicureanism to a more sophisticated critique of the Stoics. The readers are thus invited to be
more active philosophical participants, but only indirectly.
The introduction to De finibus v is significantly shorter than the other two. Book 1’s
introduction is comprised of twelve paragraphs; book 2’s is made up of six. Book 5’s
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introduction is contained entirely in a single paragraph. It is barely an introduction by
comparison, but it stands out from the rest of the dialogue because Brutus is again explicitly
addressed. The abbreviated introduction might result in a less stark separation between the
authorial Cicero and his readers than was established in earlier books, but there is also less need
for that separation because of the dramatic setting. The setting of book 5 stands out for a number
of reasons: the characters are in their youth; the dialogue takes place long before those of the
other four books; the dialogue takes place at the ruins of Plato’s Academy in Athens; the
presentation and refutation occur in a single book; the tone appears to be nostalgic rather than
academic. Cicero’s readers are unlikely to read the authorial Cicero into the young ‘Cicero’
character because of the surprisingly unconventional circumstances of De finibus v. Cicero is
able to displace his own views without relying on a long preamble.
The introductions of De finibus i, iii, and v illustrate that the concerns of Cicero as author
may differ from those of the characters, including the one called ‘Cicero’. This means that
Cicero, calling attention to himself as author, equally calls attention to ‘Cicero’. The character
role confirms the separation that Cicero’s authorial presence creates in part by involving other
thinkers in brief imaginary exchanges. At De finibus ii 28, for example, ‘Cicero’ engages
‘Epicurus’ in a pretend dialogue. ‘Cicero’ explains that Epicurus’ tendency to rely on sensory
delight as the model for pleasure is problematic because it allows that ‘no deed is foul enough to
consider refraining from so long as it is done for the sake of pleasure and no one is watching’. As
if prompted by this unkind assessment, Epicurus appears to ‘[take] refuge in the claim that
nothing can be added to the pleasure of one who feels no pain. But that static condition of not
being in pain is simply not called pleasure.’ The character ‘Cicero’ steps out of his conversation
with Torquatus to make this critique even though there is no reason to think that Cicero himself
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would not have stood by it. It seems that the point of this imaginary exchange is to remind the
reader that ‘Cicero’ is fictional, as is the Epicurus he draws into debate. ‘Cicero’ in addition has
‘Epicurus’ say ‘I am not concerned with names’. This passage represents one of the main
arguments Cicero presents against the Epicureans, that the term pleasure (hedone, voluptas) is
inadequate to account both for painlessness and sensual pleasure.169 The position Cicero gives to
‘Epicurus’ is consistent with Epicurean theory. There is no reason to think that Cicero would not
have stood by this critique, yet he has ‘Cicero’ disengage Torquatus to make this critique against
an imaginary Epicurus. The character ‘Cicero’ devises a conversation with a fake character
named ‘Epicurus’ and a fake character named ‘Cicero’. It seems that the point of this exchange is
to remind the reader that ‘Cicero’ is fictional, as is the ‘Epicurus’ he draws into debate.
Translation also obscures Cicero’s own perspective in a few ways. First, it gives Cicero
the opportunity to use the others’ words instead of his own to refute positions. At De finibus ii 48
and 49, for example, Cicero’s translations emphasize the paradigm of sensual pleasure on which
Epicurus allegedly depends. Cicero’s critique borrows legitimacy from Epicurus’ own words
against the Epicureans. In some cases, Epicurus’ words are held against Epicurus himself.
Cicero’s translation of Epicurus’ letter to Hermarchus is one strong example. After a lengthy
translation, Cicero comments ‘I do consider the letter I have just translated virtually word for
word to be highly laudable, even though it is utterly inconsistent with the central tenets of
Epicurus’ thought’ (ii 100). Cicero translates Epicurus in order to use Epicurus’ own words to
undermine Epicurean theory.170
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For a full treatment of Epicurean pleasure in De finibus, see Warren 2016. Concerning the
adequacy of voluptas as a translation for hedone, see Powell 1995.
170
This should remind us of Socratic ad hominem arguments.
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Second, translation makes explicit the dimension of textual meaning and interpretation. It
also raises questions about the legitimacy and even the possibility of translation. De finibus
opens with a defense of Cicero’s ‘putting into Latin themes which philosophers of the highest
talent and most refined learning have dealt with in Greek’ (i 1). Translation is not the only
concern Cicero has, a point he makes explicit at De finibus i 6, but it is central to his project. He
frequently includes brief translations of passages from Greek philosophy, sometimes asking for
verification that the translation is accurate, and sometimes insisting that his translation work is
superlative. The first announced translation Cicero provides asks for validation from Torquatus.
At ii 20-21, Cicero asks Torquatus to
consider carefully…whether I am translating this particular saying
correctly: ‘If those things in which the indulgent find pleasure
freed them from fear of the gods, and from death and pain, and
taught them the limits of desire, then we would have nothing to
reproach them for. They would have their fill of pleasures in every
way, with no element of pain or distress, that is, of evil.’
Torquatus verifies that these are in fact Epicurus’ words, but that Cicero fails to understand their
meaning. Despite being technically accurate, at least the context of Cicero’s translation fails to
capture Epicurus’ meaning. This passage demonstrates one way in which Cicero surpasses Plato,
in that he encourages the reader to see that translation itself contains a problem of expression:
what constitutes an adequate translation? Can a translation ever capture what the original thinker
meant?171
Despite these difficulties, Cicero gives us an idea of what the best translations might be—
they are the ones that are easy to understand. Cato’s translations are always made with
exceptional care. This is clear when he considers the translation for ‘disturbance’ at iii 35:
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The interrelated problems of translation, language, and meaning receive much attention in the
history of philosophy, but I am focusing on Cicero’s purpose here rather than his position.
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emotional disturbances, which make the lives of the unwise a harsh misery (the
Greeks call such disturbances pathe, and I could have literally translated the
word as ‘illnesses’, but it would not suit all cases. One does not usually call pity
or indeed anger an ‘illness’, but the Stoics call each a pathos. So let our term be
‘disturbance’—the very name seems indicative of vice.)
Cato not only gives an adequate translation, but he explains that he has chosen ‘disturbance’ for
pathos because it includes as many cases as possible. Cicero rewards Cato’s efforts, exclaiming
at iii 40 ‘how lucidly your language conveys your exact meaning, Cato’. Piso’s translations are
likewise praised at De finibus v 96 for their ‘aptness of expression and clarity’.
Cicero effectively maintains a central emphasis on translation in his De finibus by
incorporating so many translations and by drawing explicit attention to acts of translation as they
occur. The attention Cicero draws to translation makes it stand out as its own enterprise with its
own aims and challenges. Consequently the concerns of the authorial Cicero and the ‘Cicero’
character can be viewed independently of the translator Cicero. Each represents a different mode
through which Cicero may or may not say what he means, or through which he can mean several
things at once. Any reader that wishes to understand what Cicero himself thinks about any given
concept or question must scour each of these roles and build an interpretation that supports all of
them. Cicero plays with the concept of saying what one means in its own right, and nurtures it as
a philosophical device it at every level of interpretation in De finibus. One cannot say if Cicero
ever says what he means in this dialogue without qualifying which Cicero is being discussed.
Cicero in all three of the modes addressed here permeates every section of De finibus, each with
distinct though related goals. While this would not make sense for a philosopher working to
develop a system of concrete claims, Cicero’s philosophical allegiance to the New Academy
means that he has little use or interest in developing such a system. His philosophy cannot be
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reduced or expressed simply. He relies on all three of the modes, his trifold role in De finibus, to
conduct philosophy at all.

Cicero the obscure
Cicero incorporates himself into De finibus as author, character, and translator. This
provides three different avenues through which Cicero may disclose or withhold his own view.
Cicero’s Academic directive to conceal his own view appears to contradict the emphasis Cicero
places on saying what one believes and being straightforward in philosophy. At the beginning of
book 2, Cicero suggests that his contemporaries have wandered too far from this kind of
transparency and earnestness in discourse because they are not invested in the positions they
advance. He writes:
the practice with other philosophers is that a member of the audience states a
view, and then is silent. This is in fact what currently happens in the Academy.
One who wants to hear the philosopher’s view says perhaps: ‘In my opinion
pleasure is the highest good.’ The philosopher then puts the contrary position in a
continuous discourse. Evidently, then, the one who had declared that such-andsuch was their view did not really hold that opinion but simply wanted to hear the
opposing arguments. Our procedure, though, is a better one. Torquatus stated not
only what he thought, but why he thought it. (ii 2-3)
The better procedure, modeled by Torquatus, is characterized by what I am calling transparency:
the disclosure of detailed opinions actually held by the speaker. Epicurus in some ways occupies
a better position than many of Cicero’s contemporaries and can be a model for philosophy
insofar as he is transparent. Torquatus, the representative of Epicureanism, is similarly imitable
because he truly holds the views he expounds, just as Cato does in book 3 (i 34, 72).
Truth-telling and transparency are used as important ideals over the course of the text.
Epicurus, too, is praised for his transparency. Cicero claims ‘his words express his meaning, and
he writes in a direct way that I can understand’ (i 15). Over the course of Cicero’s refutation in
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book 2, however, Epicurus falls from model transparency to confused opacity such that Cicero
can infer, ‘he cannot, in my view, be saying what he really thinks’ (ii 90). Epicurus’ descent is
grounded in his understanding of pleasure. Cicero translates ‘pleasure’ as voluptas, emphasizing
forms of pleasure that involve the body directly, sensory delight (i 23). Torquatus does not
dispute Cicero’s translation, but he insists Cicero misunderstands Epicurus’ meaning. Epicurus,
he maintains, held the absence of all pain to be ‘not only true pleasure, but the highest pleasure’
(i 38). If Epicurus says what he means when he calls pleasure the highest good, he must admit
that his ethics is absurd. If he concedes that by ‘pleasure’ he really means something other than
the most universal interpretation of the word, then he is not being straightforward.
Cicero’s analysis of pleasure, especially its relationship to virtue, contributes significantly
to his judgment that Epicurus cannot really be saying what he means when he makes pleasure, in
its common and correct usage, the highest end. Cicero suggests that his criticism must already be
obvious to the Epicureans themselves, for they are inconsistent in putting their theory into
practice. They ‘act in ways that make it clear [they] are pursuing not pleasure but duty’ (ii 58).
Pursuing duty over pleasure is ostensibly an abandonment of Epicurean ethics that means, for
Cicero, Epicureans avoid becoming bad people. Epicureans do not generally pursue every
depraved pleasure they can.172 Cicero maintains that this is because their good nature keeps them
from practicing what they approve in theory. Cicero would undoubtedly prefer they recognize
that they have adopted a theory that would destroy their good character if they practiced it
scrupulously. More importantly, the apparent abandonment signifies the difficulties of exercising
the tenets of Epicurean ethics. For example, Cicero alleges that Epicureans find pain ‘unbearable
172

Cicero allows that Epicureans are good people for reasons non-philosophical (including his
friendship with Atticus and former studies with Phaedrus) and philosophical. Friendship is
highly valued in Epicurean theory, for one important philosophical example. For a complete
treatment see Frede 2016.
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when…fixing some punishment for the wicked. But when you require the wise person to have
more goods than evils, it becomes quite tolerable’ (ii 57). From the fact that Epicureans cannot
express their position consistently, Cicero determines they must not be transparent.
Cicero further suggests that lacking transparency indicates the presence of something
shameful. Cicero asks Torquatus to consider ‘how it would look if a man of your name, talent,
and distinction…dare not reveal in a public forum the real object of his actions, plans and
endeavors…his real view about the highest good in life!’ (ii 74).173 Virtue is central in public
circles. Epicureans in general, especially those with ambition for public office, must conceal
what they think. They live in clandestine duplicity, forced to ‘dress up just for show, but the truth
is hidden within’ (ii 77). Cicero makes himself the philosophical foil to the undesirable
Epicurean position, purporting to hold the following view: ‘beliefs are those that are honourable,
praiseworthy and noble, the sort which can be openly expressed before the Senate and the
people, in every assembly and gathering. You should not be unashamed to think what you are
ashamed to say’ (ii 77).
The Epicureans possibly could use deception to hide their real views from nonEpicureans, but more likely they simply fail to see that they do not hold the kind of true beliefs
Cicero describes. This is in some ways a more likely explanation given the lack of clarity in
central concepts and the Epicurean rejection of many conventional forms of critical thinking.174
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Cicero does not elaborate here on the political involvement of Epicureans. One major
problem Cicero has with Epicureanism is its disassociation with political life (see chapter 1). If
Epicureans do not live public lives, they may avoid Cicero’s criticism. In the context of De fin. i
and ii, however, Torquatus holds the praetorship (the second most prestigious position in the
cursus honorum) and is looking forward to becoming consul (the most prestigious position) like
his father (Annas 2001, xv-xvi).
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Epicureans famously accept sense-impressions as true without requiring further criterion of
certainty. Cicero also alleges their rejection of mathematics and logic. Scholarship tends to agree,
Epicureans find intellectual pursuits worthwhile only to the extent that they contribute to the
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Still, if their beliefs were ‘honourable, praiseworthy and noble’, then it is difficult to understand
why the Epicureans market their position in different ways to different groups. There remains at
least an untrained, intuitive sense that inconsistency is undesirable. There is something
unpalatable in their theory that they don’t want the rest of the world to see.175
In addressing Epicurean ethics Cicero emphasizes the importance of saying what one
means. When Epicurus fails to say what he means, the reader has a negative model for the
character of philosophical inquiry; philosophers should directly convey what they mean, unlike
Epicurus and his followers. Cicero’s treatment of the Stoics bears a similar message. The Stoics,
Cicero claims, ‘have a way of arguing that is not so much subtle as obscure’ (iii 3). It is clear that
Stoic theory will face criticism for being unclear, particularly since the lack of clarity is both
unnecessary and unjustifiable. Cicero allows that there are two legitimate reasons philosophers
use unclear language. He explains, ‘there are two circumstances in which this might be
excusable: first, if it is done deliberately, as in the case of Heraclitus… Second, if the difficulty is
caused by the obscurity of the subject-matter itself, as with Plato’s Timaeus’ (ii 15). Cato claims
‘the obscurity is ingrained in the subject-matter’ so that any difficult language the Stoics employ
should be excusable. Cicero remains unconvinced and replies, ‘when the Peripatetics expound
the same doctrines I understand every word’ (iv 2). If Zeno did not firmly establish any
conceptual changes when he broke with his predecessors to found Stoicism, one would expect
there to be some other differences significant enough to warrant the break. Though their ideas
might not be different, for example, perhaps the terms the Stoics invent should still be
pleasure and tranquility of the individual. Most often this can be reduced to the study of nature in
order to understand why ‘death is nothing to us’ (Inwood 2011, 15).
175
Cicero does not require that all of those possessing true beliefs have the same view: ‘We can
leave to the frivolous Greeks the perverse practice of heaping personal abuse on those whose
personal view of the truth differs from their own’ (ii 80). Different approaches to truth seem to
be valuable in philosophical inquiry for Cicero.
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meaningful. They should alter the way that people engage the philosophy and transform
themselves. The new vocabulary should promote a perspective that fundamentally changes how
the same ideas were understood before. At least, this is what Cicero suggests when he says the
new Stoic arguments ‘should change our lives, our plans and our wills, not just our terminology’
(iv 52). In Cicero’s view, the Stoics fail to do this consequently cannot justify their break with
the Old Academy. When they introduce their new terms, they appear not to ‘change our lives’.
They take up the old concepts and make them less clear.
In addition to demeaning Stoic terminology, Cicero also challenges the Stoics’ ability to
disclose their position publicly. For the Stoics, objects typically called ‘evil’, including illness,
enslavement, and the loss of family, property, or life, are not considered evil. Instead, these
things are the counterpoint to ‘preferred’ objects. Just as, given the chance, one should choose
health over illness as a preference, similarly one should, given the chance, reject illness in favor
of health. However promising this view might be in managing one’s fear, it is not a viable public
philosophy for Cicero. He asks us to ‘imagine an orator addressing a public assembly, with
Hannibal at the gates and spear flying over the city walls. Would the orator declare that captivity,
enslavement, death and the loss of one’s homeland are not evils?’ (iv 22). Advancing Stoic ideals
during an emergency does not seem to be in the city’s best interest. The demands of public office
require that the orator or Senator take a stand with regards to the very objects that the Stoic finds
merely ‘preferred’ or ‘rejected’. Like the Epicureans, Stoics cannot fully embrace the tenets of
their system and also respectably hold public office.176 Cicero asks, ‘what sort of philosophy is it
that speaks a common language in public, but its own language in its treatises?’ (iv 22). Cicero
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Unlike the Epicureans, the Stoic reliance on virtue might make their position defensible. In
the image Cicero offers, the Stoic orator could appeal to courage to protect the city and not be
inconsistent with his philosophical identity.
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has forced the audience to consider whether public officials with Stoic values can say what they
really think in public.
Cicero attacks Stoic transparency in two ways. On the one hand, the Stoics have an
abundance of new terms, none of which ‘expresses any ideas’, or at least any new ideas (iv 22).
If the Stoics were transparent, they would only be endorsing one of their predecessors. On the
other hand, the Stoics cannot be forthcoming about their views in public. The Stoics never seem
as poorly equipped as the Epicureans, however. Epicurean failure to be transparent is reflected
by inconsistencies within the theory or between theory and practice. The Stoics, even when they
lack transparency, do not endure the same allegations of inconsistency. When Cicero addresses
Piso and the Antiochians, the cohesion of the Stoic system is contrasted with comparably uneven
Antiochian theory. Even when the public might doubt Stoic claims that great personal loss is not
evil, however outrageous the claims appear, none could find the Stoics inconsistent with
themselves (v 85). Cicero advises Piso, ‘your own system is not like this’ (v 83). He even goes
so far as to call Piso’s account self-contradictory (v 85). What preserves the Stoic system from
the same fate as the Epicurean one is likely Cicero’s marvel at the cohesion of the Stoic system.
The precedent for discussing truth-telling in philosophy had already been established for
Cicero by Plato. Socrates and his interlocutors indicate that they should ‘say what [they] believe’
in several dialogues. The directive for truth-telling has been taken up as a theme in Plato’s
dialogues by some scholars. Gregory Vlastos posits the imperative to ‘say what you believe’ as
one of two requirements that make the Socratic elenchus successful (Vlastos 1994, 7).177 He
argues that truth-telling crucially separates the rigorous and philosophically suitable elenchus
from vicious eristic, by making it possible to test the truth of the question and the sincerity of the
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The other requirement is that the participants refrain from making speeches.
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interlocutors, as well as allowing Socrates to challenge an interlocutor’s way of life (Vlastos
1994, 8-9). One might find Socrates’ efforts to shame his interlocutors dubious, but Vlastos’
interpretation suggests that an emphasis on sincerity, an essential component of the elenchus,
strengthens Socrates’ examination.
Plato is widely accepted as Cicero’s model in practicing philosophy. He is ‘extolled as
Cicero’s idol, as one who set a standard for all future philosophers and as supreme master of
literary excellence’ (Degraff 1940, 147).178 The evidence supporting this view is overwhelming.
Cicero openly praises Plato, and he appeals to Plato’s texts and ideas frequently. Central ideas
and arguments from Plato’s Phaedo, Apology, Republic, Lysis, Crito, Gorgias, and Protagoras
are all present in Cicero’s works (Degraff 1940). Translations of the Gorgias and Menexenus
appear in the Tusculanae Disputationes, and we know Cicero translated Plato’s Protagoras and
Timaeus (Degraff 1940, 145-146).
There are several challenges for Vlastos’ interpretation within Plato’s works. The
Protagoras contains several passages that do not fit the ‘standard elenchus’ Vlastos identifies.
Plato neither consistently has Socrates ask an interlocutor to ‘say what you believe’, nor does he
have Socrates appear to offer his own truly held opinion. On the one hand, Socrates implies the
value of saying what one thinks in the Protagoras. This is clear when he insists that he and
Protagoras be direct with one another. He exclaims ‘It’s not this “if you want” or “if you agree”
business I want to test. It’s you and me I want to put on the line, and I think the argument will be
tested best if we take the “if” out’ (331c5-7). By removing conditional statements, they each
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Degraff highlights passages in Cicero’s Academica, De divinatione, De finibus, De legibus,
De re publica, and Tusculanae Disputationes, among others, to establish Plato as Cicero’s
‘standard for all future philosophers’. As the ‘supreme master of literary excellence’, Degraff
cites De divinatione, De officiis, Tusculanae Disputationes, Brutus, De oratore, and Orator,
among others.
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would be forced to deal with the views of the other directly. Socrates suggests that the use of ‘if’
introduces a distance between one’s beliefs and the position one discloses. That distance
insulates the speaker from the challenges posed by the other, making it less likely that those
challenges could effectively improve false opinions. On the other hand, he tells Protagoras, ‘it
makes no difference to me, provided you give the answers, whether it is your own opinion or not.
I am primarily interested in testing the argument’ (333b6-333c7). Socrates does not criticize
Protagoras for using evasive tactics or lecture him on the importance of saying what one thinks.
He instead announces that it does not matter where they begin so long as Protagoras completes
the argument. Socrates thereby propels the discussion forward for the sake of philosophical
inquiry. Even if Protagoras refuses to say what he means, the argument at hand is worth
scrutinizing. Protagoras helps demonstrate that the truth a complete argument can uncover is
more important than the individual views of the interlocutors.179
At this point, I have shown that Cicero uses the dialogue form to preserve his Academic
priorities and conceal his own position from his readers. Yet it is also clear that Cicero’s
emphasis on truth-telling and transparency appears to contradict those efforts. Cicero appears to
be giving the advice that philosophers should say what they really think, but not acting according
to that advice. In some sense, Cicero’s hypocrisy reflects his shared criticism of the Epicureans
and Stoics, that they cannot be transparent in public. In addition to his suggestions that we be
transparent in philosophy, Cicero sometimes suggests the opposite. The Protagoras demonstrates
the complexity of the idea that we should ‘say what [we] believe’ in philosophy. This kind of
truth-telling may generally be a good idea, but it is easy to imagine circumstances in which
saying what we believe is inappropriate or unproductive. Plato’s treatment is complex, and so is
179

My reading of the Protagoras is consistent with Terence Irwin’s response to Vlastos (see
Irwin 1993 for a more thorough critique of the ‘standard elenchus’).
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Cicero’s. Cicero does not always adhere to this ‘better method’ Torquatus uses. Sometimes
Cicero turns away from this method by shifting his emphasis from transparency to consistency.
At other times, he appears to disregard that method altogether. This is an apparent contradiction
in Cicero’s various postures surrounding truth-telling and transparency. Cicero’s aim for this
confusion, I suggest, is to make it nearly impossible for the reader to interpret whether he says
what he thinks. As a result, Cicero reinstates himself as a model for Academic skepticism.
Cicero sometimes suggests that the interlocutors need not be transparent in De finibus.
The first clear example occurs at De finibus ii 69 after Cicero has given a detailed account from
Cleanthes of Assos describing the relation between pleasure and virtue for the Epicureans:
[Cleanthes] would ask his audience to imagine a painting of Pleasure, decked out
in gorgeous regal attire, sitting on a throne. By her side are the Virtues, depicted
as servants who consider their whole duty and function is to minister to Pleasure
and whisper her warnings (if this can be conveyed pictorially) to take care not to
do anything unwittingly which might offend public opinion, or bring her pain in
any way. ‘We Virtues’, they cry, ‘were born to serve you. We have no other
business.’
Pleasure is given every privilege and luxury in this image, though her dazzling appearance does
not indicate any strength of character. Virtue, etymologically and culturally understood to be
one’s strength, is recast as a group of sycophants in slavish service. The image is meant to be
shocking and perverse. Cicero uses this description to illustrate his point that Epicurus’ theory, if
taken at its word, inverts traditional values and debases virtue.
Cicero anticipates Torquatus’ response at ii 70: ‘you will reply—and this is your strong
point—that Epicurus denies that one can live pleasantly unless one lives morally. As if I care
what he affirms or denies! My question is rather this: what can someone who treats the supreme
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good as pleasure affirm consistently?’180 Epicurus’ best defense is that he was a good person
who maintained that there was still a role for virtue in his ethics, despite making pleasure the
summum bonum. Yet Epicurus cannot consistently say that virtue matters while also subverting it
to pleasure. Failures in transparency can be detected through inconsistencies between words and
deeds. Inconsistency in words alone is equally undesirable, but contrary to expectation, Cicero
casts the imperative aside. He claims not to care what Epicurus says at all. Cicero shifts his
emphasis from transparency in philosophy to consistency. Because Epicurus cannot be
consistent, we cannot rely on his own views, but only what follows rationally.
In De finibus v, the challenge to the imperative involves replacing transparency with
consistency and, more starkly, Cicero’s refusal to disclose his own opinion. Both emerge from a
when Piso asks Cicero to judge in the case of Quintus Metellus, explaining that
He saw his three sons become consuls, and one of those was a censor too and
celebrated a triumph; a fourth son was praetor; he died leaving all four safe and
well; his three daughters were married; and he himself had served as consul,
censor and augur, and had celebrated his own triumph. Assuming that he was
wise, surely he was happier than Regulus, who died in enemy hands of sleep
deprivation and starvation, even if Regulus was also wise? (v 82)
Piso defends the idea that being virtuous (i.e., being wise) is sufficient for a happy life, but
insufficient for the happiest life. Both men being wise, it is ridiculous for him to suppose that
Metellus and Regulus are equally happy. The Stoics, however, insist that virtue is sufficient for
happiness, so the virtuous or wise person is happy regardless of his circumstances. Thus Cicero
tells Piso that the question would best be directed to the Stoics themselves (v 82). In effect, he
refuses to pass judgment and give his own opinion. Piso is not deterred, however, and asks
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At negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est) quemquam qui honeste non vivat iucunde
posse vivere. Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget; illud quaero, quid ei qui in voluptate
summum bonum ponat consentaneum sit dicere.
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Cicero to start the conversation over from the Stoic perspective. Cicero insists ‘we are wandering
off the point’ and demands that we figure out what the commitments of each party are. Again, he
blatantly refuses to answer the question and is returning to designations of what is consistent.
Piso, dedicated philosopher that he is, keeps trying to get some commitment out of Cicero and
asks ‘are you in agreement with Theophrastus’ great work On Happiness?’ (v 85). Cicero again
avoids the question, repeating his observation that they ‘are wandering from the point’ (v 85).
The central focus of Cicero’s evaluation is consistency rather than transparency. It
appears to turn the criterion of good philosophy away from transparency and toward mere
consistency. Cicero makes Stoicism the more cohesive counterpart against Antiochus. By
comparison the Stoics make obvious Piso’s own lack of consistency and cohesiveness. Piso, by
making external goods necessary for the happiest life must also accept that poverty, for example,
is an evil so that ‘no beggar can be happy, however wise’ (v 84). Cicero compares the Old
Academy with the Stoics and claims that many might reject Stoicism because it is hard to
understand how anyone ‘would be happy even when inside the bull of Phalaris’, but they cannot
be accused of inconsistency (v 84). Piso, on the other hand, would be accused of inconsistency as
well as the unlikelihood of a wise person being happy in the bull of Phalaris on account of his
wisdom.
Two modes of evasion are used. First, Cicero shifts from transparency to consistency.
Second, he refuses to disclose his own position; he ostensibly removes his views from the
conversation. This facilitates a kind of objectivity that might otherwise be lost while fully
adhering to the imperative to say what one thinks. In effect this may very well demonstrate the
extent to which saying what one thinks can be put to use in philosophy. When Cicero checks the
conversation to keep it from ‘wandering’, he emphasizes that the quality of the debate remains
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important, even though definite claims cannot be made about his own position. It might be best
to be able to identify, at least, what one’s deepest allegiances are, and to speak directly about
those views, but Cicero also leaves open the possibility for philosophy that does not depend on
the expression only of what one thinks. Indeed, his own Academic affiliation encourages him not
to express what he thinks when he is teaching others.181
Cicero’s rejection of the transparency he praised at the beginning of De finibus ii is not a
contradiction. Not only does Cicero have defensible reasons for developing this tension, but he
also has a clear precedent in Greek philosophy. Socrates similarly advances and overturns the
requirement that his interlocutors ‘say what [they] believe’. The context-sensitive approach to
transparency in Protagoras and in De finibus is sensible. It allows for individuals to adopt
different positions as needed, and it makes it possible for the philosopher both to care about
earnest conversation and also keep his own position out of view as needed. This is how Cicero
can lead the readers through a serious discussion about ethics while also remaining free from
commitment to philosophical doctrines.
Many commentators seek to uncover Cicero’s own position in De finibus. The standard
interpretation has Cicero endorse the position of the Old Academy.182 The less conventional
interpretation maintains that Cicero is too radical a skeptic to endorse the Old Academy. 183 The
precise position that Cicero holds in De finibus should be a secondary concern. Academic
181

He does give a kind of provisional acceptance of Theophrastus, but the position is never
confirmed and never denied (v 85).
182
See n. 88.
183
Brittain 2016 is an excellent work arguing in favor of Cicero’s radical skeptical methods in
De finibus, but he emphasizes first that Cicero’s apparent endorsements of the Antiochian
position are superficial and then argues that Cicero suspends judgment between the Stoic and
Antiochian position. This suspension of judgment, he maintains, parallels Cicero’s suspension of
judgment in Academica. The more standard interpretation of De finibus, however, is that he
adopts a mitigated skeptical position along the lines of Antiochus (see Schofield 2008 and
Ioppolo 2016 for two examples).
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skeptics (Old or New) argue for the unimpeded critical evaluation of every idea, and the word of
an authority figure might impede one’s ability to critically assess an idea (Griffin 1997, 10-12).
More important than Cicero’s own view in the text is the readers’ ability to practice philosophy
well. This requires a good teacher that refuses to allow students to accept any idea on the basis of
authority rather than rational assessment of its plausibility.
In conclusion, Cicero considers himself to be that teacher. He uses the dialogue ‘as a
means of avoiding commitment and authority’, just as Plato does (Press 2012, 267). Cicero and
Plato engage with the philosophical use of transparency and obscurity in similar ways. Unlike
Plato, Cicero hides his own position by making his personae visible. Cicero as author, character,
and translator complement the discussions throughout the text concerning the value of
transparency in philosophy. Together they challenge readers to scrutinize the arguments
presented in a new way. The readers should question the positions of each school, and the
connection between the ideas of those schools and the actions of their practitioners. They should
only accept that which has the most rational support. That is, casting doubt on transparency
allows for at least the most talented readers to begin engaging in Cicero’s Academic
philosophical practice. Dialogue is a suitable philosophical medium for a number of reasons. In
the case of De finibus, the dialogue form challenges the audience to reconsider what it might
mean for any of the characters to say what they think in philosophical debate. This is all the more
true in the case of the Cicero character that need not represent the views of the author Cicero.
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CONCLUSION
Each chapter of this dissertation offers some insight concerning Cicero’s aims for the De
finibus. I show that Cicero develops flat, useful readings of the dominant positions without
rejecting eudaimonism itself, that he offers his own alternative to the cradle argument on which
the dominant positions rely, that he uses truth-disclosive terminology to suggest the relative
strength of different positions, and that he obscures his own position, if he has one, in several
ways over the course of the text. These features serve the two primary, interdependent aims I
find in Cicero’s project: the critical assessment of the dominant ethical positions, and the
education of his readers.
In the first chapter, I argue that Cicero uses the De finibus to instruct his Roman readers
how to distinguish better and worse philosophical positions. This requires that he present the
Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians as examples of how not to do philosophy. Cicero’s
assessment of the other Hellenistic schools has often been criticized for being inaccurate, but
such criticisms overlook that Cicero’s assessments are carefully conducted in service of his
pedagogical aim. That is, Cicero’s treatment of the other schools highlights some key qualities
that philosophers should manifest. Philosophers should be competent, avoid unnecessary jargon,
honor the good work of their predecessors, and develop strong philosophical arguments that
complement political engagement. Cicero rejects each of the schools for its failure to express one
or more of these qualities. The Stoics and Epicureans especially become models of irresponsible
philosophers in contrast to Cicero’s own project, which demonstrates a good way to do
philosophy through Academic skepticism. The result of Cicero’s process is a sophisticated
philosophical position that promotes eudaimonism, because it takes virtue seriously in a way that
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can support political activity, yet rejects the current eudaimonistic theories because they fail to
meet Cicero’s philosophical or political requirements for Roman philosophy.
In the second chapter, I show that Cicero suggests at least one positive position in De
finibus when he arranges the text to enact dramatically an alternative to the ‘cradle argument’
ubiquitous in Hellenistic philosophy. Cicero rejects the cradle arguments as presented by each
Hellenistic school, especially the Epicureans and Stoics, because they seek the summum bonum
of rational adults in the behaviors and inclinations of pre-rational infants. Instead of appealing to
infancy, Cicero suggests the origin of ethically relevant ends are better sought during an
intellectually mature engagement with philosophy. The reverse chronology of De finibus allows
Cicero to appeal to such a time in his youthful philosophical studies, within the context of the
philosophically and rhetorically most impressive dialogue of the text.
Thus the results of Cicero’s critical assessments have both a negative outcome, rejecting
the dominant positions, and a positive outcome, suggesting alternative positions. These positive
contributions are subtle but, depending on the aptitude and training of the readers, powerful.
Cicero additionally uses his authorial choices in De finibus to serve both the aims of critical
assessment and instruction. In the third chapter, I argue that Cicero uses his position in De
finibus as author to select and employ terminology carefully. In this text, Cicero employs
terminology to express the clarity of evidence and conclusions carefully both with respect to the
terms he chooses and the ways in which he uses them. Cicero generally uses clarus and illustris,
for example, to refer to strong moral examples, i.e., examples of virtuous or otherwise admirable
behavior, but other truth-disclosive terms to refer to strong philosophical examples. Plane
generally indicates a position worth consideration. Apertus and perspicuus indicate value based
on their context. Perspicuus is used in books 3 and 4 because perspicua are the starting point for
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Stoic ethics, but it remains important in book 5. This suggests perspicuus, and thus the Stoic
position, remains worth consideration even after Cicero criticizes it in book 5. I argue that Cicero
uses these truth-disclosive terms to (1) challenge any presuppositions Cicero’s readers might
have either about his personal position, or about the directness with which ideas should be
presented in philosophy, and (2) lead the most astute readers to consider the relative strength of
some positions against others, namely, that the Antiochian position is the strongest candidate and
the Stoic position remains influential.
The final chapter extends this discussion of Cicero’s role as an author to include the other
roles he creates for himself in De finibus. Cicero chooses to include himself in the text in three
distinct roles, effectively obscuring his position from the readers, in order to guide his readers
into making their own philosophical judgments. Cicero calls attention to his presence in the text
as an author, translator, and character. In his narrations and introductions, Cicero expresses the
persona of author. The authorial persona alone is concerned with communicating with Brutus
and justifying his work. This generates distance between Cicero and his audience by introducing
three different recipients of the philosophical debate contained in the text: the interlocutors,
Brutus, and whatever other readers take up the work. As translator, Cicero calls attention to the
language used in the text. He claims to be engaged in translation as a part of his project, and he
praises Cato’s translation of important Stoic terms. Unlike the authorial Cicero, the translator is
not concerned with obscuring Cicero’s own position. The translator Cicero does, however, force
his readers to recognize his complex concerns. Finally, in his role as the character ‘Cicero’, he
forcefully obscures his own position. In the first place, Cicero’s own position may be consistent
or inconsistent with ‘Cicero’ on each major point of argument. Additionally, ‘Cicero’ engages in
imaginary conversations within the dialogues, further distancing Cicero from the text. The triple
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roles prevent the readers from attributing any position to Cicero himself in order that they engage
with and evaluate the philosophical positions themselves and without concern for the authority
that Cicero’s personal endorsement of any position would carry.
Through each of these four areas, Cicero directs De finibus both at the interlocutors and
at the readers. The demonstrations that Cicero uses at the level of the interlocutors, however,
serve the interest of the readers’ philosophical education. Cicero seeks to show his readers the
general improvement of philosophizing over the course of the text, and the circumstances under
which that philosophy takes place. The relative successes and failures of philosophical positions
in the dialogue instruct the readers about the general terrain of ethical discourse. In learning
about ethics, the readers are ideally thinking more critically about the principles on which they
guide their lives and become better people. As better people, they might also become the
virtuous citizens who could steady Roman politics again. Cicero is in some sense concerned with
the impact of De finibus on the political future of Rome even when he deals with the minutiae,
down to the knuckle bone, of Hellenistic ethics.184
The best philosophical practices to help restore order to Roman politics and save the
republic from tyranny belong to the Academics. Cicero demonstrates several features of
Academic skepticism in De finibus. Cicero refrains from having his character set forward any
positive position, focusing instead on the comprehensive criticism and dismissal of every other
position. This feature is centrally concerned with the Socratic aim of ‘relieving others of falsely
believing what they don’t’ (Thorsrud 2018, 51). In addition, he sometimes offers some
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De finibus could also be considered a protreptic for philosophizing. The choice to be
sufficiently critically engaged to practice philosophy is an ethical one. Because ethics is
fundamentally eudaimonistic for Cicero, the clarification of appropriate eudaimonistic thinking
necessarily supports philosophy. This could be a crucial protreptic toward philosophy for
Cicero’s Roman audience.
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alternative positions that might be stronger than what is currently available, as in his dramatic
enactment of the appropriate appeal to origins as an alternative to the cradle argument. This
demonstrates that in his critical assessment and some creative presentation Cicero suggests ‘the
most probable solutions to the problems discussed’ while also ‘concealing his own opinion so as
not to interfere with the autonomy of the participants’, which applies to the interlocutors as much
as the readers (Thorsrud 2018, 51). Yet even the best available answer in De finibus, the
Antiochian position, is unsatisfactory. It is therefore likely that the best practice in philosophy is
to engage in classical skepticism and either extend provisional acceptance of the position that has
the most rational support via Carneadean probabilism, or suspend judgment where no view is
better supported than the others.
The appropriate adoption of Academic practices among the interlocutors is reflected only
in ‘Cicero’. In the case of De finibus, it seems that the best ethical ideas are grounded in
eudaimonism, but the existing eudaemonist approaches of the Stoics, Epicureans, and
Antiochians are all problematic for different reasons. If the interlocutors were good philosophers,
they would all be turned away from their positions and toward further inquiry or more careful
discernment with respect to the strongest and weakest component parts of their theories. Yet
Torquatus, Cato, Piso, and the minor characters of book 5 all fail to do this. At the end of the first
dialogue, Torquatus attempts to pass ‘Cicero’ off to an Epicurean better suited to defend
Epicurean ethics against Cicero’s criticisms. Though he claims he could reply to Cicero’s
criticisms, he would prefer to ‘leave it to more experienced philosophers’ (ii 119). At the
conclusion of the second dialogue, Cato is similarly unmoved by the criticisms of ‘Cicero’. Both
Cato and ‘Cicero’ express an interest in continuing the conversation together another time, but
Cato insists that ‘Cicero’ remember the conversation thus: ‘you really accept all of our opinions
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save for our terminology, [while] I on the contrary do not accept any of the tenets of your school’
(iv 80). Cato thinks that his own position remains untarnished by ‘Cicero’, and furthermore that
the position of ‘Cicero’ is somehow weaker than Cato’s because of his provisional acceptance of
the what seems plausible. The conclusion of the third dialogue indicates that ‘Cicero’ is the only
interlocutor who is not convinced by Piso’s position and exposition. Lucius, whose education as
at stake, is ‘completely won over’ without even waiting for the rebuttal from ‘Cicero’ (v 76).
Quintus, a minor character in book 5, asserts that Piso’s position is ‘already quite secure’ against
‘Cicero’s’ insistence that Piso must strengthen his position (v 96). Piso remains unchanged in his
position.
The interlocutors are unable to understand the full force and sophistication of the
Academic school and its methods. ‘Cicero’ cannot get the interlocutors to accept the major errors
of their theories that he exploits. This indicates the necessity for an esoteric and exoteric
position. For those who are unable or unwilling to see the strength of the Academic position
against the others, there must be some position in De finibus that would help them become better
people and citizens. The Antiochian position is best suited for these readers. For those who are
able and willing, however, there is a better way of practicing philosophy. Cicero’s Academic
practice is only discernible for his readers, not for his interlocutors. There is some suggestion,
then, that the readers should make better progress in philosophy than the interlocutors made. The
subtlety of Cicero’s writing, however, makes it so that only the most careful readers who are
most capable of practicing Academic skepticism well would be able to discern the Academic
features operating in the text. Thus Academic skepticism becomes an esoteric position that is
only available to those who can use it appropriately. In effect, the real participants in De finibius
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are the readers, and the strongest participants should take Cicero’s way of doing philosophy as a
main lesson of the text.
Additionally, by presenting interlocutors unconvinced even when they seem to be
refuted, Cicero follows Plato’s example of often having Socrates’ interlocutors unconvinced or
unmoved. A likely purpose of this sort of display is to show that the intellectualist understanding
of the formation of patterns of opinion and thought is questionable. People maintain their
opinions due to their interests and desires as much as their intellectual perspicacity and honesty.
Cicero, similarly to Plato, shows unconvinced interlocutors in order to challenge the readers to
be better interlocutors and philosophers than the participants in the depicted dialogue.
In order to appreciate Cicero’s De finibus, then, it is necessary to appreciate both the
contents of the explicit arguments contained in the text as well as the dramatic context of those
arguments. Like the excavationists, good readers of De finibus should evaluate the arguments for
strength, detail, and accuracy. Yet they should also borrow from the contextualists and interpret
how those arguments appear within the context of the De finibus overall. This allows good
readers of De finibus to avoid attributing Cicero’s misrepresentations of the Epicureans, Stoics,
and Antiochians, to careless error. Given the context of the entire work, it is evident that these
misrepresentations are purposeful. They are useful, flat readings of existing philosophical
schools that can be helpful in teaching philosophical novices about the worst positions in order
that they might be able to recognize and generate better alternatives for themselves. We must,
then, gain better appreciation of Cicero’s strength as a philosophical writer of contrived
dialogues having many features in common with Plato’s dialogues.
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